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"'Until We Fall to the Ground United': Cherokee Resilience and Interfactional 
Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century," chronicles the political history of the 
Cherokee tribal government from 1906 to 1950. After the 1898 Curtis Act eventually 
abolished the recognition of the Cherokee and other tribal governments in 1906, the 
Cherokees put aside the nearly one hundred years of sometimes violent factionalism to 
retain their autonomy. Coming together under the Keetoowah, the tribe reorganized under 
a new constitution and charter according to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act passed in 
June 1936. 
Before the twentieth century, tribal factionalism enabled the US to interfere in tribal 
affairs beyond enforcing its Indian polices. Beginning with removal to the West, the US 
signed the Treaty of New Echota with the party most favorable to the officials' goals. 
After the Trail of Tears in the 1830s, violent retribution for removal and a dispute on the 
official government of the tribe led to the US intervention and Treaty of 1846. Opposing 
sides were chosen again in the American Civil War, causing a harsh Treaty of 1866 that 
damped self-determination even further. Disagreement occurred after the Dawes Act and 
allotment was forced on all in the tribe.  
However, with the Curtis Act and dissolution of tribal government in 1906, those divided 
were able to work together peacefully because they had few other options. The tribe  
found itself without a way to govern themselves and submit claims and complaints to the 
US. The splintered factions united in the 1920s and along with the terms of the Oklahoma 
Indian Welfare Act served as a successful, single, federally-recognized, authoritative 
tribal body: Keetoowah Incorporated, followed by the United Keetoowah Band. This 
coalition continued, albeit with some conflict, until the 1970s and the rewriting of the 
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 In 1898, the United States government passed the Curtis Act, declaring that it would no 
longer recognize tribal governments in Indian Territory after the completion of land allotment in 
March 1906. As a result, in the early twentieth century, the Cherokees and other tribes lost their right 
to self govern. However, despite the sometimes violent intratribal factionalism that ran rampant for 
nearly one hundred years, the fractionated tribe eventually worked together to reorganize and retain 
their sovereignty through a charter under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936.
1
 Without this 
intratribal cooperation, the Cherokee would not have regained US recognition and their sovereignty to 
provide for their citizens until the tribal revitalization in 1970. 
 This work contributes to native political history, as well as general US history, by chronicling 
not only the outside US American Indian policies and what they meant for the Cherokee but also how 
the people reacted among themselves to this external pressure. "Until We Fall to the Ground United" 
provides the other side of the story and is similar to the works of William G. McLoughlin and 
Andrew Denison; American Indians, and specifically the Cherokee as this work's focus, opposed the 
federal government, organized, and fought amongst themselves regarding the best actions for the 
survival and happiness of their people. Some believed this would be achieved through assimilation 
into white mainstream society while others believed a return to traditional tribal ways proved a better 
                                                          
1
 A constitution and corporate charter of the Cherokees was approved and ratified on October 3, 1950. The 
Congressional act that approved the Cherokees organizing under a charter occurred in 1942 and US federal 
recognition was extended to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians of Oklahoma in 1949. 
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option. Regardless of these ideological differences, Cherokee leadership in the early twentieth century 
proved resilient and put aside those arguments to work together for the future of their people. 
 Chapter Two provides a historiography including the shift of depicting American Indians as 
passive observers to active participants, as well as the vast amount of monographs that depict US 
Indian policies concurrent to the relevant era of this work. These remain vital to understanding the 
outside pressures the tribes encountered. Works by historians such as Angie Debo, William 
McLoughlin, and Andrew Denson chronicle the negative effects of US Indian policies while authors 
like Francis Paul Prucha and Frederick Hoxie study the policies themselves, as well as the negative 
effects of such policies on Native Americans.   
 However, scant historiography exists for the Cherokees specifically in the time period from 
1906 to the 1930s, even from the tribe itself. When the federal government no longer officially 
recognized the tribal government, official records of the National Council and chiefs were no longer 
kept. Therefore, reliable sources are extremely difficult to find for the era in comparison to earlier 
times. This work relies heavily on local newspapers, as the official paper of the Cherokees also 
disbanded. When a person wanted to distribute news to the rest of the tribe, they would submit a letter 
or announcement to a local paper for publishing. A few letters exist from the Keetoowah faction but 
otherwise, newspapers remain the only voice of the natives. Today, oral histories and tribal accounts 
of that era have been digitized and published on tribal websites and blogs. However, a historian must 
remain objective and scrutinize these stories heavily as the same factionalism erupted in the 1970s 
and continues today, with each side weighing the scales in their favor. For example, the website of the 
United Keetoowah Band provides a detailed history of its origins as a religious society and its rise as 
a political entity, along with the concurrent Cherokee Nation government. On the other hand, the 
Cherokee Nation's account of its history does not include the Keetoowahs even once, skipping the 
years 1906-70 when the rival faction served as the only existing Cherokee government.  
3 
 
 Another tempestuous aspect of American Indian history is the discussion of race, ethnicity, 
and blood quantum. An analysis of intratribal relations and politics and their effect on sovereignty 
within the United States cannot be separated from a discussion of race and ethnic identity, especially 
within the Cherokee who took pride in their heritage and defined their ideological factions by it. This 
study includes these aspects of race, ethnicity, and blood quantum as needed but not as extensively as 
other historians such as Circe Sturm and Erik Zissu. Sturm and Zissu have already written extensively 
on the topic, as is outlined in the second chapter.
2
 Race is mentioned by tribal members when 
discussing factions, such as "full blood" to mean Traditionals and "mixed blood" as Progressives. 
These are generalizations and not completely accurate. Traditional leader John Ross, for example, 
was only one-eighth Cherokee. Both factions used ancestry as a form of insult, the "mixed bloods" 
often referred to as "blood traitors" and corrupt while the "full bloods" were seen as child-like and 
backwards. Progressives, even though they tended to live within white society, often still practiced 
their native religion. David Rich Lewis and William Wash in "Reservation Leadership and the 
Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy" also point out the contradictions and simplification that result 
from utilizing Progressive versus Traditional language. Lewis and Wash do not provide an alternative 
to these terms and neither does this work. Research from within the tribe solely relies on these terms 
to define their factions and this work adheres to how the tribes define themselves.
3
 
  In addition to the tribe's own definitions of identity, the US government utilized the degree 
of blood quantum to measure restrictions and rights they granted indigenous people as they saw those 
without white ancestry as less "civilized." When the factions united in the 1910s, Redbird Smith 
sought to bring together all Cherokee, regardless of blood quantum, as everyone was "Indian." Since 
                                                          
2
 Circe Sturm, Blood Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 2002); Erik Zissu, Blood Matters: Five Civilized Tribes and the Search of 
Unity in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge Publishing Company, 2016).  
3
 David Rich Lewis and William Wash, "Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: 
William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928," Ethnohistory 38 (Spring 1991): 124-48. 
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the focus of this dissertation is solely political and legal in nature, discussion of blood quantum and 
racial identity is limited only to when it is mentioned within legislation or treaties. 
 Similarly, several versions of "American Indian" are utilized. In this dissertation, to avoid 
close word repetition, I utilize native, American Indian, Native American, Indian, and indigenous. 
The term "Indian" remains very offensive to First Nations peoples of Canada. However, in this work, 
the these terms refers to the peoples indigenous to the current political borders of the United States, 
who are referred to as each of these terms within legal and personal documents, as well as in relation 
to one another. No offense is meant through the use of these terms.  
 "Until We Fall to the Ground United" chronicles the history of the Cherokee Nation and its 
politics during this tumultuous era in its history with the end of federal recognition of tribal 
sovereignty.
4
 In the early twentieth century, the tribe struggled to continue self governance after the 
Curtis Act ended federal recognition. The Keetoowah organized under a corporate charter in 1905 to 
continue in a limited, more business oriented capacity. Realizing the need for cohesiveness to achieve 
any positive results for their people, the factions came together to organize under the Oklahoma 
Indian Welfare Act (OIWA), passed in June 1936. After years of a complicated application process 
involving working with less than knowledgeable US officials, the Keetoowah gained a charter under 
the OIWA to function as the recognized Cherokee tribal government, and the US approved their new 
charter and new constitution in 1950.  
 To better understand the importance and difficulty of such an alliance of factions, one must 
know the long history of factionalism and its consequences as well as concurrent US Indian policies. 
This work continues with chapter three providing the historical context of US Indian policy and the 
Cherokee's tribal government, beginning in 1828 with the creation of a centralized republican tribal 
government. At the time, the US believed the best way to handle "the Indian problem" would be to 
                                                          
4
 Keetoowah Society Laws, April 29, 1859, The Original Keetoowah Society, 
http://keetoowahsociety.org/laws.htm (accessed December 1, 2017).  
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move them all west, away from Anglo American society. However, the Cherokees and others did not 
wish to leave their ancestral homelands. As a result of these pressures, the clearly delineated factions 
that can be traced to today. After the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, Cherokee Chief 
John Ross and a delegation of elected officials traveled to Washington DC attempting to prevent the 
loss of their homelands. An opposing faction of assimilationists, without any authority from the 
Cherokee people and known as the Treaty Party, signed an agreement with the US that resulted in the 
Trail of Tears.  
 After removal, conflict erupted over which faction would serve as the government of the tribe 
as well as revenge against those who signed the removal treaty. After arriving in Indian Territory, 
some of those who followed Ross asserted a traditional tribal law and assassinated the leaders of the 
Treaty Party for giving up their land without authorization from the people. This began violent 
guerilla fighting between both groups throughout the 1840s until the intervention of the US 
government led to a peace agreement between Ross and Treaty Party leader Stand Watie. This incited 
a cycle of factionalism over the best choices for the tribe resulting in the intervention of the US, 
which caused a further erosion of self-determination through another treaty. 
  After an era called the golden age of the Cherokee Republic, the nation once again suffered 
from violent factionalism, as the US did, during the American Civil War. Ross wished to remain 
neutral while Watie allied himself with the Confederates. To keep the nation together, Ross 
eventually allied with the Confederacy, but most of his followers joined the Union cause. Once again 
the Cherokees fought each other until the peace treaty forced upon them by the US government in 
1866. The harsh Treaty of 1866 and the end of legal jurisdiction marked a lessening of Cherokee 
sovereignty.  
 After the American Civil War and during Reconstruction, the Cherokee Nation pulled itself 
back together to rebuild, a difficult feat since much of the nation had been burned. In the late 
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nineteenth century, the United States sought to assimilate American Indians into Anglo-American 
society. The federal government placed native children in boarding schools to teach them English and 
white culture while also attempting to eradicate their languages. Concurrently, the US also sought to 
turn formerly nomadic people into sedentary, individual, agricultural farmers. To do so, the US ended 
native traditional communal ownership with the General Allotment Act in 1887, which applied to all 
tribes except the Five Tribes. In 1893, the federal government created the Dawes Commission to 
apply the policy to those exempt, including the Cherokee. 
 However, with the creation of the Dawes Commission and allotment, many of the same 
fissures dating back to the 1830s reemerged. While factionalism did not always follow blood 
quantum, most of the time "full bloods,"
5
 or Traditionals, opposed the ending of communal land 
holding while "mixed bloods," or Progressives, favored assimilation. Despite different political 
maneuvering, in the beginning the Cherokee government maintained a stance against negotiating, 
with one official stating that if allotment occurred, the people would become like the Anglo American 
poor who did “not own a foot of the earth’s surface in which they could be buried.”
6
 
 Generally, Traditionals opposed allotment because they did not believe in private land 
ownership. They believed that the US wanted to destroy the Cherokee as a self-governed nation, 
along with their culture and eventually the people themselves. At the same time, most Progressives, 
and many tribal officials, embraced allotment and assimilation. Many of these people had 
intermarried with whites and already established large farms, industries, business, and maintained 
commercial interests. With mixed bloods making up most of the wealthy elite of the tribe, the social 
                                                          
5
 A term utilized by the tribe, not the author's description. 
6
 The term “full blood” is used not only in reference to blood quantum but also those who believed in living 
according to old Cherokee ways. They are also called traditionalists, which also included some of mixed 
ancestry. The term “mixed blood” refers to those living as Anglo Americans and favoring complete 
assimilation. Andrew Denson, Demanding the Cherokee Nation: Indian Autonomy and American Culture, 
1830-1900 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 226; Rolison, “The Cherokee Nation from Indian 
Territory to Statehood,” 65, 76; Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 196; Alexandra Harmon, “American Indians and 
Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age,” The Journal of Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age 90 (June 2003), 126; 
Kent Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five Civilized Tribes (Orem: Ancestry 
Incorporation, 1999), 10, 17. 
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differences intensified with allotment as the traditionalists lived in poverty. While these same 
divisions occurred with removal from ancestral lands in the east in the 1830s, throughout resettlement 
in the 1840s, and during the Civil War, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the 
splitting of the factions themselves.
7
 
 While preparing to enforce allotment, the US passed legislation that eroded sovereignty. The 
US abolished treaty rights, enabling Congress to rule whatever it deemed best. On May 1, 1871, the 
Supreme Court decided in the Cherokee Tobacco Case that “an act of Congress may supersede a prior 
treaty.”
8
 The US also weakened the role of tribal governments by extending its criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian Territory with the 1885 Major Crimes Act. In 1889, a federal court opened in the area, 
eroding tribal control over its own people. In 1898, the Curtis Act officially ended federal recognition 
of tribal sovereignty for the Five Civilized Tribes. The act terminated their tribal governments and 
instituted a civil administration for the territory, officially requiring Indians to submit to allotment, 
which paved the way for statehood. Any legislation passed after 1898 required the approval of the US 
president. The act allowed the tribal governments to continue in a limited form until the process of 
allotment finished in 1906.
9
 
                                                          
7
 Harmon, “American Indians and Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age,” 113, 117, 125; Denson, Demanding 
the Cherokee Nation, 186, 214, 230, 216; Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 196, 198; Katherine Mae Rolison, 
“The Cherokee Nation from Indian Territory to Statehood and the Impact of Allotment: One Family's Story," 
(Ph.D. diss., Arizona State University, 2004), 48, 65, 100-01; Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment 
of the Five Civilized Tribes, 1, 7, 10. 
8
 Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 US 616 (US Supreme Court, 1870); William G. McLoughlin, After the Trail of 
Tears: The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1993), 267. 
9
 Lawrence C. Kelley, Federal Indian Policy (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1990), 72; US Congress, 
The Major Crimes Act. United States Attorney’s Manual (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1997); 
Rolison, “The Cherokee Nation From Indian Territory to Statehood," 68; “Treaty with the Cherokees, 1866. 
July 19, 1866,” In Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vol. II Treaties, edited by Charles J. Kappler 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904) [hereafter cited as Kappler]; Thomas J. Morgan, 




 sess. House Executive Document 1, pt. 5, Vol II, Serial 725. 
Washington, DC, pg. 3-4; McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees' Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-
80, 376; Harmon, “American Indians and Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age,” 107; Conley, The Cherokee 
Nation A History, 196-7; Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five Civilized Tribes, 1893-
1914, 23, 33-4, 36, 38; Rolison, “The Cherokee Nation from Indian Territory to Statehood,” 80; US Congress. 




 sess., 1898.  
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 At this time, the Traditionals refused to negotiate with the Dawes Commission. After the 
Curtis Act, the Dawes Commission received the authority to enroll all citizens and punish anyone 
hindering their work. The Cherokees attempted to fight the act in court because it violated treaties, 
but as Congress had ended the treaty making process, many became resigned believing they had no 
other choice but to negotiate. Despite the act, the Cherokees held an election for principal chief in 
1899. Wolf Coon ran under the National Party, which had historically represented full bloods, and 
Thomas Buffington represented the Downing Party, which had previously worked for reunification 
after the American Civil War. Buffington won by a majority of about four hundred votes.
10
 During his 
term from 1899 to 1903, Buffington oversaw the final arrangements of allotment and dissolution of 
tribal government, appointing the seven delegates to meet with the Dawes Commission. As a 
supporter of the assimilation policy, he spent most of his time attempting to reconcile his people to 
acceptance of their new status as many full bloods rebelled.
11
 
 After the Curtis Act, the US needed to complete the process of allotment and extended the 
Cherokee government until March 6, 1906. Chapter four chronicles the ending of the tribal 
government and the factional conflicts that continued until the end. William C. Rogers served as chief 
and labored to finish the allotment process, accepting it as inevitable. He refused to call the last 
meeting of the National Council or for a final election because the nation would soon be defunct. 
However, this angered many Keetoowahs, who met and elected Frank J. Boudinot as chief. The US 
never recognized Boudinot and continued to work with Rogers as if nothing had ever happened. 
Many Traditionals retreated to their lands and ceased to make contact with the outside world. 
                                                          
10
 The sources do not reveal the total amount of votes cast. 
11
 Cherokee National Council, “An Act Providing for the Appointment of a Commission to Negotiate with the 
US Commission,” December 2, 1898, Box 3, Cherokee Nation Correspondence December 1897 to December 
1898, Dawes Commission Records, Indian Archives, Research and Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical 
Society, Oklahoma History Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma [hereafter cited as DC]; US Congress. The 




 sess., 1898; John Bartlett Meserve, “Chief Thomas Mitchell 
Buffington and Chief William Rogers,” The Chronicles of Oklahoma 17 (June 1939): 135-46;  
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 After 1906, with allotment unfinished and a figurehead needed to sign deeds, the US 
appointed "chiefs for a day" until 1914. The moniker "chiefs for a day" applied to the presidentially 
appointed chiefs, who served as mostly powerless figureheads to sign allotment deeds but carry out 
no other work on behalf of the tribe or their people. The Cherokees split and focused on their survival 
through the lean times after many were swindled from their allotments and through the Great 
Depression. In the 1920s, they began to loosely and unofficially organize to care for their people. In 
the 1930s, the Indian New Deal and Indian Commissioner John Collier sought to return tribal affairs 
to the American Indians. Though it initially excluded Native Americans in Oklahoma, it laid the 
foundation for future programs. Finally, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act sought to aid the needy 
within tribes as well as provided a method of obtaining federal recognition under a charter. The last 
two chapters discuss the Cherokees putting aside their differences and, beginning at the grassroots 
level, organizing under a single entity to obtain a charter and federal recognition. 
 The sources for the third chapter explaining the historical context of the tribe up to 1906 
derive from Cherokee government documents, US government documents, tribal and Anglo 
newspapers, interviews obtained during the Federal Writers Project in the 1930s, and letters from 
tribal leaders. Sources for the early-to-mid twenty-first century are more difficult to obtain. With the 
US formally abolishing the recognition of the Cherokee government, tribal officials no longer kept 
records or any documents. The only reliable sources of information are local newspapers, as even the 
Cherokee Observer ceased publication in March 1906. When a Cherokee leader needed to 
disseminate information to others, they sent their announcement to a local newspaper to print. Very 
few personal letters exist, with only some documents from the Keetoowah in the University of 
Oklahoma Western History Collections. Only an assortment of newspaper clippings can be found in 
the Keetoowah collection at Northeastern State University and at the Oklahoma Historical Society. 
The archives at the Gilcrease Museum in Tulsa mostly focus on John Ross and the nineteenth century. 
The tribe itself does not keep records of their earlier history, most of it going to the Oklahoma 
10 
 
Historical Society, which only possessed the Keetoowah Constitution of 1950. Sadly, that leaves 
newspapers and their reprintings of Cherokee letters and announcements as the most available 
primary source on this topic. US government documents, such as the Congressional serials and 
legislation is readily available. Although these documents provide information of treaties and views 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, they do not record events within the tribe nor do they mention 
intratribal relations.  
 As will be explained at the end of chapter five, the Cherokees in charge of the government 
organized by charter in the 1930s, and those who supported the government dissolved in 1906 by the 
US remain in conflict today. Both sides argue that they are the true Cherokee government, and today 
two tribal governments exist and are federally recognized. Both have requirements for citizenship and 
keep membership rolls, offer public services, and issue license plates. I include but chose not to 
heavily rely on the interviews of current tribal leaders as they fall on each side of the argument with 
factionalism strong and their accounts of history very biased. Several have made their positions and 
histories known on public blogs. Also, several are understandably reluctant to speak with outsiders. 
Other branches of history, such as World War I and several other eras, must rely on written primary 
sources as their participants have passed on. I will follow the same methodology. I wish not to 
exclude the tribal voice and I include it through the letters and writings of those present in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I simply wish to avoid including the bias from the modern 
struggle for control of the tribe. A historian's duty is to interpret the sources objectively and without 
bias, as much as humanly possible. Those involved in politics, such as these faction leaders and those 
with family on both sides of the fight, know that who writes and controls this history controls the 
future, which could include land and monetary aspects as well as sovereignty issues. I choose to 
remain outside of political motivations and chronicle the story of a tribe coming together to save their 
way of life and sovereignty. This dissertation will chronicle and analyze the resilient leadership that 
11 
 
kept the tribe going in the early twentieth century, incredibly impressive after the violent factionalism 
of the previous century, without passing judgment as to the status of the two recognized tribes today. 
 Primary sources for the Keetoowahs, explained later in this work, are difficult to find due to 
their secrecy. Both the Cherokee Nation and the United Keetoowah governments of today have 
written their own histories, but both must be analyzed skeptically. For example, due to jurisdictional 
disputes currently happening, allegations exist that the United Keetoowah Band (UKB) have revised 
their history to portray them as the descendants of the Western Cherokee that removed from Georgia 
in 1817. The Cherokee Nation disputes those claims, arguing that no proof to substantiate it exists. 
The research for this study revealed no evidence to support the UKB’s claims. It instead draws on 
such sources as federal documents, American Indian and Anglo American newspapers, and Cherokee 
sources. Each are checked against at least one other primary source to prevent false information from 












REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 This work provides a missing chronicle of the Cherokee to existing historiography by not 
only covering the early to mid twentieth century but also by discussing their intratribal 
factionalism and overcoming such conflicts to reorganize under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare 
Act. However, existing historiography pieces together aspects of the story, such as the histories of 
American Indians, US federal Indian policy, the Cherokee, and the Keetoowah. This work 
combines the study of the external pressures on the Cherokee such as federal Indian policy as 
well as internal pressures on tribal leaders from resulting various reactions. 
 Early historiography of American Indians, written by white American reformers, 
chronicled the external pressure and related tribulations endured by tribes due to US federal 
Indian policies. Included in these studies, along with later historians of US federal Indian policy, 
are the consequences of such policies for natives during the mid twentieth century. During the 
1960s, the rise of the Red Power Movement also gave rise to American Indians publishing their 
own histories and experiences. Lastly, in the 1990s and 2000s, authors began to combine the 
history of US Indian policies with the stories of the tribes. This work furthers this trend by 
chronicling the external pressures from the US federal Indian policies in addition to concurrent 




 Most early writing on American Indians were by anthropologists. Early works on the 
history of tribes were written by white American reformers who called themselves "friends of the 
Indian." The authors chronicled the negative consequences of federal Indian policy. They wrote 
to gain sympathy for the plight of the natives, as well as exposing greed and corruption of the 
white Americans who capitalized on these policies. An early example is Helen Hunt Jackson's A 
Century of Dishonor (1881). Jackson wrote on the broken treaties, forced removals, and 
massacres of natives from colonial times to the mid nineteenth century. She remained highly 
critical of the US treatment of indigenous.
1
  
 Angie Debo served as the first historian to chronicle the aftermath of assimilation and its 
negative effects on Oklahoma's indigenous with And Still the Waters Run (1940). Controversial at 
the time of publication due to its exposure of several prominent businessmen profiting from 
native poverty, And Still the Waters Run provided an accurate portrait of the state of Oklahoma 
Indians in the early twentieth century, living in poverty without their own central government or 
anyone to advocate for them. Debo's work paved the way for further studies on federal 
government policies and the effects they had on the people they were supposed to benefit. Debo's 
work is still cited in historiography of American Indian policies.
2
 
 Several sources consulted in the research of this work concur with the arguments of 
Jackson and Debo that US Indian policy did not benefit natives. In addition, some Anglo 
Americans benefitted monetarily from such legislation. However, such points have been 
thoroughly argued by Jackson and Debo, as well by later historians of American Indian policy 
during the 1940s-50s. This issue continues the discussion of the effect of the external pressures, 
such as assimilationist policies, on the tribe and how the people reacted.   
                                                          
1
 Helen Hunt Jackson,  A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States' Government's Dealings with 
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 During the mid twentieth century, historians analyzed the federal policies in detail. 
Authors such as Frederick Hoxie and Francis Paul Prucha studied the origins and motivations of 
US political leaders during the passage of legislation. While they agree the policies were 
disastrous to tribes, the historians fall into two schools of thought: policymakers had good 
intentions towards indigenous but their policies failed or that politicians sought to end the 
"Indian" problem as well as personally benefit from the acquisition of native property.  
 Study of the coexisting US Indian policy illustrates the external pressures natives faced 
and to which they reacted, sometimes quite differently from one another. After Manifest Destiny, 
American Indians were rarely left alone by the federal government. The term allotment in 
historiography and primary sources in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, refers to the 
Dawes Allotment Act of 1887. This policy sought to end native communal living and force 
indigenous peoples to farm their own individual holdings. Allotment was only a specific 
implementation of the larger US policy, to "assimilate" American Indians into mainstream white 
society. After abandoning the idea of keeping natives separate from white society on reservations, 
and with the US population growing and expanding west, the federal government and "friends of 
the Indians" reformers implemented things such as mandatory Anglo-style boarding schools to 
force their culture onto young indigenous so they could more easily assimilate into white society.  
 Francis Paul Prucha’s The Great Father (1984) serves as the foundational narrative on 
native-white relations and policy up to 1980. Prucha argued that the federal government, 
politicians, and reformers were well intentioned in their continuation of paternalism towards 
Indians. They sought to make Indians “indistinguishable from other kinds of Americans.”
3
 The 
author calls the aggressive promotion of assimilation as humanitarian concern for Indians, not just 
from “Friends of the Indians” but also from the government.  
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 Henry E. Fritz’s The Movement for Indian Assimilation (1963) argued the concept of 
assimilation emerged amongst the people who moved to the western frontier and witnessed the 
fraudulent and apathetic management of Indians’ affairs. Fritz further clarifies the political nature 
of assimilation by reviewing the difficulty passing the allotment bill through Congress. He argues 
that the allotment law depended on western land hunger because western Congressmen would not 
vote for its passage as just a humanitarian reform measure. In addition, Senator Henry Dawes did 
not solely author the act named for him, nor did he act as the strongest supporter. According to 
Fritz, other politicians elected to place Dawes at the front of the issue because several of his 
constituents were strong supporters of Indian reform and it would gain further support in 
Congress. Once in Congress, the act required further amendments to pass, with greedy land 
speculators pushing for application of allotment to all reservations instead of President 
Cleveland's original intent of applying it to one tribe at a time. Fritz argues that “in order to get 
the approval of Congress, the Dawes Act compromised some of the finest humanitarian 
ideals…with the realities of American politics, and was perverted by the latter.”
4
 Fritz concludes 
that allotment may have worked if Congress had fully enforced it and the act had remained 
humanitarian without the unscrupulous compromises made to achieve passage.
 
 
 William T. Hagan in American Indians (1993) also covers assimilation, concluding with 
Fritz that the sale of surplus lands to white settlers motivated policy makers as well as reformers 
as a positive influence in the assimilation of natives.
5
 Hagan provides charges that several 
government officials already knew allotment would fail in 1887 because it had been unsuccessful 
in the mid-1870s with certain tribes, like the Chippewa, who had sold or been defrauded of their 
land. In Taking American Indian Lands Hagan covers the Cherokee during the allotment 
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processing. He states allotment gained momentum and was widely implemented despite previous 
failure because “greed and humanitarianism [had] rarely coalesced so beautifully.”
6
  
 Rose Stremlau's Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an 
Indigenous Nation (2011) provides the personal histories of families suffering during and after 
allotment. While beyond the scope of this work as I focus on political history, Stremlau's work 
covers in greater detail the personal difficulties that the new generation of leaders shared. This 
dissertation contributes to this line of historiography by illustrating these common experiences 
greater enabled the Cherokee to band together under a common goal of bettering life for their 
people and regaining self-determination to achieve this goal.
7
 
 In regards to the federal Indian policy passed during the time period covered by this 
work, Jon Blackman in Oklahoma's Indian New Deal (2013) provides the most comprehensive 
chronicle of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA), as well as the overall Indian New Deal 
reforms. Instead of focusing on a single tribe, he inserts snippets of statements made during 
meetings from representatives of various tribes. Attempting to record the reaction of each of the 
tribes residing in Oklahoma proved too large for a single work, and as is a feat too large for this 
work. Blackman argues that the biggest impact of the OIWA remains not only that it regained 
federal recognition, but that it also taught Oklahoma Indians how to function and made decisions 
through a constitutional government.  This work disputes his generalizations of tribes within 
Oklahoma as the Cherokees had experience with a constitutional republic since the adoption of its 
first in 1828. Blackman does acknowledge that the Cherokees served as one of the two tribes who 
organized under the charter provided in the OIWA, but maintains his view that all Indians in 
                                                          
6
 William T. Hagan, Taking Indian Lands: The Jerome (Cherokee) Commission, 1889-1893 (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 6. Several other historians cover assimilation policies as well as 
allotment itself: Cathleen D. Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States 
Indian Service, 1869-1913 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Frederick E. 
Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2001). 
7
 Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
17 
 




  In regards to the Cherokee specifically, few complete histories of the tribe have been 
written, despite the tribe adopting a written language and becoming literate in English relatively 
early in comparison with other native nations. The most comprehensive work is William G. 
McLoughlin's After the Trail of Tears. Andrew Denson's Demanding the Cherokee Nation picks 
up where McLoughlin finishes and comes the closest to the time period of this dissertation.  
Robert J. Conley's The Cherokee Nation: A History (2007) chronicles early Cherokee history. 
Duane H. King in the introduction of The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled History (1979) 
relates to this work's history of factionalism by briefly mentions that internal political/factional 
conflict existed before the creation of the nineteenth century Anglo-styled constitution and Trail 
of Tears. The conflict King describes previous to removal is less organized and on a familial level 
rather than organized as political parties. The first known disputes began with the consolidation 
of tribal power from individual villages to a more central, single council. King states that this 
centralization of power occurred after the emergence of a mixed ancestry class that lived similarly 
to whites, creating higher and lower economic classes. The existing tribal structure did not suffice 
to protect tribal property. To protect from the encroachments of whites, the Progressives created a 
centralized power having more regulation over the behavior of their own people. King also argues 
that wealthy slaveholders were able to consolidate power to serve their interests because their 




 In a less convincing argument, Gerard Reed in "Postremoval Factionalism in the 
Cherokee Nation" in The Cherokee Indian Nation (1979), argues that before removal the 
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Cherokees "maintained tribal unity as well as peaceful coexistence with the United States" and 
that the Indian Removal Act of 1830 "then fragmented the tribe" as the Treaty Party emerged 
after Jackson refused to enforce the Worcester v. Georgia (1832) decision. Also opposite of King, 
Reed writes less favorably of John Ross, stating he "forced" Elias Boudinot of the Treaty Party to 
resign his editorial position of the Cherokee Phoenix to prevent news to be published that would 
lift Cherokee morale during the removal crisis. Reed argues that the "underground protreaty 
faction" worked for the "salvation" of a people they believed would perish unless moved west, 
painting them as the saviors of the tribe.  
  Bryan Edward Russell's dissertation, "Writing a Way Home: Cherokee Narratives of 
Critical and Ethical Nationhood," focuses on the use of Cherokee literature to tell the stories of 
the marginalized population, specifically queer and freedmen. Russell points out that with the 
Keetoowah and Traditional opposition to freedmen citizenship and the nation's ban on same-sex 
marriage affected the tribe's history. Russell's work begins the process of exploring other aspects 
of Cherokee society and the effect of a constantly transitioning political landscape on all people 
involved. 
 Allogan Slagle's Burning Phoenix: A Study of Federal Acknowledgement, 
Reorganization, and Survival of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma 
(1993) and Georgia Rae Leeds' The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma 
serve as the historiography of the Keetoowah. Because the leaders of the unification of the early 
twentieth century and government that reorganized under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act were 
Keetoowah, these works serve as the few chronicles of the early and mid twentieth century. 
While Slagle and Leeds focus on the internal aspects of the Cherokee tribe during this time 
19 
 
period, this dissertation adds to historiography by combining the internal aspects as well as 
external pressures and opportunities all Cherokee faced in the early twentieth century.
10
 
 Since the 1960s, American Indians have published their own histories. David Cornsilk 
and Allogan Slagle, members of the United Keetoowah Band, have written and published their 
tribe's histories. Robert Conley, a member of the Cherokee Nation, has also published The 
Cherokee Nation, A Troubled History. In addition to these authors, autobiographies of important 
tribal leaders, such as Wilma Mankiller's Mankiller serve as insight to tribal politics. This work 
utilizes native-written narratives when available, such as Mankiller, Cornsilk, and Slagle's 
publications. Tribal histories by their citizens provide details passed down through oral traditions 
of their families normally not available to non-indigenous historians. 
 William G. McLoughlin's After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees' Struggle for 
Sovereignty, 1839-1880 (1994) serves as a comprehensive study of Cherokee history from its first 
written constitution in 1828 to the abolition of tribal government in 1906. In addition to studying 
the US policies toward the indigenous, McLoughlin contributes to historiography by also 
discussing the social, cultural, and intratribal political  ramifications of such policies. He 
describes the Cherokee as active participants in the policies affecting them and the differing 
reactions of various groups eventually caused the factionalism of the tribe.
11
 McLoughlin studies 
both the external and internal conflicts leaders of the Cherokee endured, providing context for 
this work, which begins when McLoughlin ends.  
 Andrew Denson’s Demanding the Cherokee Nation (2004) also focused on the late 
nineteenth century, arguing that the overwhelming majority of people involved in implementing 
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the policy harbored poor intentions. He asserts that reformers often planned new policies for 
various non-white peoples to “set them on the road to civilization” by destroying their cultures 
and familial roles, then leaving the people to ruin when they set their sights on another poor 
ethnic people.
12
 Denson focuses on the intentional cultural genocide, stating politicians purposely 
endorsed an assault on land held in common, which in turn served as an attack on the main facet 
of native culture, religion, and way of life. He states that Americans, both reformers and 
politicians, believed that only after completely stripping natives of their culture could they 
become integrated American citizens, the purpose of allotment. Denson's work illustrates the 
extend of what natives faced.  
 Conley, King, Reed, Russell, Slagle, and Leeds lay the foundation of the history of the 
Cherokee tribe. Historiography of allotment by Prucha, Fritz, Denson, and McLoughlin prove 
important to this work as they provide the context of the assimilation policies that rendered the 
tribes impoverished. After losing lands, the natives then lost their tribal governments, which 
would have helped them navigate these trying times. This dissertation picks up where previous 
historiography ends in the early twentieth century with the abolition of tribal governments. 
Previously, native leaders had to contend with the external pressures of US federal Indian policies 
as well as resulting hardships from removal west, the American Civil War, and allotment. Internal 
pressures erupted as factions emerged from differing reactions and strategies in handling these 
events. In the twentieth century, leaders either found themselves resigned to assimilation or 
vowed to continue fighting allotment. The loss of land and rampant poverty became a shared 
experience of a new generation of leaders.  
 After failing to secure separate statehood, tribal governments ceased operation and 
natives found themselves struggling with day to day survival. Those who refused to keep fighting, 
as well as later those who accepted allotment, continued a form of de facto government on a 
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community level to continue caring for their people. In 1905 the Keetoowah organize as a 
business under a corporate charter in order to continue suing the US for funds owed to the tribe. 
Later, these community level groups, facing the same external pressures of survival without a 
tribal government and during the aftermath of allotment, work together to create a cohesive unit 
for all of their people. This coalition of leaders proves advantageous and enables the Cherokee to 
capitalize on the passage of favorable US Indian policies during the Indian New Deal from the 
1930s-50s. 
 The works of Prucha, Hoxie, Fritz, Hagan, Denson, and McLoughlin demonstrate that the 
external issues of assimilation heightened factionalism within the tribe as natives reacted in 
various ways and differed on the best strategy for survival. This dissertation uses the context of 
these works to show that while previously external pressures led to internal crises, with the new 
generation of leadership with a shared experience in assimilationist polices and the abolition of 
their government, the factions of the tribe came together to work for the benefit of all their 
people. 
 Previous historiography ends after the Curtis Act takes effect for several reasons. First, 
sources are scarce after the abolition of tribal government. Without a centralized institution 
keeping records, legal documents, petitions, and personal papers of tribal politicians ceased to be 
recorded. After 1906, if information needed to be disseminated to the Cherokee people, leaders 
would publish their writings in local newspapers. As a result, local newspapers provided the bulk 
of native sources. Tribal and museum archives do not possess personal letters or writings of the 
Cherokee from this time period, most likely from the focus on day to day survival by the people. 
A later interview of Keetoowah leader Levi Gritts was taken in the mid twentieth century and 
serves as one of the only written firsthand account of the time period by a Cherokee. A lack of 
sources causes the research of this time period to be very difficult, spotty, and tedious.  
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 Secondly, many policies affected several tribes at once and it remains difficult to speak 
on one tribe without including concurrent events with others. For example, allotment affected 
many more tribes other than the Cherokee but the experience and reaction of the people varies 
from tribe to tribe. Some policies included two unrelated tribes together, such as settling on the 
same lands, while at the same time another act may include another two tribes. This creates 
confusion in not only research but also in writing a coherent narrative of a manageable length.  
 The events of the early twentieth century are also utilized today in the struggle for 
authority between two factions of the Cherokee. As a result, many histories are told in a biased 
manner, contradictory to each other and favoring each group's right to tribal control. The 
Cherokee Nation cites itself as the same, continuous government created by the constitution in 
1828. The UKB argues that the government created in 1828 ended when the Curtis Act abolished 
it in 1906. The Keetoowah government, recognized by federal charter then with an approved 
constitution in 1950, served as the tribal authority. Historians have not fully examined the logic of 
both sides and individual Cherokees cite one history over the other, usually depending on their 
personal membership. Other historians indirectly comment on the two governments by only 
mentioning one in their conclusion, usually that of the Cherokee Nation. Rose Stremlau 
concludes her work by stating that the Cherokee had no formal government until the new 
constitution in the 1970s.  Jon S. Blackman briefly quotes other tribes as having disputes over 
whether Progressives or Traditionals should run their new governments, but does not go into 
detail or mention that of the Cherokees. The lack of historiography likely occurs because of the 
previously mentioned lack of sources as well as strong personal biases within the tribe.   
 Lastly, general American Indian history of the early twentieth history is also scarce. Once 
tribal governments are abolished, not much is written on natives. Historiography covers code 
talkers and native participation in the world wars, as that topic has much more sources available. 
This dissertation not only fills in the deficit of native history in the early twentieth century, it also 
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chronicles the importance of previously contentious relations shifting to amicable cooperation 
under intense external pressure from assimilation policies. During a low point of Cherokee 
history including destitution and a lack of tribal government, leaders used their shared experience 
to cooperation and organize at the grassroots level to care for their people and regain self-
determination. As a result, the Cherokee were better prepared to take advantage once more 























FROM WHENCE WE CAME: FACTIONALISM AND THE CHEROKEE NATION, 1828-
1906 
 Throughout United States history, Cherokee self-determination faced repeated threats as 
the federal government demanded land, jurisdiction over natives, and submission. Prior to the 
1920s, disagreements and factions within the tribe resulting from varying reactions to these 
external pressures enabled the US to capitalize on the fragmented tribe and reduce self-
determination. This ultimately led to the dissolution of tribal governments in 1906. In addition to 
providing historical context, this also illustrates the shared experiences of the pre-twentieth 
century faction leaders. These early generations endured and faced the external pressures of the 
Trail of Tears, involvement in the American Civil War, encroachment of white settlers, allotment 
of their lands, and disastrous assimilationist policies. The resulting infighting amongst factions 
not only weakened the tribe's negotiating power with the US, it also created feelings of betrayal 
and feuds along factional and familial lines. These conflicts prevented intratribal cooperation as 
leaders and their immediate descendents harbored decades long grudges. In studying the 
sometimes violent intratribal factionalism prior to the twentieth century, it greater emphasizes the 
importance and magnitude of the cooperation and coalition of the leaders in the 1920s. 
 To fully appreciate and understand the difficulty and importance of the conflict the 
Cherokees put aside in the 1920s, it is instructive know the history of the tribe and the magnitude 
of the sometimes deadly conflict between opposing sides within the tribe that had been an issue 
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since the early nineteenth century. After the creation and approval for an Anglo-style centralized 
republic in the early-nineteenth century, the tribe quickly split into two factions regarding forced 
removal to the western United States. This created opposing sides that would affect the tribe until 
the early twentieth century. The leaders of the early twentieth century had to not only overcome 
the dissolution of federal recognition and relations with their tribal government, they also had to 
heal the fissures of several generations. 
 In 1827, the Cherokee approved the constitution for a centralized republic, planned and 
created by a group of elite men. The twelve draftees of the constitution did not represent the 
majority of the tribe, most coming from wealthy mixed race families. All but one owned slaves. 
The traditional practice of women and children as part of decision making, and consensus as the 
method of political discourse disappeared.
1
 
 The new tribal government consisted of three branches: the legislative branch with two 
councils, judicial that included a supreme court, and the executive branch of the principal chief. 
The only major discernible difference from the US was the legislature chose the principal chief.
2
  
 This new republic marked a shift in the types of leaders of the nation. Previously, the 
tribe was led by the local heads of clans of the villages rather than a single, centralized chief. 
Many in the tribe adopted the agricultural and educational system of their white neighbors, 
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creating a different faction of the Cherokees, often called "Progressives" or "Mixed Bloods." 
Others, who retained their culture and lived as their ancestors with very little contact with Anglo 
Americans, became known as "Traditionals." The Progressives took leadership of the nation 
under the new constitution, with their influence stemming from personal wealth and the practice 
of interacting with whites, a skill greatly needed with increasing Anglo settlers in the Cherokee 
Georgia homelands. A large number of Progressives also adopted a system of plantation slavery 
similar to the southern states. However, these Cherokee planters avoided much of the cruelty and 
abuse displayed by white slaveholders. After traders came to live within the nation, intermarriage 
and full acceptance of mixed offspring inheriting their father's estates led to a wide inequality of 
wealth within Indian society. According to Duane H. King, this disparity not only separated the 
people by lifestyle and created different economic classes, it also resulted in envy and spurred on 
acquisitiveness previously unknown in Cherokee culture.
 3
  
 This split into two factions continued throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and the remnants can be seen today. Traditionalists, also referred to as "full bloods" 
within the tribe and in US government agents' descriptions, wished to maintain their culture and 
resisted any changes and adoption of Anglo culture. The Progressives, also referred to as "mixed 
bloods" by the same parties, lived apart from the rest of the tribe and attended eastern US schools, 
striving to adopt American practices by women following the cult of domesticity and men 
farming. They embraced change as inevitable and formed a new wealthy elite class within the 
tribe. Many of these privileged believed sovereignty depended on the US viewing them as 
civilized and similar to white society. By 1835, seventy five percent of all "full blood" Cherokees 
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maintained matrilineal traditions and the majority of the tribe did not adopt Anglo lifestyles. 
These differences created conflict within the tribe, mostly along the lines of class and ancestry. 
The former leaders, the conservative and traditional town elders. could only attempt to persuade 




 As with nearly every tribe, the time comes when the indigenous are dispossessed of their 
land, which also challenges their self-determination. Shortly after approving their constitution, 
Georgia settlers began coveting native land. The Cherokees had hoped that since their 
government and constitution reflected that of the US, they could appear more "civilized" and 
prevent removal.
5
 However, at the time, the US Indian policy sought to move the natives west 
onto reservations, separate from Anglo Americans. At the same time, the state of Georgia also 
began pushing for their removal due to the desire for new territory and the discovery of gold. 
Georgians passed anti-Indian laws, such as annexing native lands for distribution via lottery and 
declaring Cherokee laws void. In addition, settlers illegally squatted on native land in hopes to 
persuade the Cherokees to sign a treaty agreeing to move west. In 1826-1827, the Georgia 
General Assembly passed resolutions asserting its complete domination over the land and people 
within its borders, including native people.
6
  
 In addition to the actions of the state of Georgia, US President Andrew Jackson 
convinced Congress to approve the Indian Removal Act to move tribes to reservations in western 
America. The majority of Cherokees did not support removal, and the tribal government sent 
delegations to Washington, DC, to negotiate. In light of attacks from the state of Georgia, white 
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invaders, and the federal government, Chief John Ross decided to use the US judicial system to 
fight removal, resulting in two landmark cases that would dictate the status of tribal sovereignty 




 At the time, the US did not have a distinct Indian policy, making the cases even more 
important as they established the precedent for future US-indigenous relations throughout the 
nineteenth century. The Cherokees hired American lawyers more versed in US law and hoped to 
prove that Georgia had acted illegally by violating the tribe's sovereignty. Previous treaties 
recognized the tribe and others as a "nation within a nation."
8
 
 Cherokee v. Georgia (1831), resulted from a southern state arresting a Cherokee within 
tribal lands for murder, trying him in American courts, and executing him. The tribe argued that 
state laws held no validity within tribal borders because it was "nation within a nation" according 
to the commerce clause of the constitution. The Cherokees also sought a ruling that would further 
restrict the state from enforcing any of its laws over the natives. In the final ruling, the court 
decided four to two to deny Cherokee jurisdiction on the grounds that it did not consider them a 
foreign state according to the constitution's use of the term. Chief Justice John Marshall defined 
the Cherokees as a "dependent, domestic nation" not a separate, sovereign country. This ruling 
affected the tribe from this time forward as it defined the natives' status as wards of the US 
government.  Marshall also conferred that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear a 
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Cherokee request to interfere with Georgia's laws. This proved a setback for the tribe and only a 
year later Marshall would modify their ward status.
9
  
 Worcester v. Georgia (1832) stemmed from the arrest of several American missionaries 
in the Cherokee Nation for violating the Georgian law that required all Anglos wishing to reside 
within tribal lands to apply for a permit and swear an oath to the state. The law violated the tribe's 
right to regulate immigration within their own borders.
10
  
 Chief Justice Marshall again led this case, ruling that Georgian laws were void because 
they violated federal treaties, contract and commerce clauses of the constitution, and the 
sovereign authority of the Cherokee Nation. Marshall defined the tribe as a "distinct political 
society," capable of self-government, and endorsed the right to their land.
11
 A victory for the 
tribe, Worcester v. Georgia dictated that a state could not impose laws on the tribe. Marshall 
commented that only Congress was granted an overriding power in American Indian affairs. 
Additionally, he dictated that tribes did not lose their sovereign powers by becoming subject to 
the US government.
12
 This ruling marked the validity of the laws of the Cherokee Nation as well 
as prevented the states from passing discriminatory laws that would override tribal legislation.  
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 Despite the victory in the Supreme Court, removal of natives west remained an issue, 
especially with Andrew Jackson determined to move them west. Jackson maintained that the state 
retained its sovereign right over all land and people within territory as a "nation within a nation" 
could not exist. The president refused to regard any previous treaties or to end Georgia's anti-
Indian actions. Without the support of the executive branch, the Supreme Court could not enforce 




 Like most Anglo Americans, Jackson believed in the inevitability of the extinction of the 
indigenous as they could not compete with whites. In the paternalist attitude that served as the 
foundation of US Indian policy, Jackson based his argument in Congress for removal west as a 
benevolent action to give the tribes a last chance to assimilate away from the harassment of 
settlers. On May 28, 1830, the Indian Removal Act became law.
14
 
 Under the act, the president created an Indian Territory on public lands west of the 
Mississippi River, which the US guaranteed as the property of the natives as long as they 
inhabited the area. Regarding self-determination, the tribes removed would forever be free of the 
jurisdiction of the any territory or state. Lastly, the act granted legal title to the new land, and 
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 An important clause of the Indian Removal Act required the American Indians to 
demonstrate they were moving willingly by signing a removal treaty. With the Cherokee Nation 
officially refusing to agree, the US exploited the intratribal factionalism of the people by working 
only with those most agreeable to removal regardless of a lack of tribal authority. 
 The Cherokees had been debating the subject of removal among themselves for quite 
some time. The Cherokee Phoenix tribal newspaper kept the citizens informed of other tribes' 
experience with removal, the varying sentiments of natives, as well as coverage from Anglo 
newspapers. It reported that "the popular feeling of the Nation [was] decidedly opposed to a 
removal."
16
 Those opposed, mostly still living traditionally, refused to move west and Cherokee 
Chief John Ross urged his people to resist removal by every means short of violence. The 
National Council met and officially voted against removal.
17
  
 However, not all Cherokees opposed removal. A different group than those who 
supported the Treaty of New Echota, some Progressives (known as Old Settlers) accepted early 
US offers and moved west earlier in the nineteenth century, believing it the only way to live 
without white interference. As pressure from the US increased, the tribe began passing anti-
removal legislation in order to maintain a united front. On November 17, 1828, the General 
Council decreed that any persons who abandoned their homes and moved west forfeited their 
citizenship. The tribe passed a law on October 24, 1829, making it illegal to sell treaty lands 
belonging to the nation without tribal government approval punishable by the death penalty. This 
created the foundation for later violence and deepened the fissures between factional leaders. 
18
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 In December 1829, the Cherokee people gathered to sign and send the "Memorial of the 
Cherokees" to Congress as well as circulate it throughout their citizens. The petition held more 
than three thousand signatures and asked the legislative branch of the federal government to halt 
the actions of the state of Georgia and Jackson. Ross and other leaders traveled to Washington, 
DC, several times in attempt to stop removal. Their efforts fell upon deaf ears.
19
 
 As thousands of Georgians moved into Cherokee country in the early 1830s, a minority 
of the tribe began to grow hopeless. They looked to tribal politicians John Ridge, Major Ridge, 
and Elias Boudinot. These men formed a faction, called the Treaty Party, consisting of those who 
believed their people had no choice but to move west. They thought the petitions and negotiations 
with the US futile and sought to move west and perhaps get a better agreement if they left 
willingly. The US took advantage of this discourse, stating that those who agreed to enroll for 
removal would have an easier time of an evitable fate. With a constant influx of white settlers, 
they believed that removal remained the only way for the tribe to continue unmolested.
20
 
 The Treaty Party, or Progressives, consisted of natives that were most often but not 
always of mixed ancestry. They were most assimilated into Anglo American society, often 
educated in federal Indian schools and literate in English, owning slaves, and considered the 
wealthy elite. In addition, they embraced Christianity and frequently interacted with whites as 
neighbors. The Treaty Party's members were separated from most of the rest of the tribe not just 
by heritage but also by how they lived, and as monetary class. They believed, similar to the policy 
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of assimilation, that a better future would result from incorporation with white society rather than 
remaining separate from it. Additional political contention resulted from the defeat of several 
Progressive leaders in the 1830 elections, with John Ridge especially resentful of his loss to John 
Ross for the office of chief.
21
  
 The Cherokees who remained resisted the Indian Removal Act by staying on their 
homelands and refusing to sign any removal treaties were known as the Traditionalists or Ross 
Party, as the chief led them. While the Progressives lived amongst whites and participated in their 
economic system, the Traditionalists preferred to live together, apart from Anglo American 
society, maintaining their traditional culture. Often without any mixed ancestry, those who 
followed Ross often lacked formal education and lived at a lower economic class. Circe Sturm 
argues that while American Indian resistance to the US has been centered around issues of 
autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination, "racial identity becomes a rallying point of 
collective resistance as well as a sources of political and social factionalism."
22
 While racial 




 Chief Ross headed the delegation that traveled to Washington, DC, to negotiate with the 
US. Ross planned to sell only a small portion of their land, believing then the federal government 
would be appeased and not force them to move. Ridge also sent a delegation to discuss removal 
in 1835. Both factions returned to Cherokee Nation, and at its October 1835 annual meeting in 
Red Clay, Tennessee, the National Council rejected Ridge's proposed treaty of removal.
24
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 Despite having their proposal denied and having no authority from the tribe, the Treaty 
Party met with a treaty commissioner in December 1835 at New Echota, Georgia. One hundred 
Treaty Party members eventually signed the Treaty of New Echota, agreeing to sell all Cherokee 
homelands and move west. The treaty agreed to a full cession of all lands and removal to Indian 
Territory by 1838 in exchange for five million dollars, transportation to the west, and subsistence 
aid for one year after arriving at their new homelands. Leaders of the Treaty Party received 
rewards for their willingness to negotiate and the Georgia governor exempted the Ridges and 
Boudinot from having their land distributed via lottery. The treaty passed the US Senate by a one-
vote margin. The US had finally gotten an agreement from the Cherokees to move, even though 
the signers held no authority within the tribe.
25
  
 Ross and other leaders had been negotiating in Washington, DC, against removal and did 
not find out their lands had purportedly been sold until they returned. The betrayal shocked Ross 
and the majority of Cherokees. The tribal government acted quickly in an attempt to delegitimize 
the opposition by impeaching the Ridges from the National Council and forcing Boudinot to 
resign as editor of the Cherokee Phoenix. Ross and his followers protested the treaty and 
petitioned the US Senate to reject it. Even though only a few tribal members signed the treaty, it 
committed all of the Cherokees to removal, resulting in the death and hardship now known as the 
Trail of Tears. Despite the petition, the Senate ratified the treaty in 1836 and the US began setting 
up stockades to imprison the people in anticipation of removal in 1838. The Trail of Tears 
removed 16,000 Cherokees and killed about 4,000.
26
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 After arriving in Indian Territory, the Cherokees still considered themselves a sovereign 
nation and vowed to keep negotiating with the US to receive further reparations for their suffering 
and survival. With external pressures of removal finished, leaders faced the aftermath in the form 
of internal issues with three factions claiming authority over the entire tribe.  
 Once the Ross Party arrived in Indian Territory, they realized that three separate factions, 
developed prior to and during removal, existed and considered themselves independent. To 
recreate a single, unified, stronger Cherokee Nation, the three groups would have to negotiate and 
compromise. Otherwise whenever the US wanted an agreement, they would just recognize 
whichever faction was most agreeable to its goals.
27
  
 Upon arriving in Indian Territory, Ross and his followers, around 14,000 people known 
as the Eastern Cherokees, found a pre-existing tribal government of Cherokees. This group, 
known as the Western Cherokees, or the Old Settlers, had willingly moved in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries. The Old Settlers had their own simple system of government with 
three chiefs, a council, few written laws, and no constitution. The Old Settlers government met 
only twice a year in their capital, Tahlontusky, to elect chiefs and national officers (council 
members), judges, and lighthorsemen (police). Led by chiefs John Brown, John Looney, and John 
Rogers, the Western Cherokees only constituted one-third on the entire Cherokee population.
28
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 Already in the Indian Territory, the Treaty Party, led by John Ridge, lived peacefully 
amongst the Old Settlers. However, with the signers of the Treaty of New Echota and the Ross 
faction in the same area, civil war erupted among the tribe, making reunification nearly 
impossible. The leaders of the Progressives did not believe they had betrayed their people. In a 
likeness to the US paternalism, the Treaty Party thought they were doing the best for their tribe by 
separating them from the violence and encroachment of the white population while they learned 
to assimilate into American society.
29
  
 The Treaty of New Echota failed to specify how the separate Cherokees should govern 
themselves. Since the US continued to allow the tribe to select its own leaders, the people 
remained fully responsible for unification. Each faction maintained its own ambitions and self-
serving motivations, none of which blended with the other groups. Before removal, Ross and the 
Eastern Cherokees asserted that their government would continue in full force in Indian Territory. 
Upon arrival, they reinstituted their bicameral legislature and judicial system. A complication 
arose from an 1819 action in which the Eastern Cherokees had legally disowned those who 
moved west early, refusing to recognize the Old Settlers as a separate nation. In turn, the Old 
Settlers believed themselves the only legitimate government of the Cherokees in Indian Territory 
and challenged the newcomers' authority.
30
 
 However, the Treaty Party and the Old Settlers combined smoothly. The Treaty Party 
arrived a short time before the Ross Party, and agreed to mix into the Western Cherokee, also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Eastern Band of Cherokees. This group still exists today. Not within the scope of this dissertation, an 
extensive historiography already exists regarding the separate band, including Duane King's "The Origin of 
the Eastern Cherokees as a Social and Political Entity," in The Cherokee Indian Nation: A History 
(Nashville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1979). 
29
 Treaty with the Western Cherokee, 1828. May 6, 1828. 7 Stat., 311. Proclamation, May 28, 1828 
[Kappler]; John Ross Papers [GMP]; Clark, Cherokee Chief, 81; Anderson, ed. Cherokee Removal, 113; 
Sturm, Blood Politics, 65; Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, 316; Rogers, Ani-Yun-Way, 200; Conley, The 
Cherokee Nation, 159; McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 4-5, 10. 
30
 Treaty with the Cherokee, 1835. Dec. 29, 1835. 7 Stat., 478. Proclamation, May 23, 1836 [Kappler]; 
Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 159; McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, xiii, 2-5; Anderson, ed. Cherokee 
Removal, 113; Sturm, Blood Politics, 65; Perdue and Green, eds., The Cherokee Removal, 121; Reed, 
"Postremoval Factionalism in the Cherokee Nation," 150. 
37 
 
known as the Old Settlers, government. The Old Settlers harbored reservations about them, but 
did not regard them as criminals despite the Cherokee Blood Law the Ross faction swore they 
broke.  In 1840, these two groups officially merged and joined to oppose the Eastern Cherokee. 
The more prosperous Ridge followers clashed often with the Ross followers, who remained 
hostile to them because they saw them as traitors and had suffered more in the Trail of Tears as 
they did not have the resources to remove themselves. The Treaty Party often retaliated with 
aggression and sent unfavorable reports to the area's Indian agent and nearby stationed US 
military, eventually complaining directly to officials in Washington, DC. This caused further 




 At Ross' suggestion, his followers and the Western Cherokees met on June 3, 1839, at 
Takatoka, four miles east of present day Tahlequah. John Brown, primary chief of the Old 
Settlers, proclaimed that the newcomers could choose any territory they liked, vote and run for 
any offices, and were subject to the Old Settlers' government and laws. He also told Ross that no 
further action was required on his part as one nation, that of the Old Settlers, already existed. 
Brown assumed the Eastern Cherokees were simply immigrants without a nation or government, 
and considered the Cherokee people united as he had taken them into his tribe.
32
  
 Ross replied that the Eastern Cherokees would not just submit to their existing 
government because then the minority (Old Settler) would rule the majority (Ross' followers). 
Ross instead called a meeting between chiefs and councils. On June 12, 1839, Ross suggested 
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each side appoint three men, who would together appoint three more men, to create a council of 
nine to draft a code of laws and decide a method of election for new national officers and a 
council. The Western Cherokees rejected this offer, perplexed because they believed the tribe 
already united under their existing rule.
33
  
 Ross had other reasons for refusing to simply merge with the Western Cherokees. He still 
denied the validity of the Treaty of New Echota, and hoped to renegotiate terms the with US. He 
feared if they joined Old Setters, their politicians would control final negotiations regarding 
removal and accept the treaty's terms since they had already moved and did not suffer the death 
and hardships during the Trail of Tears. In addition, the payments due to the Eastern Cherokees 
from the US for removal would be under the control of the Western chiefs, which Ross believed 
to be the true reason the Old Settlers refused to negotiate with him. In addition, the same day that 
Brown had refused Ross' plan, the Treaty Party arrived at Takatoka to meet with the Old Settlers. 
Ross assumed they arrived to persuade the Western Cherokees out of making any concessions, 
interfering with unification.
34
   
 Ross replied to the Old Settlers' refusal to his idea by asking them to suggest a method for 
uniting their people. Brown proposed two separate nations. Ross refused because he knew, that 
like the situation with removal, the US would only negotiate with the faction that served its 




 On the other hand, Brown believed that because Ross refused his idea of a two 
government system, the Eastern Cherokees wanted to dissolve his nation and create a tribe 
controlled by Ross. Brown informed Ross that the Old Settlers suggested that all Cherokees meet 
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at his nation's October council to revise the laws and possibly rewrite the constitution. The Old 
Settlers refused any further concessions and Ross declined a further meeting. Unification 
remained at a stalemate when Brown adjourned the Takatoka Council on June 20, 1839.
36
 
 When the general attendees of the council learned the Western Cherokees refused to 
compromise regarding unification, many became angry. Jesse Bushyhead, a Ross follower, and 
Sequoyah, an Old Settler, gathered people and called for a People's Council. Tribes had utilized a 
"People's Council" as a traditional method to solve contested issues by popular consensus.
37
  The 
organizers set a meeting for July 1, 1839, at Illinois Campground. The National Council of the 
Eastern Cherokees agreed they would accept the solution devised by the People's Council. The 
Eastern Cherokees would gain the most from a majority agreement since it constituted two thirds 
of the total population.
38
 
 After the failure of the Takatoka meeting, approximately 150 members of the Ross Party 
secretly met on June 21, 1839. They agreed to exact revenge on the signers of the Treaty of New 
Echota as they had broken the Cherokee blood law forbidding the sale of Cherokee land without 
permission from the National Council, punishable by death. This group that planned and 
participated in the assassinations did not see themselves as vigilantes, they believed they were 
carrying out the laws of their people. Without the knowledge of Ross, the assassins decided to act 
the next day, murdering Major Ridge, John Ridge, and Elias Boudinot. Allen Ross, the son of 
Ross, remained close to his father to ensure he knew nothing of the plot. John Ross had prevented 
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 After reviewing the Cherokee Blood Law, the revenge party drew straws at Double Head 
Springs to determine the actual executioners. They divided into four groups, with approximately 
twenty witnesses accompanying each to ensure the actual killers remained anonymous. Major 
Ridge, travelling in Arkansas, died from a gunshot while he stopped to water his horse. John 
Ridge, his son, was dragged from his bed at his home in Indian Territory and stabbed more than 
twenty times. Elias Boudinot, Major Ridges' nephew, died after an attack with a knife and 
hatchet. A witness to the attack sent a messenger to warn Boudinot's brother, Stand Watie, who 
escaped. After these deaths, the revenge groups abandoned their plan to murder the other eight on 




 Watie, the new leader of the Treaty Party, held John Ross responsible and promised 
further violence. He then gathered men to exact revenge on the chief. Several hundred people 
reacted quickly and surrounded Ross' home at Park Hill to protect him. Instead of fighting those 
protectors, the Treaty Party appealed to the US.
41
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 The same day, Ross reported the assassinations to General Matthew Arbuckle at Fort 
Gibson, also informing him of Watie's actions in gathering a mob and threatening to kill him. 
With the Treaty Party appealing for action from the US, citing chaos and violence in Indian 
Territory, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs put Arbuckle in charge of arresting and punishing 
the murderers. Arbuckle panicked and requested a brigade of volunteer troops from the governors 
of Arkansas and Missouri to protect him from an uprising of the Cherokees. The soldiers arrived 
to find no evidence of further violence and returned to their garrison at Fort Leavenworth.
42
 
 The US War Department ordered the arrest and trial of the assassins, further charging 
Arbuckle to apprehend them. Arbuckle, who never believed Ross' ignorance of the plot, compiled 
a list of suspects and threatened the use of military force if Ross did not turn them over. The 
military held Ross fully responsible for the deaths, even though the chief had reported the 
incident to them and asked for federal troops to prevent further bloodshed. Ross continued to 
deny any knowledge of the plans, only stating that the men had been carrying out tribal law and 
declared the matter resolved within the tribe.
43
 
 In September 1839, Arbuckle declared that Ross had failed to adequately punish the 
revenge party and that his troops would arrest all suspects. Recognizing the illegality of federal 
intervention in such tribal matters, Ross replied that the US could only arrest those over whom it 
had jurisdiction. All of the murders had occurred on tribal land (except that of Major Ridge in 
Arkansas), so the US had no authority to arrest and try Cherokee citizens. The chief publicly 
declared the threats of Arbuckle as falsehoods to harass Indians and blamed the difficulties on the 
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military. Eventually, Arbuckle abandoned his efforts to capture the revenge party. However, he 
continued to distrust Ross and their relations remained strained.
44
   
 In addition to causing illegal federal intervention from the general at Fort Gibson, the 
murders of the Treaty Party caused greater ramifications that would also hinder unification. This 
caused the negotiations that Ross hoped to resume with the US regarding the terms of removal to 
be delayed as well. The pre-existing tribal divisions that began in Georgia exploded and began 
one of the bloodiest eras in Cherokee history. Each faction retaliated with revenge killings on 
both sides until 1846. In 1842, Stand Watie killed one of the men who had murdered his uncle.  In 
1845, Watie's brother was killed by the Ross faction. During that year more than thirty killings 
occurred between the two factions.
45
 
 Arbuckle suggested Ross and the Old Settler chiefs meet at Fort Gibson on June 25, 
1839, to prevent any further violence. Western chiefs Brown, Looney, and Rogers wrote Ross, 
urging him to attend the Fort Gibson meeting and cancel the People's Council on July 1. Arbuckle 
and Indian agent Montfort Stokes told Ross they supported the proposal of the Western 
Cherokees because the tribe could not function with two separate governments. Arbuckle also 




 Ross refused to attend the meeting at Fort Gibson because its organization deprived his 
faction any official standing. The meeting served only as an opportunity for them to agree to Old 
Settler rule, with the Eastern Cherokees only having the power to sue for concessions. Ross 
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argued that the government should go with the will of the people, stating the People's Council, as 
a tradition, retained more validity because even members of the Old Settlers could attend and 




 The People's Council met on July 1, 1839, at Illinois Camp Ground near Tahlequah, 
about a mile and a half from Park Hill. Approximately 2,000 people attended, including many 
Old Settlers. Attendance remained lower than expected, most likely from people fearing further 
violence. Old Settler chiefs did not attend because the Ross majority could outvote them and they 
discouraged their followers from attending. On July 5, Sequoyah wrote the Old Settler chiefs at 
Fort Gibson, inviting them to attend. Brown and Rogers adamantly declined but Looney agreed 
and joined the gathering.
48
  
 The council elected Sequoyah and George Lowrey (an Eastern Cherokee) as presiding 
officers. Next, it formed a "steering committee" of about twenty people, which included John 
Ross. The leaders first tackled the issue of violence and the executions of the Ridges and 
Boudinot. The council granted a full pardon to every person accused of murder since the arrival 
of the Eastern Cherokees to prevent any further violence from either side. However, the council 
summoned the Treaty Party members to appear within the next eight days and apologize or they 
would be exiled as outlaws. After their public apologies they would remain ineligible for any 
tribal office for five years and could only run afterwards if they Cherokee Nation approved. 
Seven of the Treaty Party came forward, but the rest refused. Watie declared he would rather die 
than accept such humiliating terms.
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 In its most important achievement, the People's council created the Act of Union on July 
12, 1839. With signatures from Sequoyah and Looney representing the Old Settlers and Ross for 
the Eastern Cherokees, the Act formed the two groups into a single Cherokee nation. The act 
called for the creation of a government suitable to the tribe's situation, providing full rights for all 
citizens. The council disbanded in late August 1839 while a committee drafted a new constitution 
for the entire tribe.
50
  
 On July 19, 1839, Ross wrote to Arbuckle and Stokes to report the Act of Union united 
all the Cherokee people. Arbuckle immediately declared the act void because even though some 
Western Cherokees signed, they lacked the authority to do so as they were not the chiefs. This 
proved ironic considering the Eastern Cherokees were removed by a treaty signed by those 
without tribal authority. This action portrays the inconsistency of US negotiating and dealing with 
tribes as they chose and whichever position best benefitted it. Arbuckle argued that the act would 
remain invalid until all Old Settlers agreed. Chief Looney had signed, but he had no right to 
depose Brown and Rogers. US Secretary of War Joel Poinsett believed the new government 
illegally seized power from the Western Cherokees. Ross argued its validity because people from 
both sides were invited to participate, and those who did had signed. The act granted both factions 
equal rights and participation in government. Arbuckle also stated that in declaring members of 
the Treaty Party outlaws, the council deprived them of rights. He viewed this as the council 
approving of the murders and began to threaten to arrest Ross as an accessory to the 
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assassinations. Arbuckle declared no union had occurred and continued to acknowledge Brown as 
the chief of all Cherokees.
51
   
 Concurrently with the People's Council, the Old Settlers held their own meeting at 
Tahlontusky on July 22, 1839. Brown and Rogers presided over the event, with Looney away 
attending the People's Council. Watie and his followers attended to show their support. They 
invited Ross, who declined to leave the People's Council but he did send a delegation, which left 
quickly after encountering hostility from Treaty Party members.
52
  
 Brown and Rogers attempted to revive Ross' original proposal of a government that 
consisted of representatives from each faction. The chiefs decided that no Old Settler who 
cooperated with the Ross Party could serve in their government. Many of the attendees rejected 
the plan. Next, the Western Cherokees adopted a resolution to expel all whites from their territory 
sympathetic to Ross and increase the amount of their police to enforce their laws. They adjourned 
to meet again in October for elections. The Western Cherokees elected John Rogers as their 
principal chief and deposed Looney because he participated in the People's Council.  
 With the People's Council and Old Settlers' meetings still in session, on August 20, 1839, 
the Treaty Party called its own meeting at Price's Prairie. Angered by their classification as 
outlaws, the Treaty Party refused to support the Act of Union, which they called the "mobocracy 
of John Ross."
53
 They maintained that the murders of their leaders deserved punishment and 
agreed to appeal to the US for an investigation and punishment. Those at the meeting voted for 
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 In a letter to Poinsett, Waite and his followers reported they feared for their lives and 
acknowledged their refusal to submit to what they considered Ross' tyranny. The requested 
protection and negotiation with their delegates. Upon arrival in Washington, DC, President Van 
Buren and Poinsett sided with the Treaty Party nearly instantly. Poinsett agreed to order troops 
from Fort Gibson to arrest the assassins and to protect Watie's faction.
55
 
 The meeting at Price's Prairie proved a disastrous setback for Cherokee sovereignty. In 
requesting federal protection, the Treaty Party invited illegal US intervention in internal tribal 
affairs, which the US would use to their advantage later. While Watie and his followers 
eventually grudgingly admitted the People's Council government served as the tribe's political 
body, they had proved willing to sacrifice their people's autonomy for factionalism. Without their 
letters and meeting with the officials in Washington, DC, the US would not have had military 
troops intervene and impose their will.
56
  
 The Old Settlers held another meeting on November 10, 1839, to refute the People's 
Council government, which they considered Ross' seizure of the tribal government. Rogers, who 
held a personal hatred for the eastern chief, knew many Western Cherokees thought favorably of 
the People's Council's proposal. He sought to strengthen his faction by establishing a closer 
alliance with the Treaty Party. In joining with Watie, Rogers also accepted the War Department 
interfering in Cherokee affairs, an action few of the people wanted.
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 The factionalism became further complicated when a split occurred within the Western 
Cherokees. Sequoyah, Looney, and other leaders urged their followers to support reunion under 
the proposal of the People's Council. About two hundred Old Settlers agreed to accept the Act of 
Union. In addition, they voted to depose Brown and Rogers for siding with the Treaty Party and 
refusing unification on anything but their own terms. Rogers, John Smith, and a man called Dutch 
led those Western Cherokees who still opposed reunion. However, with violence increasing, 
Rogers fled to Mexico with his family.
58
  
 The People's Council reconvened at Tahlequah, its new capital, on September 6, 1839. 
Led by Ross' nephew, the constitutional committee presented its draft, closely modeled on that of 
the Eastern Cherokees from 1827. The council adopted the new constitution. It differed from the 
Eastern Cherokees' as it changed the elections of the principal and second principal chiefs to 
popular vote. The council and attendees elected officials, with Ross chosen as principal chief, and 
began other national business, such as developing foreign policy with other Indian nations. Under 
the new election system, the Old Settlers received at least one-third of posts. Some won offices, 
such as Dutch, but quickly resigned because they refused to recognize the new government.
59
 
 Soon after elections, the council voted to send Ross and a delegation to Washington, DC, 
to request a renegotiation of the Treaty of New Echota with better terms, as well as explain the 
justification for the Treaty Party killings. Once they arrived in the capital, Poinsett refused to 
meet with the delegation because he had heard rumors of Ross' involvement in the assassinations. 
Eventually, Poinsett agreed to meet the delegation without the chief. However, Poinsett stated he 
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did not recognize the Ross followers as the legitimate government of the Cherokees. Ross sent a 
petition to Congress in February 1840, but it did not accomplish anything.
60
  
 At the same time as the meeting with Ross' delegation, groups from both the Western 
Cherokees and the Treaty Party arrived to meet with Poinsett. They both informed the Secretary 
of War that they believed only a political and geographical division of the tribe would end 
difficulties. From November 1839 to the spring of 1841, all three factions repeatedly sent 
delegations to the US capital to negotiate for their political power. Although US officials 
supported the Western Cherokee government, they took no action. Ross continued to send several 
petitions and memorials. The People's government received few concessions, except gaining 
some of the withheld payments for removal.
61
 
 While the leaders held meetings in Washington, DC, chaos and civil war erupted within 
the Cherokee Nation. The issue of fully uniting all factions, as well as revenge for removal and 
the murder of the Treaty Party, led to seven years of internal guerilla warfare. The tribe had to 
postpone renegotiation with the US as it remained impossible in a nation where survival became 
the priority of most leaders. Killings occurred on both sides, with many people fleeing to 
Arkansas. The Cherokees argued among themselves whether the violence occurred because of the 
original betrayal of the Treaty Party or the murders of the Ridges and Boudinot. Assassinations 
remained common, with murders occurring almost weekly. Lawlessness abounded with arson, 
robbery, and gang crime. The fighting also destroyed agriculture and livestock, causing further 
death from disease and malnutrition. The anti-Ross factions furthered war within the nation in 
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order to get the intervention of the US military, which hopefully would depose Ross. The 
majority of citizens supported Ross, who won several re-elections as principal chief.
62
  
 Congress received word of the continuing violence and the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs conducted an investigation. Ross learned of the committee and submitted a memorial on 
April 20, 1840. The committee found that the War Department instigated and worsened the 
conflict and unrest in Indian Territory. The House refused to permit filing of the report because it 
negatively portrayed US officials. A member of the committee, John Bell, gave a copy to the 
press on July 27, 1840, which published it as "Bell's Suppressed Report."
63
 
 Bell's report showed the US government had broken the removal treaty by withholding 
the $800,000 due to the Eastern Cherokees in hopes it would force them to dissolve their 
government of the majority and join the more agreeable Old Settlers. The US had no legal right to 
choose the Western Cherokee government as the legitimate governing body for all Cherokees. 
The report criticized Secretary Poinsett in aiding minority rule and censured the War Department 
for unnecessary involvement in internal tribal affairs. Although no direct gains resulted from the 
report, it acknowledged unlawful interference in Cherokee politics.
64
    
 After seven years of internal warfare, the US fully intervened. Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs William Medill met with all three factions. He advised President Polk no compromise 
would reconcile the three parties and advised the division of the tribe into two separate nations. 
Arbuckle, now Indian agent to the tribe, also supported Medill's proposal. This obviously 
hindered the Cherokees' sovereignty and negotiation abilities with the US. Polk accepted Medill's 
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advice and asked Congress to create a bill breaking the Cherokees into two on April 13, 1846. On 
June 2, the House Committee on Indian Affairs reported it supported the president's 
recommendation and introduced a bill.
65
  
 To prevent division and losing everything he had worked for in the past seven years, Ross 
offered again to negotiate an agreement with the other two factions. Before Polk would agree to 
rescind his bill, Ross had to not only create a consensus with all parties involved but also 
acquiesce to several concessions by a committee appointed by the president. In another assault on 
autonomy, the federal government met with the Cherokees and began negotiating a "compulsory 
agreement" in the summer of 1846. If the Cherokees had been able to unify rather than resorting 
to violent factionalism, the federal government would not have been able to force additional 
concessions favorable to the US.
66
  
 Signed in August, the Treaty of 1846 united the Cherokees into a single nation with 
sacrifices made from all factions. Ross was forced to accept the Treaty of New Echota but the 
treaty enacted the Act of Union, the previously written constitution, and a patent to their seven 
million acres in Indian Territory. The Western Cherokees yielded their autonomy by conceding to 
Ross' leadership but gained a portion of the removal funds. The treaty granted amnesty to all past 
crimes and provided a settlement for the heirs of the Ridges and Boudinot. The US once again 
recognized Ross as the Principal Chief of the Cherokee. After the signing of the treaty, Ross and 
Watie shook hands to symbolize reconciliation and unity.
67
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 With a unified government, the Cherokees were able to focus on rebuilding their nation 
in Indian territory and fostering economic prosperity. In the period from 1846-60 the Cherokees 
utilized their political autonomy to focus on rebuilding their nation in Indian Territory and 
instilling economic prosperity. The Treaty of 1846 recognized their status as a sovereign nation 
but existed as such only with the interference and permission of the US. This furthered the 
precedence that the federal government maintained the right to divide or dissolve the tribe if it 
chose. The Cherokees soon adopted different strategies in the effort to secure their status as 
autonomous and maintain control over their internal affairs.  
 In efforts to convince the US of the importance of Cherokee sovereignty, the tribe wrote 
often to Congress to describe their "advanced civilization." They stated if their political status 
was curbed then their progress as a people would suffer as well. The tribe called themselves the 
"eldest brothers" of all Indians and as missionaries to the others who could serve as an example of 
the benefits of advancing civilization. The Cherokees also asserted that after the suffering of the 
Trail of Tears, the US owed them political autonomy. They mostly focused on the strategy of 
magnifying their progress toward civilization until the American Civil War.
68
 
 The Cherokees had once again achieved a thriving republic by the 1850s. The tribe kept a 
delegation in Washington, DC, permanently to remain current on any relevant issues. The tribe 
studied other politicians, developing important lobbying tactics and important personal relations. 
They hired lawyers, addressed US officials, reestablished a newspaper in 1844, The Cherokee 
Advocate, and solicited support from white reformers know as the "friends of the Indians." 
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Known as the "Golden Age of the Cherokee," the period from 1849-60 featured a rise in 
autonomy, infrastructure, and economics.
69
  
 The American sectional crisis regarding slavery and the dissolution of the Union 
shattered the decade of prosperity and autonomy of the Cherokees, despite their initial 
proclamation of noninvolvement. When civil war erupted in 1861, the tribe once again divided, 
along similar lines as before. The faction leaders from the removal crisis remained in charge. The 
same generation had the shared experiences of deaths caused by the Trail of Tears, losing their 
homelands, and bitter, violent feuding. Also, as before, internal fighting cost the tribe further 
rights to self governance as the US would capitalize on the instability.
70
  
 When the war began, Ross sought to remain neutral and issued a proclamation refusing 
any role in the American war. Most Cherokee supported the Union. However, the North made no 
effort to keep an alliance with Native Americans. Socially, the tribe had more connections with 
the South. Indian agents usually came from southern states and with the creation of the 
Confederacy, the entire federal bureaucracy in the Indian Territory resigned and joined the 
conflict. Socially, the Cherokees lived similarly to southerners, many living on plantations and 
owning slaves (such as Watie and Ross).
71
  
 Despite the declaration of neutrality, the old factions within the tribe chose opposing 
sides. The Treaty Party, which consisted mostly of wealthy slave owners, supported the South. 
Watie ignored Ross' proclamation and publicly announced he and his followers supported 
secession and planned to side with the Confederacy. Now known as the Southern Party or Watie 
Party, the proslavery minority still resented the persecution by Ross' followers and some saw the 
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 The Watie Party, sent a delegation to negotiate an alliance by treaty without any authority 
from the Cherokee government. In July 1861, General Ben McCullough made Watie a colonel 
and issued guns and supplies to a newly created company of Watie's three hundred followers.
73
  
 After the Southern Party aligned with the Confederacy, neutrality of the tribe in the 
American Civil War began to waiver. The Cherokee Nation began to divide between supporters 
of the North and the South. Ross feared his rivals would use their Southern alliance to seize 
control of the tribal government resulting in internal violence. To prevent this, Ross called a 
general council, open to all citizens, in August 1861. The chief proclaimed he believed it 
necessary to form an alliances with the Confederacy to keep the tribe unified and from fighting 
one another. Several months later, the Cherokees signed a treaty applicable to the entire tribe with 




 Despite Ross' actions, the tribe remained split between Northern and Southern supporters, 
which paralleled the same lines as the factional divisions prior to removal. Watie's soldiers 
formed the Knights of the Golden Circle, also known as the Southern Rights Party. Led by 
Reverend Evan Jones, Ross' pro-Union soldiers became the Keetoowahs, or the Pin Indians, who 
supported living according to traditional Indian culture. Many later became abolitionists.  
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  The American Civil War did not mark the first use of the term Keetoowah. The 
Keetoowah were founded in 1858 "when it became evident that the white men was invading the 
home of the Cherokees and by inter-marriage was gradually threatening to absorb the fullblood 
element."
75
 They stated "the term Keetoowah [was] the original word for Cherokee and the 
members of this society claim to represent the original Cherokee nation."
 76
 In addition, several of 
those who emigrated with the Old Settlers to the west in the early-nineteenth century referred to 
themselves as Keetoowah. 
 With the split in factions, the Cherokees began fighting each other, just as Ross had 
predicted. Ten thousand Union troops entered Indian Territory from Kansas and defeated the 
Cherokee soldiers who fought for the South. At this time, many Ross supporters deserted and 
joined the North, forming a federal regiment. In the meantime, Watie's men fled further south. 
Once several of his people defected to the North, Ross changed course and formally, the 
Cherokee tribe supported the Union.. Federal troops arrested Ross (much to his relief at seventy 
years old) at his home in Park Hill and transported him to Northern controlled territory in Kansas. 
The chief received a parole and spent the remainder of the war in the east, lobbying for the tribe 
in the US capital.
77
 
 After Ross' arrest, civil war within the tribe erupted once again between his supporters 
and Watie, similar to that of the 1840s. The Confederate Cherokees occupied Tahlequah and 
declared a new tribal government. Watie served as chief and his followers constituted the 
National Council. The Northern Cherokees returned a few months later and argued their 
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government had never ceased to exist and that Ross still held the office of chief. Violence and 
raids occurred rampantly throughout the territory, creating a situation that surpassed the guerilla 
warfare of the 1840s.
78
 
 Robert E. Lee surrendered, ending the Confederacy, on April 9, 1865. Watie did not 
capitulate until June 23, the last Southern general to do so. At this time, the Cherokee Nation lay 
in ruins, burned and desolate from all the fighting. In addition, the postwar Reconstruction era 
treaties would serve as an even further erosion of tribal sovereignty and once again factionalism 
had divided the Cherokees. The US capitalized with postwar treaties to gain a large portion of 
property belonging to the tribe as part of their removal concessions. The treaty also reduced 
political rights and the autonomy of the indigenous.
79
  
 To decide the tribe's postwar fate and punishment, five US commissioners met at Fort 
Gibson in September 1865 to negotiate treaties with the Five Tribes. Dennis Cooley, chairman of 
the commissioners, officially deposed Ross as principal chief. Ross fought to maintain the rights 
granted by earlier treaties but the division between the factions cost the tribe any united front to 
protest effectively. In the spring and summer of 1866, the Watie and Ross groups sent separate 
delegations to jockey for federal recognition.
80
  
 The resulting Treaty of 1866 ordered the Cherokee to abolish slavery and accept 
freedmen as full citizens. The tribe had to sell a portion of their land along the Kansas border and 
allow the future sale of the Cherokee Outlet for the resettlement of other tribes being removed to 
Indian Territory. The US established a new district court within the tribal nation for all cases 
involving American and Indian citizens. With this stipulation, the tribe lost further jurisdiction in 
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their own nation. Furthering eroding autonomy, the Cherokees were forced to help create a 
general council for Indian Territory as a multi-tribal legislature. This new body served as a step 
towards bringing the territory completely under US law, rather than allowing the tribes to handle 
their own affairs. Lastly, the US declared the right to establish one or more military posts within 
the nation, giving it the ability to maintain troops within tribal lands. Confederate states were to 
free their slaves but did not have the requirement of granting them full rights of citizenship, 
losing land, or relinquish the ability to try and prosecute crimes within their borders.
81
   
 More than four thousand Cherokees died in the war, leaving thousands of widows and 
orphans in poverty and facing starvation. The Cherokee, rife with factions, once again had to 
reunify their nation, with land, property, and livestock destroyed, and the territory in ruins. Unlike 
their unification after removal, the tribe now also had to contend with railroad rights of way 
(another concession in the Treaty of 1866), a white territorial government, and the increasing 
intervention of US courts in Indian Territory. In August 1866, Chief Ross died, leaving Lewis 
Downing in charge of rebuilding a nation and continuing the struggle for sovereignty during what 
would later become known as the allotment period. Fortunately, factional violence ended with the 
war. Stand Watie, John Ross, and other leaders of conflicts from the 1830s-40s died soon after 
and the younger leaders did not hold the same resentments from the previous period.
82
  
 After Ross' death, a power vacuum occurred as a struggle for control occurred between 
the Traditionals who supported Ross and the Progressives who followed Watie. Downing, who 
did not speak English, served as second principal chief and applied to finish Ross' term. The 
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National Council met in August 1866 and instead of confirming Downing as chief chose William 
P. Ross, the nephew of the late chief, to finish the term. Although determined to continue his 
uncle's policies, the Traditionals resented Ross, who lived an assimilated, wealthy lifestyle similar 
to that of the Progressives. Actually, neither faction fully supported the appointment, as the 
Traditionalists believed they had lost power and the Watie Party faced resentment from the new 
chief.
83
   
 Ross led the nation through the complicated Reconstruction era. The tribal government 
faced difficulties as a result of rebuilding their nation after the devastation of a war and the harsh 
terms of the Treaty of 1866, further external pressure resulted from US demands to sell the 
Cherokee Outlet, rights of way through the territory by the railroad companies, and a growing 
number of illegal white squatters. The Southern Party continued to send delegations separate from 
the official tribal government to Washington, DC. They opposed the Traditionalists and agitated 
for separate monetary settlements and political power. Lacking his uncle's charisma and 
effectiveness, William Ross stubbornly excluded Watie and his followers from any political 
decision making. However, the majority of the citizens remained alienated from the political 
process and instead focused on the daily struggle to rebuild their homes and lives. As a result, this 
prevented further factionalism as most were weary of fighting.
84
  
 With the supposed closing of the frontier at the end of the nineteenth century and white 
settlers clamoring for land, the US government searched for a solution that would create 
homesteads and eliminate the "Indian problem." Concurrently, social reformers in the east and 
self-proclaimed "friends of the Indian" believed assimilation into Anglo society remained the key 
to improving American Indian life. In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, which 
would divide tribal land of all except the Five Tribes. In 1893 the US created the Dawes 
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Commission to apply the policy to those initially exempted, ending the traditional practice of 
communal land ownership. In addition to changing the method of land holding, the allotment 
policy also included the Curtis Act of 1898, ending tribal governments and sovereignty.
85
  
 During the tribal election in August 1867, several people sought to create a compromise 
government between the two factions. In this process, political parties formed rather than warring 
factions. An adopted Cherokee citizen, John B. Jones established the Downing Party in 
opposition to Ross. Since he had made the first effort in communicating amicably with the Watie 
Party, who agreed to support him, Downing seemed the best candidate for achieving a 
compromise. Supported by several from both the Watie and Traditional factions, Downing won 
the 1867 election and took office in November. Appointing several government officials from the 
various factions, the Downing Party began the move towards national reconciliation.
86
   
 While this new generation of leaders proved more willing to cooperate than their 
predecessors, they grew up with the violence between the factions and resentments between 
leaders still existed. However, even with these bitter memories, this era of cooperation and 
collaboration fostered a prosperous golden era of the Cherokee republic. This period shows the 
positive results of working together, often only possible after a new generation of leaders with 
different shared experiences of those previous take charge. Within the time period of this work, 
this era of cooperation is rivaled only by the collaboration of various factions in the 1920s. 
However, the progress of the leaders in the 1870s-1880s was shortened by unfavorable US Indian 
policies of assimilation. In contrast, the leaders of the 1920s were able to take advantage of the 
favorable federal Indian policies of the 1930s. 
                                                          
85
 Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 183-5; McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 228-46. 
86
 Downing was reelected in 1871. McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 246-7; Denson, Demanding the 
Cherokee Nation, 179. 
59 
 
 Downing, reelected in 1871, exercised impressive political skill to keep the factions 
working together in a coalition government. By the 1870s, the nation had mostly overcome the 
bitter factionalism fighting of the past. However, as internal issues lessened, external forces 
pressures mounted. Before the American Civil War, the Cherokees had to deal with greedy 
homesteaders, cattle ranchers, and railroad companies vying for their land. Now, in addition to 
these continued issues, the loss of treaty negotiations, jurisdictional loss in criminal prosecution, 
and allotment all proved even more challenging.
87
  
 With the adoption of the assimilation policy through allotment, the relations between the 
US and tribes changed. In 1870, Congress abolished the treaty process, by which the Cherokees 
had long based their argument for the right to self-determination. US legislators stated that while 
the Supreme Court defined the tribes as "domestic, dependent nations," Congress retained plenary 
power to protect its wards regardless of treaties. In other words, Congress ranked its ideas of 
paternalism and responsibility towards the Indians above their self government, suggesting the 
US did not believe the tribes capable of taking care of themselves.
88
  
 In 1870, the Cherokee Tobacco Case affected all natives and redefined their place within 
the US by raising the question of the power of Congress to supersede treaty stipulations. Tribal 
lawyers used the case to argue that the Treaty of 1866 exempted Indians from excise taxes and 
that treaties remained the supreme law of the land. Congress had previously abolished the treaty 
process but did not invalidate the previous agreements. In January 1871, during the trial, 
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Congress declared that "No Indian nation or tribe…shall be recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe, or power with whom the U.S. may contract by treaty."
89
 
 On May 1, 1871, the judges ruled that "An act of Congress may supersede a prior 
treaty."
90
 The trial proved a major loss for all Indian nations as it abolished treaty rights and 
Congress maintained that it could legislate whatever it deemed best. After the decision, many 
Cherokees believed Congress could take away land held in common and begin pushing for 
private ownership of land, which would erode cultural traditions and mean the end of tribal 
government. Some Americans interpreted the ruling as defining Indian Territory as within the 
boundaries of the US. As a result, even more white settlers flooded into the area, exacerbating the 
intruder and jurisdiction issues.
91
  
 In regards to jurisdiction, the federal government further edged out tribal governments by 
applying its criminal jurisdiction over Indian Territory. After the Civil War, the Western District 
of Arkansas court moved from Van Buren to Fort Smith and gained authority over all crimes 
committed in Indian Territory except those between two natives. Indians could no longer 
administer justice to whites in their territory and as a result, lawlessness abounded. The US used 
the increase in criminal activity as an argument that the tribe could not maintain order. As a 
result, the US argued it must govern for the natives. In 1885, the US assumed jurisdiction over all 
crimes in Indian Territory with the Major Crimes Act. In 1889, a federal court opened in the 
territory, ending any remaining tribal control.
92
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 After undermining tribal legal jurisdiction, the federal government continued to work 
towards the further assimilation of Indian people to mainstream American society and abolishing 
tribal governments. In addition, reformers and white settlers promoted allotment as a solution to 
the "Indian problem," as well as a method ultimately to convert Indian Territory into a state. 
Defined as the policy of dividing tribal lands held communally into individually owned private 
property, allotment was intended to end all formal barriers dividing natives from the American 
population. Several earlier treaties with land cession aspects, including the Treaty of 1866, 
contained allotment clauses to be enacted when the tribe deemed themselves ready. In the late 
nineteenth century the US deemed the Indians ready.
93
 
 Although legislators had been arguing for allotment for a few decades, the Five Tribes 
resisted the policy by constantly keeping representative delegates in Washington, DC. The most 
support and progress towards private ownership came with its adoption by reformers who called 
themselves "friends of the Indians," including Senator Henry Dawes. During a speech at the Lake 
Mohonk Conference in 1885, Dawes stated that although the Cherokee Nation lacked extreme 
poverty and homelessness, the tribe could advance no further because "There [was] no 
selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization."
94
 This sentiment portrays the ethnocentricity 
of American reformers and legislators at the time. Dawes blamed communal land ownership for 
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illegal white intrusion into Indian Territory as they saw no organized homesteads, law and order, 
and assumed it was open land subject to no jurisdiction. 
 At the same time, reformers also endorsed private property as the foundation of American 
society and a way to prevent paucity and reliance on the US for subsistence. This belief 
contradicted Dawes' statements regarding the tribe lacking homelessness and poverty. However, 
in American society, the ownership of private property (especially land) marked prosperity. The 
Indian Rights Association supported opening surplus lands to white settlement because they 
believed it would accelerate assimilation as the natives would live among and learn from their 
Anglo American neighbors. Other reformers wanted to immediately grant US citizenship to 
natives and created boarding schools to separate the children from their parent's culture. 
Ultimately, reformers justified their actions with the argument that allotment served as the only 
way to save natives from inevitable extinction. They believed their culture would not survive the 
influx of American settlers and would eventually die out. Concurrently, these people did not mind 
destroying what they viewed as an inferior culture in order to "save" the natives.
95
  
 The US not only wanted to push the Indian to become a yeoman farmer, but also viewed 
allotment as a way to end tribal governments. The US would benefit from a lack of tribal 
government because the natives would have no organized structure from which to organize and 
protest US policy. In addition, the federal government would not have to negotiate or work with 
tribes in a manner similar to foreign nations. Legislators could make decisions as they saw fit, 
since they already characterized Indian land as property of the federal government and that 
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natives occupied it at the president's consent. In regards to treaties conveying land ownership to 
the tribes, officials maintained that since both parties broke these agreements, they were void.
96
  
 As a result of varying reactions to these extreme external pressures, factionalism 
reemerged during the late-nineteenth century regarding allotment. Like during removal, these 
divisions ultimately weakened any opposition against private ownership. Traditionals opposed 
allotment, wanting to continue their practice of holding land communally, while Progressives 
favored assimilation as they already lived among and similarly to Anglo Americans. Officially, 
and despite the political maneuvering of each faction, the Cherokee Nation formally maintained a 
stance against negotiating with the US regarding private ownership. One Cherokee politician 
stated that if they agreed to allotment, the people would become like the American poor who did 
"not own a foot of the earth's surface in which they could be buried."
97
 
 In addition to the fact that they didn't believe in private ownership, Traditionals also 
knew the US wished to end the Cherokee Nation as a sovereign nation, perhaps also even their 
culture and the people themselves. Traditionals usually rejected any assimilation and strove to 
preserve their culture, believing the tribe's difficulties resulted from turning away from their 
heritage. To them, communal land also represented security and remained more important than 
any economic opportunity in American society. Importantly, many Traditionals remained 
incapable of unrestricted interaction with whites because they did not speak English or 
understand private markets and trade.
98
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 Cherokee officials used the Traditionals and their associated image by whites as "weak 
and unenlightened" to argue against a change in US policy, which revolved around a debate over 
the best action for these people, marking a change in tactics.
99
 Previously, the tribe argued that 
their progressive achievements (living a sedentary agriculture lifestyle with an Anglo style 
government) gave them the right to be left alone. Now, the Cherokee changed their position, 
pointing out that due to the uncivilized state of most of their people, they needed to prepare and 
aid them first before any federal interaction. Tribal officials stated the Traditionals (who 
supported this argument) remained the most vulnerable under allotment and needed paternal care, 
which the Cherokee system provided better than any other. The Cherokees stated that until all of 




 Concurrently, most Progressives, and even some tribal leaders, supported allotment and 
assimilation. Many had intermarried with whites and already had settled on large farms or owned 
industries, businesses, and maintained commercial interests. The wealthy elite of the tribe mostly 
consisted of Progressives, with social differences strikingly obvious with the more simple living 
of the Traditionals. A few well known citizens, such as Elias C. Boudinot, favored the sale of 
land because they had agreements with and would benefit monetarily from their affiliations with 
railroads and businesses clamoring for more territory. Many had urged the people to voluntarily 
own land individually long before the federal government. Other groups joined the Progressives 
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in supporting allotment, such as freed slaves, who would receive their own land. However, 
regardless of faction, most Cherokees saw allotment as inevitable.
101
 
 The 1870s tribal elections centered on reactions to assimilation policies, as well as 
economic issues. In 1873, Chief Downing died and the people elected William P. Ross as 
principal chief. Also during this time, political parties shifted, becoming centered on ideas of 
blood quantum and economic interests and class. A form of populism emerged, with Traditionals 
dominating the Downing Party and working for lower class interests.
102
  
 While more cooperative, the factionalism from removal and the Civil War continued. 
When Stand Watie died in 1871, James M. Bell became the leader of the Watie followers, which 
became known as the Bell-Boudinot faction. This group, most related by family ties and Civil 
War alliances, opposed Chief Ross, as well as the Downing Party. Bell-Boudinots remained an 
alienated fringe faction throughout the 1870s and lobbied for the opening of Indian Territory to 




 In the 1875 political campaigns, the Traditionals gained the majority of leadership 
positions. By the time of these elections, Ross had alienated the Progressives by limiting annuity 
payments to those "of blood" and also to the Traditionals by not living according to their ancestral 
ways. In addition, hard economic times worked against the chief, with the populists blaming him. 
Later, in 1879, Dennis Bushyhead and Rabbit Bunch formed the National Independent Party to 
work against both the Downing Party and Ross.
104
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 In the 1875 elections, the Downing Party selected Charles Thompson, a Traditional 
spokesperson, as its candidate for chief while the National Party backed William P. Ross. Despite 
previous intratribal cooperation, opposition between the two parties escalated in violence in 1874, 
with political motivated killings on both sides during the 1875 election. Ross appealed to Fort 
Gibson for troops to maintain peace. He did not receive the assistance and only further alienated 
several Cherokees by inviting outside interference. At the end of the election, both parties 
claimed a victory and several hundred armed men gathered in Tahlequah. The National Council 




 As chief from 1875-79, Thompson called for Traditional domination. He served as the 
second Traditional chief elected after 1827. He sought to restore traditional living to the tribe and 
opposed any outside interference. Supporting Thompson and the new direction of tribal politics, 
the Keetoowah Society reorganized as a political party, joining with the Downing Party, to 
oppose Progressives, who they saw as corrupt. During the 1870s, Congress reviewed several bills 
that would create territories that would include the Cherokee Nation, and Thompson sent 
delegates to Washington, DC, to lobby against them. At the same time, the Bell-Boudinots made 
deals with railroads and businesses, sending their own delegates to support the creation of 
territories as a way to line their own pockets. Despite Thompson's actions and defeat of the bills, 
factionalism prevented any progress that would have been obtained with a single, united front.
106
 
 In 1879, the Cherokees held elections with the same divisions but without as much 
violence as those in 1875. Due to declining health, Thompson opted not to run again for chief. 
The National Independent Party selected Dennis Bushyhead while the Downing Party ran David 
Rowe. Without significant conflict, Bushyhead won the election and served as principal chief 
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until 1887. During his two terms, he dealt with issues such as railroad encroachment, education, 
white intruders, and the pressing allotment policy.
107
  
 The 1887 elections featured Joel B. Mayes on the Downing ticket and Rabbit Bunch for 
the National Party. Mayes won the election in August, but it was contested by the Downing Party. 
Rabbit Bunch's followers kept Mayes from taking office, and armed members of both sides 
arrived at Tahlequah. In January 1888, armed Downing Party members invaded the executive 
offices and installed Mayes as chief. Bushyhead willingly retired, preventing violence. Although 
Mayes identified well with the people and served from 1887-91. The new chief dealt with 
allotment as the  US began to take action to enforce its new policy.
108
 
  The assimilation policy that had been debated for a while by US politicians came forth 
with the passage of the 1887 General Allotment Act, also known as the Dawes Act for Senator 
Henry Dawes, the federal government received the authority to survey and divide tribal lands and 
override native governments with state/territorial and local jurisdiction. The president directly 
oversaw the assessment of territory, the preparation of tribal rolls, and the assignments of 
individual lots. The law stated that tribal land would be divided into one hundred sixty acres plots 
per head of household, eighty acres to single people over eighteen years of age and orphans, and 
forty acres to remaining single people under eighteen. The US would hold the land in trust for 
five years, during which it could not be sold or leased without the permission of the federal 
government. The land would remain exempt from US taxes for the first twenty five years to 
enable the owner to establish a successful farm. Natives could choose their own land within the 
first four years but if they failed to do so, officials would assign a plot to them. As a result, 
assimilation was not optional. Along with land, the natives would become US citizens and subject 
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to territorial laws. Surplus land would become US public domain and opened for settlement. 




 When Chief Mayes died in 1891, the National Council selected C. J. Harris to serve until 
the end of his term in 1895. Harris spent his time in office dealing with the proposed application 
of allotment to the Five Tribes. Harris negotiated the sale of the Cherokee Outlet and also 




 During allotment for the rest of the tribes, the US created the Jerome Commission as 
politicians and settlers coveted the six million acre Cherokee Outlet. The commission began 
negotiations with the tribe for the sale of the outlet in 1889. This action also broached the subject 
of allotment. As they did with the Dawes Commission, the tribe remained uninterested in 
anything to do with any loss of territory.
111
 
 The tribe especially opposed the sale of the Cherokee Outlet because it served as the 
nation's primary source of income. In 1883, they leased the land to the Cherokee Livestock 
Association, a group of cattlemen from Kansas, for $100,000 a year. In 1889 they received 
$200,000 for the renewed lease. The cattlemen opposed the allotment and sale of the outlet 
because they received a better price from the tribe than they would the federal government. Also, 
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 In 1890, the US began implementing various strategies to persuade the tribe to sell the 
outlet. President Harrison announced that livestock could no longer graze in the area, ending the 
lease with the Cherokee Livestock Association that brought in a substantial portion of the tribe's 
operating budget. Congress then announced the US would support illegal settlement of whites 
immigrating from Kansas rather than respect and enforce treaty obligations. The US argued that a 
portion of the Treaty of 1866 gave it the right to the title of the outlet if the tribe did not currently 
use the land, meaning farming and living as Anglo Americans. Leasing obviously did not 
constitute active use. The federal government also determined the lease of the outlet illegal, since 




 With the loss of income from the outlet leases, the Cherokees were forced to begin 
negotiations for sale. They engaged the advice of two law firms to stall the passage of US 
legislation calling for forced acquisition of the outlet. Chief Mayes believed that the nation, as the 
seller, should stall bargaining in order for the property value of the land to increase. The Jerome 
Commission offered $1.25 per acre, but the tribe refused as they had previously received an offer 




 The Jerome Commission and Cherokee delegation jockeyed for the upper hand in 
negotiations, engaging in a form of diplomatic chess. The officials recognized the natives as 
intelligent and skilled politicians, and as a result refrained from the usual implied threats and half 
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truths utilized against natives with less experience dealing with Anglo Americans. Eventually, the 
Cherokees lost their bargaining position as they endured a particularly difficult year. They 
declared they had made the final offer in December 1892. The Jerome Commission promised an 
additional $80,000, but the natives declined, stating they would accept $8,595,736.12. The 
commission agreed and submitted the paperwork by which the US purchased the 6,022,754 acres. 
The National Council quickly ratified with the support of the majority of voters on January 4, 
1892. Each Cherokee citizen received a payment of $265.65.
115
 
 During the sale of the Cherokee Outlet, the white settlers in Indian Territory began 
calling for their own government. On May 2, 1890, the Organic Act created Oklahoma Territory. 
The act provided rules for its governance and originally only applied to the Unassigned Lands 
opened to settlement in 1889 but eventually included the Oklahoma district and Indian Territory. 
Territorialization, besides violating the terms of several treaties, meant continued assimilation and 
the eventual dissolution of tribal government.
116
 
 Due to previous lobbying and negotiations, the Five Tribes remained exempt from the 
Dawes Act for a time. However, this was most likely due to the fact that Congress needed to deal 
with the legal issues raised by changing the title to their lands from the methods outlined in 
previous treaties. In order to force allotment, the federal government had to negotiate and come to 
an agreement with each of the Five Tribes. In 1893 Congress passed an amendment to the 
General Allotment Act to include the previously exempted tribes. The US sent the Dawes 
Commission to negotiate an agreement for allotment with the remaining tribes.
117
  
                                                          
115
 Hagan, Taking Indian Lands, 87, 96, 144, 152-3, 155-60, 163-4; Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 189; 
Rolison, “The Cherokee Nation from Indian Territory to Statehood,” 71-5. 
116
 McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 96-7; Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 188; Rolison, “The Cherokee 
Nation from Indian Territory to Statehood,” 78. 
117
 Harmon, “American Indians and Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age,” 107; Denson, Demanding the 
Cherokee Nation, 216; Rolison, “The Cherokee Nation from Indian Territory to Statehood,” 66; Kelley, 
Federal Indian Policy, 76; Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five Civilized Tribes, 
ix, 1, 3; Conley, The Cherokee Nation, 194. 
71 
 
 The Dawes Commission traveled throughout Indian Territory from 1894-96 in an attempt 
to secure agreements for allotment. The commission initially just sought responses from native 
leaders and attended tribal council meetings to speak on the advantages of private property. In 
1894, only the Creeks and Cherokees responded to their correspondence. The commission tried to 
convince the indigenous that they maintained a voice in their future while simultaneously politely 
threatening them. They informed the natives that they found tribal governments no longer useful, 
warning them if they did not negotiate the US could not protect them from the assaults of 
squatters and business interests.
118
 
 The commission wrote to Chief Harris in May 1894 to request a meeting, informing him 
that the US would impose the policy and take charge of their government regardless. During their 
first meeting, Harris told the US officials he did not have the appropriate authority to negotiate, 




 On July 25, 1894, the commission sent the tribe an official written proposal while visiting 
the nominating conventions of the Downing and National parties. Harris stated that he would not 
meet to negotiate since his term as chief was coming to an end, but he promised to submit the 
proposal to his successor.
120
 
 The Cherokees chose Samuel Houston Mayes, brother of Joel B. Mayes, as principal 
chief  in an uneventful election. Mayes served from 1895-1899, during the most contentious 
period of allotment. Mayes dealt with the pressure from the Dawes Commission seeking to force 
allotment as the majority of Cherokees still opposed the policy. Mayes refused to meet with the 
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commission several times, stating the nation remained forever opposed to any changes. Even 
worse, the chief faced the legislation that marked the end of tribal governments.
121
 
 When the Dawes Commission failed to find any tribal leaders willing to negotiate, they 
traveled throughout Indian Territory to speak with any citizens they could find. Most Traditionals 
opposed allotment, so the officials tried to find natives who supported the policy to help them 
promote to the others. The commission found those from various factions with personal slights. 
The commission heard stories of corruption from the Progressives and intermarried whites. These 
discontented citizens provided the commission and Congress with evidence needed to attack the 
system of independent tribal governments. With this information, the Dawes Commission 
reported back to Washington, DC, in late 1894.
122
 
 The Indian Appropriation Bill of 1893 required the commissioners to report their 
progress to the Secretary of the Interior. On November 20, 1894, the commission filed its first 
report, blaming their lack of progress on tribes refusing to negotiate. The report also described the 
harsh conditions in Indian Territory, including that lawless white settlers had overrun the land, 
and that tribal elites (Progressives) exploited the communal land. Many Americans had married 
Indian women and taken over large portions of territory. The commission stated the resistance 




 In addition, the commissioners launched an attack against tribal governments by 
describing them as run by the corrupt "mixed blood" elites and intermarried whites at the expense 
of the "full bloods." Due to the supposed incompetent tribal governments and courts, crimes such 
as robbery and murder remained unpunished. In the negligence of order, the officials reported that 
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the natives had violated treaty terms, in which they held land in trust from the US. Dawes 
recommended that the US revoke the autonomy of the tribes and either enforce treaty stipulations 
or "discharge the trustees."
124
 The commission concluded their report by suggesting Congress 
should ignore treaties,  proceed with allotment, and end tribal governments.
125
 
 The first report of the Dawes Commission caused considerable controversy. Critics in 
Washington, DC, stated the officials misrepresented information in order to persuade Congress to 
open land for settlement. Once the report was printed and widely distributed, it caused angry 
reaction amongst the natives. Each of the Five Tribes sent delegations to Washington, DC, to 
counter the growing sentiment against tribal government. Chief Mayes called the allegations, "all 
a lie, false as hell."
126
 The National Council sent a six page reply to the report to the capitol on 
December 8, 1894. 
 The Dawes Commission returned to Indian Territory, establishing its headquarters in 
Muskogee. They set to work surveying Cherokee lands, even though no agreement had been 
reached with the tribe. As in 1894, native leaders avoided meeting with the officials, always 




 Again without any marked progress, the Dawes Commission returned to Washington, 
DC, to give its second report on November 18, 1895. Officials repeated most of the information 
from the previous year, stating that conditions had not improved. Importantly, the report 
emphasized the belief that natives remained incapable of self government. Dawes stated that he 
felt it impossible to achieve his goals through negotiation and recommended that Congress take 
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 The second report caused the same controversy as the first. On January 15, 1896, Chief 
Mayes sent a twenty seven page letter of reply to Congress. He argued that the commission 
misrepresented the conditions in his territory. Mayes said Cherokees remained "contented with 
their condition," citing examples of Supreme Court cases to prove the federal government had 
"no authority to legislate away their treaty rights."
129
  
 Frustrated by the lack of results by the Dawes Commission, Congress passed the first in a 
series of acts that increased its to impose allotment, hindering tribal authority. In February 1896, 
the Committee on Indian Affairs gave the commission the authority to determine the citizenship 
of each tribe, creating rolls the US would utilize for enrollment for allotment.  Other legislators 
proposed harsher and more forceful measure to organize Indian Territory, but President 
Cleveland preferred to negotiate with the tribes.
130
 
 The Dawes Commission returned to Indian Territory for the third time in May 1896, 
establishing its headquarters in Vinita within the Cherokee Nation. The officials began processing 
applications for tribal citizenship as well as continuing to negotiate allotment agreements. Dawes 
decided to use existing tribal rolls and add names to them as he believed many were left off due 
to tribal corruption and political conflict.  
 The process of determining citizenship proved difficult as the commission had only three 
clerks, a poor organizational system, and a limited time period. After the commission finished 
enrolling natives, the federal court reviewed appealed cases for those who believed they were 
wrongfully left off of the rolls. In addition, each application also had to be sent to the tribal 
                                                          
128
 Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five Civilized Tribes, 10. 
129
 Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five Civilized Tribes, 10. 
130
 Hagan, Taking Indian Lands, 164; Carter, The Dawes Commission and the Allotment of the Five 
Civilized Tribes, 12. 
75 
 
chiefs, who had to approve or reject it within thirty days. Tribes hired their own lawyers to 
prevent the commission from adding thousands of people they considered intruders as they had 
never held tribal rights. The Dawes Commission utilized blood quantum requirements, which 
excluded some natives as they could not prove they held at least one-half native ancestry. 
Controversy remained constant regarding who to include on rolls, which came with shares of 
tribal land and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
131
 
 The Cherokees vehemently opposed the commission, still refusing any cooperation. 
Some delayed the policy by providing enrollment officers the names of all the dogs and horses in 
their villages for the assignment of a lot. Others flatly refused to put their names on the rolls or 
answer any questions. Several natives retreated to settle deep in the hills to avoid contact with the 




 The Dawes Commission accepted citizenship applications until September 10, 1896, and 
later enrolled tribal citizens without their consent. After the commission finished, and after the 
federal court reviewed appealed cases, the US denied two-thirds of the 300,000 applicants. Under 
US law, the Dawes Rolls remained the final authority on tribal membership. At this point, the 
tribes no longer determined the requirements of becoming or being a citizen, a primary marker of 




 After the closing of the rolls, the Dawes Commission sought to enroll each tribal citizen 
who did not send in an application. Congress debated passing additional legislation after several 
tribes refused to negotiate. The change of federal administration in 1897 ushered in officials even 
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more willing to force allotment. President Cleveland had always favored negotiation over force 
but his successor, William McKinley, was willing to utilize all the power of the federal 
government necessary to achieve allotment. Those eager for economic gain pushed for these bills 
and statehood, while the opposition from the Five Tribes weakened due to internal dissension. 
From these interests came the Curtis Act in 1898, which officially ended US recognition of tribal 
governments and any sovereign authority of the natives.
134
 
 The Curtis Act terminated tribal governments and instituted a civil administration, 
created by the US, for all of Indian Territory. The act required all to submit to allotment, which 
paved the way for statehood for the territory. Tribal governments would continue until all land 
had been allotted to aid in speeding along the process. However, any legislation passed by tribal 
councils after 1898 required approval of the president. In addition, the US assumed control over 
civil and criminal issues in Indian Territory, fully ending any native jurisdiction. Lastly, the act 
authorized the Dawes Commission to begin assigning private allotments as soon as citizenship 
rolls were completed with or without the consent of American Indians.
135
 
 By 1898, the Dawes Commission had signed agreements with all of the Five Tribes 
except for the Cherokees. The Curtis Act seemed to target specifically the opposition of the 
Traditionals, who refused to even speak with the commission, including concerning making rolls 
for the freedmen who they did not see as tribal citizens. After the act, US officials gained the 
authority to enroll all citizens and punish anyone hindering their work. The Cherokees attempted 
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to fight the new legislation in US courts because it violated previous treaties but eventually they 
faced no other choice but to accept allotment.
136
 
 Regardless of US laws and actions, the Cherokees still held an election in 1899. Wolf 
Coon ran for the National Party and Thomas Buffington represented the Downing Party. Despite 
a lack of active campaigning, Buffington won by a majority of approximately four hundred votes. 
During his term from 1899-1903 Buffington served concurrently with the final arrangements of 
allotment. As a supporter of the Curtis Act, the chief spent most of his time attempting to 




 The Dawes Commission did not begin the enrollment of the Cherokees until eighteen 
months after the passage of the Curtis Act. The officials waited because, as the largest of the Five 
Tribes, the Cherokees had the potential to cause problems and would most likely put up the most 
resistance. In addition, allotment remained complicated for this tribe as they had adopted the 
Delaware Indians on April 8, 1867, and the ambiguity of the signed document for this action led 
to a disagreement on property rights. Similar conflicts occurred when the Shawnees were moved 
into the same territory on June 7, 1869. Nevertheless, the commission continued enrollment and 
detailing tribal citizenship rolls.
138
 
 Forced to negotiate, the Cherokee delegates on January 7, 1889, agreed to submit an 
agreement to allot their land and dissolve their government to the people. A majority of citizens 
voted for the agreement on January 31. Many realized that earlier refusing the policy had cost 
them more favorable terms, and must now viewed private ownership as inevitable. For an 
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unknown reason, Congress refused to ratify this agreement but passed the results of a different 
negotiation that took effect in April 1900. Each citizen received an equal share of lands in the 
form of eighty acres and an equalization payment from the proceeds of excess land. The property 
would remain in trust for twenty five years, ineligible for sale, lease, or taxation. These 
exemptions served to give the natives time to learn farming for individual profit before having to 
pay taxes. At the end of the twenty five years, each would receive a title and unrestricted lease to 
the their plot. The Dawes Commission began its work amongst the Cherokees in the spring of 
1902, the same year the tribe signed their official allotment agreement. The dismantling of the 
traditional communal ownership and tribal government began in 1903.
139
 
 While the majority of the tribe had resigned themselves to their fate, a few Traditionals 
continued to rebel. The Keetoowah Society actively opposed allotment beginning in the 1890s. 
As implementation began, they harassed and interfered with the US officials until their leaders 
faced jail terms. The group softened its anti-allotment stance around 1900, but many Traditionals 
did not wish to surrender. A member of the National Council, Redbird Smith formed a more 
traditional group, the Nighthawk Keetoowah Society. Separate from the Keetoowah Society, the 
Nighthawks soon grew to 5,500 members consisting of mostly Traditionals.
140
   
 Smith kept the opposition to allotment alive, vowing to return the tribe to traditional 
ways. The Nighthawks demanded Americans honor all treaties and leave the Cherokees alone. In 
November 1890, Smith sent a petition to Washington, DC, to state that the Nighthawks did not 
"recognize the right or authority of the officers of the U.S." to make a roll or determine Cherokee 
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 As this resistance grew, the US became more aggressive to achieve the enrollment of all 
Indians, sending out US Marshals to force natives to sign for allotments. Smith and his followers 
faced jail sentences and fines as they hid from the officials in the eastern hills. In February 1902, 
the US District Court in Muskogee ordered Smith and eleven other Cherokees to appear at its 
office on March 15, 1902, to be enrolled. Smith appeared on the assigned date but refused to 
enroll. The court ordered the Nighthawks to "be confined in the U.S. jail until they do enroll." 
After a night in jail, Smith appeared before the Dawes Commission, which enrolled him as three-
fourths Cherokee and also his children. Many of the others finally registered, but some still 
continued to refuse. The Dawes officials enrolled the remaining rebels without their consent.
142
  
 Buffington failed to gain nomination in the 1903 Cherokee elections. Instead, William C. 
Rogers ran for the Downing Party and E. L. Cookson represented the National Party. Rogers won 
and served as the last elected chief under the Curtis Act. Since the Cherokee government only 
existed after 1898 to finish the allotment process, Rogers' role remained mostly honorary, as the 
US had assumed all major functions of the nation.
143
 
 Even though some felt resigned, most Cherokee still opposed allotment. Tribal citizens 
began to view Rogers as too cooperative with the US government. When he refused to call the 
usual biennial election of the National Council, many saw it as an act of tyranny preventing the 
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constitutional right of the people to select their representatives. Internal dissension occurred, 
leading, yet again, to the US interfering and overriding the decisions and actions of the tribe.
144
 
 With the sometimes violent factionalism that began and continued after removal from the 
east, the Cherokee continued to face these intratribal fissures throughout the nineteenth century 
and up to the twentieth. As a result, the Cherokee were politically weakened against the new US 
policy of allotment, even impeaching their chief in the eleventh hour of the US recognition of 
their government. However, after facing the dissolution of their tribal government, the factions 
realized they needed each other in order to have a chance of improving conditions for their people 
as well as continuing their way of life. 
 These previous events illustrated the long history of intratribal factionalism within the 
Cherokee tribe. The conflicts that began with the internal reactions to the external pressures of 
removal, uniting into a single tribal government in Indian Territory, and involvement in the 
American Civil War affected willingness to cooperate. The new generation of leaders from the 
1870s-1880s lacked these intense grudges and as a result were able to work together and create a 
golden era for the Cherokees. This progress ended as the US passed assimilationist Indian 
policies, causing the tribe to once again split over these new external issues. This level of 
intratribal cooperation would not be seen again until the 1920s. However, the leaders during the 
1930s faced more favorable federal Indian policy, taking advantage of the policies of the Indian 
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DISSOLUTION OF A NATION, 1900s-1920s 
 Many Cherokees had resigned themselves to allotment in the early twentieth century. The 
tribal government continued but, according to the US, only to facilitate allotment. As allotment 
took a longer time to implement than estimated for such a large tribe, the US continued to further 
define and clarify the place of American Indians within its society. In 1905, with tribal 
dissolution impending, most of the Five Tribes and other tribes in Indian Territory supported a 
separate Indian state at the same time that white settlers called for statehood for themselves. The 
last Cherokee council spent their final meetings agreeing to work towards the State of Sequoyah. 
However, once the change of a native state passed, a group of Cherokees continued to fight 
allotment. Internal conflict occurred when this group viewed those resigned to assimilation as 
standing in their way.
1
 
 With surplus lands after allotment open to white homesteaders, these new arrivals to 
Oklahoma Territory called for statehood, which would include Indian Territory. Talk of statehood 
began soon after the establishment of Oklahoma Territory in 1890. The debate between 
separating or joining the Twin Territories (Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory) received 
interest all over the US due to the shift it would cause in the federal government's delegates and 
representation. As early as 1866, the possibility of Indian Territory becoming a state had been 
raised as the treaty of that year included language that encouraged the tribes to establish a 
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territorial government in preparation for further organization by the US. However, statehood 
served as a further violation of tribal sovereignty as had been promised in previous treaties. This 
included the Treaty of New Echota, which declared that no other governments would be placed 
over them. Cherokees feared a territorial government would also lead to the further opening of 
their land for even more white settlement. Until 1903, the Five Tribes and other tribes in Indian 
Territory generally opposed all local and national efforts for statehood, regardless of separate or 
joined with Oklahoma Territory. With the end of tribal government as of March 4, 1907, rapidly 
approaching, the tribes became more concerned and formed intratribal channels to funnel interest 
in a separate, single Indian state. Without tribal governments, the natives believed having their 
own state would enable them to retain self-determination and continue to govern. Mentions of 
fighting against the Curtis Act and the ending of US recognition decreased at this time, more than 
likely because an Indian state provided a solution that would enable the tribe to retain their self-
determination as a part of a larger indigenous polity. 
2
 
 On August 21, 1905, a statehood convention was held in Muskogee at the Hinton 
Theatre. The Muskogee Democrat called it the "largest Indian meeting ever held in the United 
States."
3 
W. C. Rogers called the meeting to order and introduced Reverend Grant Evans, who 
gave a blessing. Rogers proclaimed that the “Five Civilized Tribes unanimously favor and seek 
separate  and independent statehood; the said privileges allowed by existing and inevitable 
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 He also argued “that owing to peculiar conditions existing in the territory it cannot be 
joined to Oklahoma without doing injustice to the citizens of the former [Indian] territory.”
5
 The 
convention later stated it would call the attention of Congress to the fact that natives, as well as 
whites, demanded some form of government and that American Indians were fully prepared to 
assume the responsibilities of that government. They argued that with the dissolution of tribal 
governments, natives would have nothing "to say about the law that would govern them when 
they became American citizens" unless they had their own state. In addition, the work of the 
required constitution committee would also "be proof positive of the ability and brilliancy of the 
Indians of the five civilized tribes [sic] and of their fitness for self government."
6
 Even though the 
Cherokees and the other Five Tribes had been operating under constitutional republics for quite 
some time before the Dawes Act, they still felt the need to prove their governing abilities to the 
US. Regarding tribal government, however, no amount of experience in politics would stop the 
course of the assimilation policy. 
 Rogers called the meeting to order and D. C. McCurtain (son of Chief Green McCurtain 
of the Choctaws) was chosen as the temporary chairman. The secretary read the list of delegates 
from the twenty-six districts of Indian Territory and afterwards it was unanimously decided that 
the chiefs called for the convention would be the Committee on Credentials. W. H. Murray 
moved that a committee of six representatives of each nation be appointed to a permanent 
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council. A motion was offered that a committee be appointed from each one of the twenty six 
recording districts of Indian Territory, to be selected by the various tribal delegations, but it was 
voted down. Murray's original proposal was accepted. When a more permanent structure was 
agreed upon, Chief Pleasant Porter of the Creek was chosen as chairman and Alexander Posey as 
secretary. Resolutions were unanimously passed instructing the delegates to vote for Tahlequah 




 The members of the convention argued that no procedure of creating new states is in the 
United States Constitution or laws; instead, they had been admitted to the Union on a case-by-
case basis. Rogers and Scott stated that since no constitutional procedure existed, they should be 
able to create an Indian state because it was not expressly forbidden. They also used the example 
of other states that were organized with the people of the proposed state petitioning Congress and 
without an enabling act. Rogers and Scott cited Vermont, Tennessee, Michigan, Arkansas, 
Florida, Iowa, California, and Oregon as examples. However, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
provided three provisions for admitting states: a congressionally appointed governor, secretary, 
and three judges; then an elected assembly and one nonvoting delegate to Congress; and lastly 
once the population of free males reaches sixty thousand, the territory drafts a constitution subject 
to US federal approval.  
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 In an additional argument, W. H. Murray argued that two states would not be more 
expensive to the federal government than one because "most economic governments are the small 
ones."
8
 In addition, denying the people of Indian Territory the right to assemble and propose to 
Congress admission of the territory was to "deny rights which we believe are guaranteed by the 
constitution."
9
 Those who viewed separate statehood as a means to maintain self-determination 
for natives sought to operate within the white political system to achieve their goals, a method 
different than the dissenting Traditional Keetoowahs. The convention adjourned until September 
5, when they would hear the reports of the various committees and adopt a constitution.
10
 
 The convention also cited the language of previous treaties that would support a native 
state. In the "Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands of the Cherokee Nation…" from July 
1902 abolished tribal government on March 4, 1906.
11
 However, that act violated the Treaty of 
1835. The natives cited the language of Article 5 of the Treaty of 1835: "The United States 
covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation in the foregoing article shall in no 




 Leaving them without a government, but also free from any state or jurisdiction, the only 
way the US could keep its treaty promises was to give natives their own state according to the 
convention. The leaders of the meeting clearly sought to navigate within Anglo American law 
                                                          
8
 “Convention on Statehood, W. C. Rogers, et. al.” Muskogee Democrat (Muskogee, Indian Territory), 
August 21, 1905. Folder 78, Box 2, William Charles Rogers Collection [WHC].  
9
 William Stryker, ed. "A Proclamation of W. C. Rogers and Green McCurtain," The Tulsa Democrat 
(Tulsa, Indian Territory), July 14, 1905. Folder 69, Box 2, William Charles Rogers Collection [WHC]; 
Clyde P. Kendall, ed. "Convention Called by W. C. Rogers and Green McCurtain," The Madill News 
(Madill, Indian Territory), July 14, 1905. Folder 70, Box 2, William Charles Rogers Collection[WHC]; 
Richard Mize, "Sequoyah Convention," in Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and Culture, 
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=SE021 (accessed October 11, 2017). 
10
 “Editorial on W. C. Rogers, Green McCurtain, et. al.” Broken Arrow Ledger (Broken Arrow, Indian 
Territory), August 24, 1905; Mize, "Sequoyah Convention." 
11
 US Congress. Cherokee Agreement Act, April 1, 1890. 56th Congress, 2nd sess., 1901; US Congress. 




 sess., 1902. 
12




 sess., 1902; "Treaty 
with the Cherokee, 1835. Dec. 29, 1835. 7 Stat., 311. Proclamation, May 23, 1836."  [Kappler]. 
86 
 
and treaty making to create a legal basis for their own state with natives making their own 
decisions. However, Congress had declared the treaty making process ended and null, with 
several politicians remarking that treaties were no longer valid because the tribe violated their 
terms as well as the US without providing many examples of such violations.
13
  
 Choctaw Chief Green McCurtain early on served as a strong supporter of Indian 
statehood. However, according to The Signal newspaper, immediately following the publication 
of the call for a convention, McCurtain repudiated the use of his name in the cause. He reportedly 
stated that he was not "in sympathy with the move and that he had been coaxed into allowing the 
use of his name against his will" and before he fully understood the issue.
14
 No such reversal is 
known of any Cherokee factions or leaders. It is possible that McCurtain, in negotiations for 
claims with the US on behalf of his tribe, may have feared the federal government would view 
this involvement as dissent and react less than favorably. During the first convention meeting, 
Rogers and W. H. Scott addressed the gathering to make the point that they “stood for no political 
intrigues” and that they did not carry a disloyal spirit or seek any danger of a conflict of 
authority.
15
 Separate statehood was not a sign of rebellion against the United States for having 
their own tribal governments abolished. 
 While the indigenous lobbied for their own state, the implementation of allotment and the 
Curtis Act continued. Tribes still had to prepare for the dissolution of their governments. During 
the last regular meeting of the National Council in Tahlequah in September 1905, Rogers 
proposed taking action to settle the business of the tribe before the dissolution of their 
government. The tribe needed to decide issues such as final land distributions and the 
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continuation of the nation’s schools. However, going forward any action taken by the Cherokee 
government required approval of the US Secretary of the Interior and the president.
16
  
 In order to give the US authorities the opportunity to review the tribe’s acts, it needed to 
submit their provisions by the time Congress convened at the beginning of December. Rogers 
recommended the creation of a commission of three delegates to represent the Cherokee Nation 
before the US government and submit their requests. The chief stated that he believed the US 
President would not withhold approval from reasonable legislation enacted by the National 
Council to aid in the final disposition of tribal affairs.
17
 
 An act passed by the council authorized Rogers to create the “Business Commission” to 
represent the nation in Washington, DC, to close their affairs with the advice and consent of the 
Cherokee Senate. It would consist of three men, receiving $15 a day with the maximum allowed 
for the commissioners capped at $1,000. However, no payment or compensation would be made 
until they were able to indicate to the principal chief the willingness of the US government to 
receive the commission and negotiate final terms. The delegates would meet and negotiate with 
the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes (also known as the Dawes Commission), the 
Secretary of the Interior, and other US authorities. Any agreement the commission made “shall be 
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binding upon the Cherokee Nation to a popular vote of the Cherokee people and shall not be 
binding upon the Cherokee Nation unless ratified by a majority vote of the legal voters….”
18
 In 
addition to creating the commission, the final council also made provisions to continue limited 
government, including the posts of the three commissioners, one clerk, principal chief, three 
citizenship attorneys, one national attorney, and a secretary/interpreter.
19
 
 The majority of the business of the final regular council meeting, as well as a special 
session called by the chief on November 10 in the old capitol building in Tahlequah, focused on 
supporting separate statehood for Indian Territory and against joint statehood with Oklahoma. In 
October, the council via unanimous vote passed a joint resolution endorsing the chiefs of the Five  
Tribes in calling for a convention in Muskogee to adopt a state constitution. The pro-separate 
state convention with multiple tribes met again on September 8, 1905, to adopt a constitution to 
be submitted to Congress for approval as necessary to become a separate state.
20
 The National 
Council's resolution cited the legal basis for separate statehood as article 5 of the Treaty of 1835 
that read, “The United States covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee nation in 
the foregoing article shall in no future time, without their consent, be included within the 
territorial limits or jurisdiction of any state or territory.”
21
 According to this treaty, the US could 
not include tribes within a new state, so the natives should have their own. 
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 Along with Rogers and representatives of the Cherokee Nation, the Keetoowah Society 
also worked towards dual statehood. They made two important alliances for their cause, Robert 
Owen and Frank J. Boudinot. Owen, 1/16th Cherokee and later one of Oklahoma's first senators, 
presented a memorial for the Keetoowah Society at the Sequoyah Convention in 1905. Owens 
and Boudinot had worked together before, successfully prosecuting claims against the US 
government on the Keetoowah's behalf. Boudinot had been appointed as legal counsel for the 
society in 1896 and served as its secretary in 1901. This partnership lessened the long standing 
resentments between the old Treaty Party and Ross Faction. Frank J. Boudinot was a relative of 
the slain Elias Boudinot and leader of the party initiated by Stand Watie, and it would seem that 
Boudinot would not want to work with the descendents of the Ross Faction.
22
 
 A Boudinot/Watie/Ridge descendant working with the traditional Keetoowah when their 
ancestors had been firmly on the Progressive side illustrates the shift in the new generation of 
leaders. Boudinots had been in the Treaty Party and fought against the Traditionals in the Ross 
Party in the early nineteenth century. As that generation passed, those such as Frank J. Boudinot 
worked with whomever possessed common goals rather than past alliances or familial grudges. 
Boudinot and his generation did not experience the same intratribal violence, feelings of betrayal, 
or hardships their relatives had endured, such as the Trail of Tears and the conflict regarding 
removal, the assassinations of the Treaty Party, or the split during the American Civil War 
between Ross and Watie followers. Instead he collaborated with anyone he believed shared his 
goal of opposing assimilation as the best method to preserve Cherokee self-determination. This 
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new generation willing to collaborate without the previous grudges expands, ultimately serving as 
the beginning indicators of the later cross-factional cooperation of the 1920s. 
 With the majority of white settlers in Indian Territory against separate statehood, 
Congress never seriously considered the constitution for the state of Sequoyah. Homesteaders 
clamored for more land as the population crowded the northeastern US states. Many settlers saw 
single statehood as a way to remove the restrictions on the sale and taxation of Indian lands from 
allotment. This would create revenue for the state as well as make available even more land for 
settlement. In addition, those seeking political balance in Congress would not have agreed to the 
admission of two Western, radical, and most likely Democratic states rather than just one. Dual 
statehood supporters faced powerful enemies, such as Judge Thomas H. Doyle from Perry. Doyle 
testified before the House Committee on Territories that a large number of indigenous in Indian 
Territory had only a small percentage of blood. The remaining Keetoowah and Crazy Snake 
Indians (Creek traditionals), who most ardently supported native statehood, existed at such a low 
population single statehood served as the only logical option.
23
  
 At the end of July 1905, Rogers announced that he would not call for the scheduled 
election in early August for National Council members. Instead, he mandated that the current 
council continue in various special session meetings to wrap up the affairs of the nation. A special 
session would be held in October but no regular session in November, when the newly elected 
officers normally would take office. The Cherokee held elections every two years, its Senate 
consisted of eighteen men and the House held forty.
24
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 Rogers' denial of a new election, which was mandated by tribal law, enraged the 
opposing faction of citizens who considered the present legislature as full of "Rogers' men" or 
"progressive men" having the majority of the vote.
25
 They stated that the chief did not want to call 
a new election because he did not want to lose the majority of the National Council vote and was 
winding up tribal affairs without consulting the Cherokee people. Rogers unofficially stated that 
the tribal government would soon be abolished so an election was unnecessary, would cause 
confusion in the business affairs of the tribe, and result in unnecessary expenses.
26
 
 Previously, little obvious factionalism occurred during the early twentieth century. Most 
Cherokees had supported a separate indigenous state. However, once it became apparent that goal 
would not be realized, Progressives such as Rogers became resigned to the doomed fate of the 
tribal government. Rogers sought to wrap up tribal affairs as best he could before the deadline. 
Traditionals, such as Boudinot and the Keetoowah were not ready to accept dissolution. They 
viewed Rogers' refusal to call a regular election as not only capitulating, but also hindering the 
Traditionals' opposition to the Curtis Act by robbing them of the right to choose the next set of 
officials who would continue the fight. While no single person or group was blamed overall for 
assimilation, the Keetoowah viewed Rogers' actions not as a betrayal similar to that of the Treaty 
Party during the Treaty of New Echota, but as an obstacle to their goal. As a result, they sought to 
remove the obstacle.  
 Leading the faction opposing Rogers, Frank J. Boudinot issued a call for an election in 
August 1905 without the consent of the principal chief or the incumbent National Council. 
Boudinot represented the mostly traditional faction of the National Party and the Keetoowahs. 
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The National Party in several districts nominated council candidates for their party ticket and 
threatened to proceed with an election as normal. They also claimed their actions would be 
approved by the Indian agent and inspector.
27
 
 Those who refused to acquiesce to the terms of the Curtis Act, Frank Boudinot and the 
Keetoowah, "composed exclusively of fullblooded [sic] Cherokees," planned and called the 
election of the council that just met at Tahlequah. Nearly every member of this new council was a 
member of the Keetoowah and "They were acting under the direction of the leaders of that 
society."
28
 The Keetoowahs presented their history and side of the story to a newspaper to ensure 
they were heard beyond the accounts of Rogers' statements. 
 At this time, the Society, as it was also known, called itself the "most perfect political 
organization among the Indians" because the plan of organization laid out at its inception in 1858 
still followed to the letter." They called themselves the "Tammany of the Cherokees." The 
Keetoowah Society was presided over by three head captains. Under these were three captains in 
each of the nine "fullblood" districts of the Cherokee Nation. This meant there were twenty-seven 
subordinate captains, who carried out the orders of the head captains. Any communication from 
the leaders reached the "ears of every member of the society within twelve hours, so perfect is 
their system of communication."
29
 The Keetoowah sought to preserve Cherokee sovereignty by 
establishing "full blood" dominance in political and social affairs of the nation. Often a secret 
society, Keetoowah meetings reportedly featured guards posted at a quarter of a mile out on every 
side of the meeting place and required a password to prove membership and gain access. 
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Newspapers of the era complained of difficulty in getting an account of their meetings. This 
secrecy served as another reason for the lack of sources and historiography for this time period.  
 Composed of a head captain and district captains, the Keetoowah “was organized to 
prolong the life of a fast dying nation that was being crushed and oppressed… [by] a white man’s 
civilization.”
30
 They ardently believed that “every step that has been taken to dispossess the full-
blood [sic] Indian of his home and form of government has been at the hands of the whites or 
mixed blood.” In 1905, Richard M. Wolfe, Dave Muskrat, and Wolf Coon served as the head 
captains. Frank Boudinot worked as the English Secretary, Daniel Grits, Cherokee Secretary, and 
J. W. Dick as the Chief Interpreter.
31
 
 In the early twentieth century, the Keetoowahs claimed they represented about fifteen 
thousand families. They protested against allotment because it ended traditional communal land 
ownership when the Dawes Commission began its work and in 1902 enrolled only under protest. 
They distinguished themselves from the Nighthawk Keetoowahs, whose members originated in 
the Keetoowahs and who refused allotments until their leaders were arrested. Of that sect, the 
society stated it was "a secret society and we know no more of its objects and purposes than the 
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 The Keetoowah asked the Dawes Commission to allow each "full blood" who 
received their land to file protests against the allotting of land to intermarried whites and 
freedmen. The Dawes Commission refused to receive those protests but prepared a separate 
traditional roll. 
 Within an unmarked newspaper article, under the header "Lost Control in 1887," the 
Keetoowah detailed the differences between them and the Nighthawk Keetoowah. "The Night 
Hawks were originally affiliated with the Keetoowahs as an auxiliary organization, but most of 
them withdrew when the allotment of lands began."
33
 The Nighthawks numbered about three 
thousand at this time. They first refused to have anything to do with any allotment plan of the US 
government, declining to enroll in 1902. As a result, Redbird Smith and several other leaders 
were jailed in Muskogee until they would consent to enroll for land. Many of the Nighthawks still 
refused to accept their deeds. The reiterating of the differences with the Nighthawks portrays the 
stated wish of the Keetoowahs to show that even though they held views different from the US, 
the Keetoowahs "have always submitted their plans and views to the proper authorities in a 
respectful and orderly manner." They also reminded the US that the society, "almost to a man," 
allied themselves with the Union during the American Civil War.
34
 
 The year 1887 marked the last time the Keetoowahs had been in power of the Cherokee 
government, when D. W. Bushyhead served as principal chief. He and the Keetoowahs 
represented the National Party, which they stated was the equivalent of the Republican political 
party of the Cherokees. They called Rogers and his Downing Party the Democrats of their nation. 
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"The history of the Cherokee nation since it was located in Indian Territory is largely made up of 
the struggle of these two parties."
35
  
 Harmony did not exist between the two political parties or factions during election time 
that year either. During the election of 1887, Joseph B. Mayes (Downing Party) was elected and 
Rabbit Bunch was the candidate of the National Party. The Nationals held a majority in the House 
and Senate and stated the Downing Party refused to sit in the council and assist in making an 
official count of the vote. The Nationals refused to give up the office of principal chief until the 
official count was finished. The Downing leaders then kicked down the door of the executive 
offices and their chief took possession. As the election of Chief Mayes was conceded, the 
Keetoowahs argued they never questioned the legality of this action. This marked "the last 
struggle of the fullbloods for supremacy in the nation until the present controversy" of Rogers' 
refusal to call an election.
36
 
 In 1903, the Cherokee elected Rogers as Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation. Seen as 
too cooperative with the federal government in the dissolution of their tribal government by the 
Keetoowah, the Cherokee impeached him in 1905 over suspicions regarding financial 
appropriations. As well as the refusal to continue the tribal government, some alleged that Rogers 
violated his oath of office by refusing to call an election in August 1905, “there upon the people 
took the matter in [their] own hands.”
 37 
 
Boudinot was elected in accordance with Cherokee law to replace him on November 21. 
1905. He took the oath of office in the Senate Chamber of the Cherokee National Council in 
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Tahlequah in the presence of a joint session of the National Council.
38
 At the time, Frank 
Boudinot issued the statement: 
"…we are opposed to the plan of Chief Rogers and his party to wind up tribal 
affairs and sell our property and surplus land until we know where we 
stand…There are hundreds of contests and controversies over citizenship matters 
that in our opinion should be cleared up before the final division of our property 
is made. We want as speedy a settlement of our tribal affairs as possible, but we 




 The Keetoowahs were especially angered on the issue of citizenship. They believed that 
no intermarried white person, wed after 1874, should be enrolled for allotment. The Traditionals 
claimed that an old Cherokee statute remained in force that gave white people who married into 
the tribe the right of citizenship, but not the right to share in allotments of lands or per capital 
payments.
40
 Boudinot stated that Rogers was elected by the Downing Party on a platform that 
declared itself in favor of allotting Cherokee lands to all citizens, "red, white, or black." The 
Keetoowahs described their actions as: 
"practically represent[ing] the last struggle of the full blood Cherokees for 
recognition upon the eve of the dissolution of their tribal government as opposed 
to the inter-married citizens and mixed blood Cherokees who are daily increasing 
in numbers, and whose forces will within a few years wipe the full blood 
Cherokees from the face of the earth by the fusion of the Caucasian blood which 




 For its first matter of business, the newly elected "rogue" council put forth resolutions for 
impeaching W. C. Rogers. on November 19, 1905. The articles of impeachment against Rogers 
listed his offenses as: 
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 Refusing to issue a proclamation calling for election of the National Council in August 
1905, depriving the Cherokee people of the constitutional right to vote for and elect their 
representatives. As such, he was accused of "willful violation" of his oath of office. This 
refusal and neglect "was a willful attempt to suspend the laws of the Cherokee Nation 
relating to elections…thereby usurping the power of the National Council [in] which is 
vested the sole power of suspending any of the said laws of the Cherokee Nation…." 
 He refused to attend the session of the newly elected National Council and to perform the 
duties of his office there.  
 Rogers refused to recognize the National Council and "assumes to exercise all authority 
properly belonging to and vested in the National Council." In addition, Rogers' 
confession of consulting with "parties" who are named "amount[s] to a conspiracy to 
subvert the government of the Cherokee Nation and a combination to resist the 
enforcement of the laws thereof, and is a felony under Section 270, Article 1, Chapter 4 
of the compiled laws of 1892. The council argued that Rogers was attempting to 
"concentrate all Cherokee national authority in himself. He is a dangerous man to retain 
in so high an office and his removal is necessary."
42
 
 Rogers refused to acknowledge the newly elected council while they were in session in 
Tahlequah. He argued that their election was not legal because there had to be an official call for 
an election issued ninety days prior by the principal chief, who appoints the election clerks. 
Afterwards, the chief had to approve the sworn returns from the various election precincts. The 
election was not called by Rogers, as he had refused to do so. The clerks were not appointed in 
the regular way, and there was no official count. Few people voted—in the Cooweecowee 
district, only twelve votes were cast compared to the normal is nine thousand. The opposing 
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faction only secured about five hundred votes in the entire nation. Rogers utilized these statistics 
to show that the new council did not really represent the majority of the Cherokee Nation.
43
 
 In regards to the charges of impeachment, Rogers claimed that it was "causing him no 
concern." He stated the council could do nothing and "represented no one except a few 
discontented full-bloods belonging to the defeated party and urged on by designing lawyers who 
hope to influence the would be council to pass legislation giving them fees that they would not 
have been able to get approved by the legitimate council." Rogers declared that he did "not 
recognize these fellows as representatives of the nation in any sense and it [made] no difference 
to [him] what action they take."
44
  
 Yet, while stating the impeachment was causing him no concern, Rogers believed it 
important enough to reiterate his defense for not calling an election. He asserted that he allowed 
the old council to hold over and called the session two months early in order to get bills approved 
to enable their submission early in the next session of the US Congress. He said when the council 
was held in November, the bills usually are not sent to Washington, DC, until the middle of 
December. There they are first reviewed and passed upon by the Indian commissioner, after 
which they go to the Secretary of the Interior. After approval there, they go to the president. It is 
therefore late February before they are returned to the Cherokee Nation. This would be too late to 
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give the Cherokees an opportunity to secure beneficial legislation in Congress before the 
termination date of March 4, 1906.
45
 
 Rogers even went as far as writing a letter to the council while they were in session, 
despite refusing to acknowledge them. The correspondence repeated his justification for refusing 
to call an election based on the timing of getting bills to the US Congress. An election, he 
claimed, would have "been at a great expense to the Cherokee Nation when nothing whatsoever 
could be accomplished by holding an election" because all the business of the tribe had to be 
concluded before March. He also asserted that he "conferred with a very great many of our 
leading citizens who entertained the same views…" This last action was what the council 
considered his conspiracy against the Cherokee government mentioned in the articles of 
impeachment. Rogers concluded his letter by declaring he was "only addressing you as my fellow 
citizens, and in no use do I recognize you as legally elected members of a Cherokee National 




 Secretary of the Interior E. A. Hitchcox refused to recognize the newly elected chief and 
reinstated Rogers. Boudinot stated for many years afterward, that, despite his lack of US 
recognition, he remained the representative of his people, Cherokees by blood. Boudinot 
continued working with the Keetoowahs and negotiating separately on behalf of Traditionals. In 
September 1905, an act of the Cherokee National Council reiterated their approval of the 1902 
allotment agreement and since enrollment would not be finished by March 4, 1906, to extend 
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 After sending his letter to the self-elected council, Rogers traveled to Washington, DC, to 
meet with officials, offering to take the records of the impeachment proceedings with him to 
present to the Department of the Interior.
48
 Boudinot and Richard Wolf also traveled to 
Washington, DC, to present their council's actions. In addition to the impeachment and electing 
Boudinot, the council also passed two appropriation bills and sought ratification from the Interior 
Department and president as required by the Curtis Act of all National Council actions. If 
Boudinot and Wolf were successful, they planned to call another session of the council and select 
a commission to be sent to Washington, DC, to carry out the final settlement of tribal affairs 
following the Keetoowah's demands regarding citizenship.
49
  
 Regardless of the issues within the Cherokee Nation, statehood was coming quickly for 
the Oklahoma and Indian territories. The "governors" of the Five Tribes met in Muskogee in early 
November 1907 to begin their travel to Washington, DC, for a last conference with the Secretary 
of the Interior in regards to Indian affairs and their cause. The delegates included W. C. Rogers 
for the Cherokee, John F. Brown, Motey Tiger, Green McCurtain, and Douglas H. Johnston. The 
conventions of tribes submitted their draft of a state constitution for Sequoyah to show the US the 
tribes were willing to accept statehood separate from Oklahoma.
50
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  However, Congress passed an Enabling Act on June 16, 1906, combining Oklahoma and 
Indian Territories. The legislation ended hopes of a separate Indian state and gave the US 
authority to oversee the dissolution of the Five Tribes as sovereign nations. On November 16, 
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the combined territories the state of Oklahoma, 
which also made Cherokees citizens of the new state. Roosevelt commented that "The Cherokees 
are a bright and intelligent race, better fitted to follow the white man's road than any other 
Indians."
51
 His statement accurately described the American attitude towards natives as well as 
the assimilation policy in regards to the Cherokee. With allotment and the end of tribal 
government, the US had done everything to force the indigenous to Americanize. 
 Not all of the Cherokee supported statehood as a way to remain independent as they 
would still be governed to a degree by the federal government rather than exist as a fully 
recognized sovereign nation or as individual tribes with a degree of self-determination. In 1906, 
the Keetoowahs met for four days near Tahlequah "with a decision to let the politics of the white 
man alone."
52
 Orators at the meeting vehemently argued against even participating in the politics 
of the proposed new state of Sequoyah. One thousand "fullbloods" out of the three thousand 
attendees pledged not to vote at all regarding statehood. Redbird Smith stated that the Nighthawk 
Keetoowahs' former councils had decided to participate in neither selecting the delegates for the 
constitutional convention nor the choosing of state or county officers. Nighthawks were angry 
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because they felt ignored in the entire process and Smith asserted that "…we should not in any 
way be responsible for the inevitable wreck and ruin of our people."
53
 
 The Keetoowah and National Party were not the only tribe with members against dual 
statehood. Ridge Paschel and J. Henry Dick, delegates from the Tahlequah Single State Club, 
traveled to Washington, DC. Both representatives sought to combat the assertion of Creek Chief 
Pleasant Porter and other advocates that all natives supported the separate state of Sequoyah. 
They, like the other opponents, were unsuccessful.
54
 
 In the wake of allotment and then single statehood, many American Indians were reduced 
to the margins of society and suffered  extreme poverty. Historian Erik Zissu observed that at this 
time Progressives acted for the benefit of their more traditional tribe members. They tried to 
prevent the further dislocation of their people. "Operating through the Indian bureau, they 
recognized an obligation to those tribal members less prepared for the challenges of life in 
Oklahoma."
55
 The Progressives, through their literacy in English and experience in working and 
living amongst whites, maintained their wealth and political power after statehood. They adopted 
the same paternalistic view towards their traditional brethren that the US maintained towards all 
of the tribe. However, the Traditionals would not have agreed with this assertion, viewing the 
opposing faction as being only concerned with their own personal wealth. 
 During the final steps of allotment, tribal councils continued in a limited form to help 
settle business. The US officially declared the Cherokee government terminated on March 3, 
1906. The citizenship rolls and assignments of homesteads ended in 1907. In November 1907, the 
Weekly Times Journal in Oklahoma City stated that "…the title 'Cherokee Nation' became 
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 Even with the dissolution of indigenous government, the US still needed a central 
figurehead for negotiations. The Act to Provide for the Final Disposition of the Five Civilized 
Tribes gave the Department of the Interior control over Indian schools, government buildings, 
and tribal funds. After the passing of Chief Rogers in 1917, US presidents appointed a succession 
of Cherokee men to serve as "chief for a day" whenever a legal document, such as a deed, needed 
signing. If a chief refused to sign, he could be removed or the document approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior. However, with the complicated nature of land transfers, the Cherokee 
government continued in an extremely limited form until June 30, 1914.
57
  
 The US deemed allotment completed in 1914, with private ownership the forced life of 
the Five Tribes, and the surplus land of 3,174,988 acres sold to white settlers. Congress abolished 
the Dawes Commission on August 1, 1914. The US transferred the commission's unfinished work 




 The assimilation and allotment policies dramatically changed Cherokee life and tampered 
their self-determination, marking the end of native representation through tribal governments. 
Along with governments ceasing to exist, tribes had also lost jurisdiction over its citizens, 
including the right to even determine requirements for citizenship, and any/all financial resources. 
In addition, once the natives became US citizens, the tribal governments lost any remaining legal 
control.   
 The allotment policy proved a failure. For the most part, the policy did not assimilate 
natives into white mainstream society and only resulted in the further impoverishment of the 
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indigenous. US officials assigned individual allotments to turn natives into prospective yeoman 
farmers, a previous symbol of American individualism and success. This did not work because in 
the early twentieth century, with innovations in technology, individual farming could not compete 
with the commercial equivalent. In addition, the trades taught to native children in federal 
boarding schools were outdated. Once they graduated, the students realized that they could not 
use the skills they learned because with the rise of industrialization, no one used older methods of 
cobblers or blacksmithing. Eventually, the Meriam Report of 1928 exposed the assimilationist 
polices' failures and detriment to American Indians. It would take nearly another decade before 
the US government began to rectify their wrongs. 
 The Cherokee reacted to the abolition of their US-recognized government by lobbying for 
separate native statehood. While not in control of individual tribes, statehood would have retained 
state level self-determination and representation for American Indians, even with the dissolution 
of tribal governments. However, once the two territories merged and it became clear the goal of 
separate statehood would not be realized, many Cherokees (especially Rogers and Progressives) 
resigned themselves to accepting the assimilation policies. Traditionals saw this acquiescence as 
unhelpful to their determination to keep fighting against allotment and the dissolution of their 
tribal government. However, Rogers or one group of people were not blamed for assimilation 
policies and the hardships endured by the people as had been the case for the Treaty Party after 
they signed the Treaty of New Echota. The Traditionals simply viewed Rogers as an obstacle, 
especially after he refused to call an election and blocking the leadership of those who would 
have continued the fight for self-determination. As a result, Boudinot and his followers sought to 
remove their obstacle by impeaching Rogers. Ultimately this failed as the US refused to 
recognize Boudinot as chief. 
 Those fighting against assimilation showed a willingness to collaborate with other 
factions. Leading the effort, Frank J. Boudinot marked a shift in the new generation of leaders. A 
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descendant of Elias Boudinot, Stand Watie, and the Ridges in the Treaty Party who at times 
violently opposed Traditionals, Boudinot worked with any who shared the goal of opposing 
allotment. Boudinot and the new generation of leaders did not experience the same intratribal 
fighting or the hardships of the Trail of Tears, violence during the unification of the Cherokee in 
Indian Territory, or the fighting on opposing sides of the American Civil War. As a result, these 
new leaders were able to collaborate for a common goal for all of their people without the 
grudges and bitter feuds their predecessors had held. This served as the beginning indication of 
later cross-factional cooperation that occurred during the 1920s when those leaders were even 













FINDING COMMON GROUND: GRASSROOT BEGINNINGS, 1906-1925 
 With the Curtis Act ending the tribal governments and the creation of the State of 
Oklahoma ending hopes of a separate Indian state, the Cherokees lacked any central institutional 
organization and self-determination. Without a tribal government to serve the people and with 
rampant poverty, the Cherokee focused on daily survival. Community-level organizations 
emerged to assist their people as unofficial governments. The Keetoowah continued to advocate 
for self-determination as well as filed for a corporate charter to at least be able to apply for 
financial aid for the tribe. As was beginning to become apparent in the previous decade, a new 
generation of leaders proved willing to cooperate. The 1920s marked a high point of 
intrafactional collaboration. With the high levels of poverty, landlessness, lack of central 
organization and representation, cooperation overruled previous differences and a common goal 
existed to care for all Cherokee people. 
 The period of disintegration after the dismantling of sovereign tribal governments was 
followed by "an innovative, multi-faceted campaign waged by diverse groups within the tribes to 
bring about agreement and unified action."
1
 In grassroots movements, intratribal political 
conventions, and through various writings, natives acted to regain their autonomy and control 
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over their own lives. Historian Erik Zissu argues that during this time the indigenous reclaimed 
using blood as a component of the notion of Indianness as a foundation for solidarity.   
 Chief William C. Rogers continued to sign land transfers after the dissolution of the 
nation. The last elected Cherokee chief until the late twentieth century, Rogers died in 1917 and 
the US did not appoint a chief again until 1919. With no central government, more Cherokees 
became easy prey for land speculators. Throughout the 1910s to 1920s, US presidents only 
appointed “chiefs for a day” when they needed something signed: A. B. Cunningham (1919), Ed 
M. Frye (1923), Richard B. Choate (1925), Charles J. Hunt (1928), Oliver P. Brewer (1931), and 
W. W. Hastings (1936). No official term of office existed, the US president simply appointed a 
new chief when a signature was needed.
2
   
 The Keetoowahs, mostly consisting of Traditionals, remained the most active in trying to 
reclaim self-determination, returning to living as their ancestors, and calling the nation together. 
In January 1900, the Keetoowah convened a convention at a place referred to as “Moody’s.” At 
this meeting, they called themselves the Cherokee Emigrant Council and appointed a committee 
of five “to let a contract for the collection of the money” still owed to the Cherokees on behalf of 
the Old Settler faction from the 1830s. Dave Muskrat headed the committee while Frank J. 
Boudinot functioned as his advisor and the group’s attorney. The Cherokee Emigrant Council 
approached Robert L. Owen, a prominent lawyer and lobbyist, and gave him the contract to 
retrieve the money. In 1905, the tribe received the 4 million dollars owed them. Without the 
Keetoowah, Boudinot, and Owen, the tribe would still not have received the money due them for 
land lost after removal in the 1830s.
3
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 After the Cherokee agreed to allotment in 1902, the Keetoowah split on unfriendly terms 
until the 1920s. Before the 1902 act, they remained mostly united in their opposition to allotment. 
However, after the act many gave up the fight and sought to work politically to achieve the best 
deal possible for them. Around that time, Redbird Smith refused to acquiesce and with five 
thousand others withdrew from the Keetoowah to form the faction of the society called the 
Nighthawk Keetoowah, which some believed numbered around two hundred Cherokee out of a 
total of eight to ten thousand. Smith’s organization not only focused on a religious revitalization, 
they also engaged in a campaign of resistance to enrollment for allotment. They evaded federal 
commissioners and returned unwanted land deeds unopened. It is often unclear after this point in 
records, both Anglo American and Cherokee, to which Keetoowah Society the sources refer to. 
When discussing "full bloods" that hid in the hills and were arrested in their avoidance of 
allotment, they are usually called "Nighthawks." When describing those who opposed allotment 
and strove to fight politically against the Cherokee Nation, refused to submit to US allotment 
legislation, and appealed to the federal government, they are described as simply "Keetoowah." 
This text follows these descriptions for the different factions.
 
While the Nighthawks began to be 
identified as a separate movement due to their return to ceremonial practice, the politically-
oriented members of the Keetoowah persisted as an organization as well. Today, the Cherokees 
themselves do not agree as to which faction did what, or deny a split even occurred, depending on 
the source’s relation to the societies.
4
  
 The Cherokee Nation signed their formal agreement for allotment in 1902. At this time 
an elder Keetoowah stated during the enrollment process that they would retain their customs, 
land, and the Cherokee tribal government would not become extinct in 1906. About 1,400 to 
2,000 Keetoowah began resistance to the making of citizenship rolls and receiving allotted land. 
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In 1902, US Marshals scoured the territory and many of the Nighthawks and Keetoowah were 
arrested and brought before a US court on a charge of contempt for refusing to enroll. These 
prisoners still refused to enroll until the jailor threatened to cut their hair, which many indigenous 
saw as a spiritual portion of the body. This resulted in capitulation. Many found themselves and 
their children enrolled against their will. Several, including prominent Keetoowah Dave Muskrat 
and at a later time Nighthawk leader Redbird Smith, refused until the arrests began. Some 
believed Smith “sold out,” but eventually the Dawes Commission enrolled full bloods by using 
the inaccurate 1896 Cherokee Census to assign land.
5
   
 In the 1890s through the first decade of the twentieth century, several reports connected 
Nighthawks to violence and the murder of "full bloods" that accepted allotment. Allegations 
accused them of not only threatening those in opposing factions, but also their own who defected. 
Some Progressives told the Daily Ardmoreite that the organization sought to murder their leaders 
who accepted the 1902 agreement beginning January 1903. The same men told a story of 
Nighthawks going to the home of Wolf Coon, a Traditional preacher, to kill him for accepting 
enrollment. They approached his door with rifles raised but found only his wife and fled into the 
hills. The men believed Wolf Coon was a target because he had denounced protestor Crazy Snake 
at a previous Nighthawk meeting. The killing of Peter Wolfe, a "full blood" who had been shot 
and killed in an ambush in the Saline District was also attributed to the organization. Another 
native was found dead on a public highway after having been threatened days before if he 
allotted. Thomas J. Madden was killed by Moses Miller after receiving anonymous notes 
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decreeing his death by the Nighthawks. Judge William Gill of Indian Territory issued an order 
directing US Marshals to prevent an uprising of the "full bloods." Upon hearing that the 
Traditionals were dancing in the Spavinaw Hills and intimidating others from accepting 
allotments, he gave roving deputies permission to hold court anywhere at any time necessary. The 
Weekly Examiner newspaper disputed the reports of Nighthawk violence. Other reports described 
peaceful ways the organization persuaded members to refuse enrollment, such as meetings with 
elders every two weeks. While the truth may never be known, a news report did cover the story of 
Jack Downing, a "full blood," who pled guilty in October 1904 for the murder of a Nighthawk 
because he appeared before the Dawes Commission and filed for allotment.
 6
  
 At this time, the Traditionals enrolled but typically only if threatened by arrest. 
Keetoowah attorney Frank J. Boudinot stated that the "full bloods" (probably the Keetoowah 
instead of the Nighthawks) accepted division of their lands and the final adjustment of their 
affairs, but wanted the US government to carry it out because the Cherokees could not agree 
among themselves. They wished the US “to be responsible for the consequences.”
7
 In 1902, the 
Keetoowah presented a petition requesting the US delay forcing enrollment on the Cherokees as 
well as their reasons for rejecting allotment. Six of the fifteen prominent members of the society 
presented their request to the Dawes Commission, with Daniel Redbird serving as head captain 
and Dave Muskrat as co-head captain. They stated as one reason that the destitution of their 
people required that they “divide with one another in order to avoid actual starvation,” meaning 
that ending communal living further hindered the already suffering people. The Traditionals also 
did not want to treat regarding land as “the painful fact that the US has failed to comply with 
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most of the important pledges made to our people.”
8
 The Keetoowah reiterated that they opposed 
the division of tribal resources amongst intermarried Anglo Americans and freedmen who they 
did not see as Cherokee. The petition concluded with the point that they recognized the sovereign 
power of the US and just hoped to work in harmony with them. The US refused, stating the 




 With the Curtis Act ending the government of the Cherokee Nation in 1906, the 
Keetoowah sought to serve as a representative of their people by forming a corporation. The band 
would shift its sole purpose from a religious band to a political body to continue leading their 
people through this difficult time. Through incorporation as a business, they could further be able 
to take the place of the defunct Cherokee Nation government. As a corporation, they could at 
least attempt to handle the financial affairs of their people. A leader of the Keetoowah since 1887, 
Rabbit Bunch urged their council, along with the remnants of the National Party, to select a 
"mixed blood" still loyal to traditional ways but more versed in the English language and Anglo 
ways to help the people in the difficult time. The Keetoowah selected Richard M. Wolfe as head 
captain and Dave Muskrat as co-captain, with Boudinot as the English secretary. To continue the 
Cherokee tribal government without as much US interference, Wolfe petitioned the Territorial 
Court in Tahlequah on September 1905 and received a corporate charter for his people, now 
called by its legal name, the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated. Displeased with the Act of Union 
that brought the Old Settlers, Ross followers, and Treaty Party together, the Keetoowah had long 
wanted separate tribal status for Traditionals. By incorporating, the Keetoowah Society organized 
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  The Keetoowah had first petitioned the US government regarding headship of the tribe 
when they opposed the 1902 allotment act, based on its provisions for Cherokee leadership. They 
alleged that it extended the authority of the officers of the Cherokee Nation beyond the life of the 
tribal government, which conflicted with both the laws of Congress and the Cherokees. These 
provisions meant that those already in power would remain longer than allowed by tribal law. 
Without a National Council to maintain accountability, the situation paved the way for corruption 
and a dictatorship without a limit of power. The Keetoowah argued the 1902 act entailed 
unnecessary cost on the nation of $36,865 per year to pay these officers whose terms had no 
noted limit, resulting in a “salary grab.”
 
The Keetoowah stated if the tribal government in 
whatever capacity was to be extended past March 4, 1906, it could only be done by Congressional 
legislation. The National Council of the Cherokee Nation had no power to extend the tribal 
government beyond that date as it no longer legally functioned, except in administrative duties 
relating to allotment deeds. Lastly, the Keetoowah argued that the National Council never had 
power to dispose of surplus lands because that authority ceased “the moment said lands were 
dedicated by act of Congress to per capita distribution among the people.”
 
By ending the 
constitutional Cherokee government, the title reverted back to the people, who must be consulted 
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about the disposition of the excess, not the defunct Cherokee Nation. Again, US officials paid no 
attention to what they perceived as a backward minority.
11
  
 On April 26, 1906, Congress passed the Five Tribes Act to continue “in full force and 
effect” the governments of those tribes until the conclusion of allotment. Had Congress 
terminated tribal governments before the process was completed, the US would have had to 
negotiate with tens of thousands of individuals to finish allotment and assume mineral leasing 
rights. Still continuing the struggle for self-determination, in 1906 the Keetoowah Society, along 
with the other Five Tribes and the Osage, put its energy into the State of Sequoyah, a separate 
American Indian state. That movement failed when President Theodore Roosevelt signed the 
document making Oklahoma a state on November 16, 1907. Many Progressive Cherokee 
politicians became prominent state officials in the new state of Oklahoma.
12
   
 In addition, the Keetoowah sued in the US Court of Claims on behalf of all Cherokee 
people to restrict intermarried persons, unborn children, and freedmen until the US Supreme 
Court deemed the Court of Claims ineffective. While unsuccessful, some cases made it to the 
Supreme Court which some contend served as the foundation for modern lawsuit for the tribe. 
From 1910-1911, they called for a formal investigation and charges against Cherokee Nation 
attorney W. W. Hastings. The US Interior Department dismissed the allegations of wrongdoing 
by Hastings, not even requiring a statement from the accused. Throughout this time, Boudinot 
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remained in Washington, DC, under the authority of the Keetoowah to labor towards getting a 
general jurisdictional act and to secure permission from Congress for the Cherokee to sue in the 
US Court of Claims.
 13
   
 Despite the progress of obtaining a charter to serve as leaders of their people, the 
Keetoowah splintered in the early-twentieth century. An exact account of how many groups 
existed is unknown as the few existing accounts are contradicting and vague. Some accounts put 
the number in the twenties, while others cite lesser numbers. Historian and author on the United 
Keetoowah Band (UKB) Georgia Rae Leeds based her numbers on an account of anthropologist 
Charles Wisdom and his undated work of "The Keetoowah Society of Cherokee" in the Chief 
John Ross papers in Claremore, Oklahoma. However, the opinion of the legal counsel for 
disputes between the Cherokee Nation against the Keetoowah in 2014 argued that Wilson 
provided a false account of Keetoowah history and serves as the reason for the unfair treatment of 
the Traditional faction in the 1930s when they were initially denied permission to organize under 
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.   
 Redbird Smith and his Nighthawks withdrew from the Keetoowah Society. He built the 
first Nighthawk ceremonial ground in the summer of 1902 near his home in Gore, Indian 
Territory. This ceremonial fire (the center of their meeting place) was to serve as the principal fire 
of all other Keetoowahs affiliated with the Nighthawks. In 1905, twenty-three fires met together. 
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In 1908, the Nighthawk Keetoowah Council elevated Redbird Smith’s position of chairman to 




 Smith's faction sought not only to return to their traditional religion and cultural 
practices, they also sought to repudiate the teachings of the first Anglo missionaries. Nighthawks 
claimed in 1914 that their medicine men discovered their organization was completely a religious 
institution. In their constitution, they declared they would be the only Keetoowah religion, and 
any person who joined another religion or society would forfeit membership. This marked a more 
radical turn from the previous policy of allowing concurrent membership in various factions. This 
led to further conflict with the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated, which also considered 
themselves the original "Keetoowah" organization. By the 1920s, Smith had rejuvenated the old 
religion among his group. The Nighthawks blamed the Anglo missionaries for leading them 
astray, arguing it "was the way of the white man and Christianity they taught [that was] 
responsible for the break in the Society."
15
 
  In the 1910s, newspapers reported Smith and his Nighthawks had traveled to Mexico 
with a document dating from 1820, hoping to prove a claim to land under the Mexican 
government, but nothing became of it. In 1914 the Nighthawks appealed to President Woodrow 
Wilson for their own reservation. Wilson rejected it, calling it a “backward step” from 
civilization. In 1921 about one hundred people left their homes in Mayes and Delaware counties 
to locate together in the extreme southeastern corner of Cherokee country. This community 
flourished for a few years and then faded away.
16
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 Up to 1914, Redbird Smith's authority declined, as many Keetoowah suspected he had 
sold out to the Americans. Smith had accepted his allotment and even sold some of the acreage of 
one minor son to finance home improvements. As a result of Smith's fading influence, branches 
of Keetoowah organizations sprang up in nearly every Traditional communities. The Nighthawks 
continued as more of a religious and ceremonial organization, boasting a membership of seven 
thousand people with meetings in Gore, Oklahoma.
 
Some reported that Smith, in his last years of 
life, became obsessed with building a spirit of cooperation amongst all the Cherokee people, even 
stating those of mixed ancestry should not be overlooked. At the time of Smith's death in 1919, 
twenty-two separate Keetoowah organizations functioned independently. Surviving sources do 
not record the names of each of the groups nor if they had any conflict with the others or just 
existed separately due to proximity. Each had its own political agenda and continued to practice 
traditional ceremonies. In addition, brutal rivalries developed between Smith's older sons, with 
each attempting to take charge of the Keetoowah Society and accusing the others of various 
wrongs. The youngest son, Stoke Smith, took charge of the Keetoowah Society, the mother of all 
the other branches of various organizations.
 17
   
 Georgia Rae Leeds chronicles the separation and creation of six different Keetoowah 
factions by the 1920s. Eli Pumpkin formed the Seven Clans Society, located near Chewie, after 
he and his followers argued they did not have equal representation in Gore. Ned Blackfox, a 
Nighthawk who joined Redbird Smith originally withdrawing from the Keetoowah Society, left 
Gore because of dissatisfaction with Smith's promises to regain the Cherokee government and 
resist US federal Indian policy. Blackfox and his followers joined the Cherokee Emigrant Indians, 
an ultra conservative group. Organized by Joe Fox and Coming Snell in 1907, the Cherokee 
Emigrant Indians claimed to be the original Chief John Ross faction and stated the other 
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 In addition, some Traditional leaders such as Ned Blackfox, James Hilderbrand, and Eli 
Pumpkin broke away from the Keetoowah Society, Inc. and organized their own societies. Names 
such as the Eastern and Western Cherokee Keetoowah began to appear (both of which continued 
to avoid allotment). These groups operated independently in their attempts to continue to avoid 
allotments, restore the old order of Traditional leadership, enforce treaties, or gain protection for 
Traditionals who had accepted their allotments. James Hilderbrand, Dick Pickup, and Ned 
Blackfox created and led a group that functioned under the title of Keetoowah Society and relied 
heavily upon the 1905 charter of incorporation even though the Keetoowah Society proper 
continued as a non-political spiritual society in Sequoyah County, with Stoke Smith as its chief.
19
  
 Groups outside of the Keetwoowah also formed to serve the people. The Cherokee 
Executive Council, Eastern and Western Cherokee, Tulsa Contingent, and the Cherokee 
Executive Committee functioned as businesses, similar to the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated to 
provide financial aid for their people. With the level of poverty caused by allotment, limited 
opportunities, and later the Great Depression, the Cherokees (and other natives) focus on daily 
survival. This explains the importance and prominence of these groups functioning as businesses 
and focusing on funds owed from the US. 
 Separate from the Keetoowahs, the Cherokee Executive Council was appointed by 
Principal Chief William C. Rogers (the last recognized elected chief, now appointed by US). 
However, the US did not authorize this council. Rogers created this body under the authority of a 
resolution passed by a convention of the Cherokee people held on October 22, 1916. According 
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the secretary James W. Duncan, the Eastern and Western Cherokee councils, the Tulsa 
Contingent, and the Cherokee Executive Committee (mostly consisted of Progressives) worked 
together under the name of the Cherokee Executive Council. Duncan described each of the four 
groups as business organizations that united for the purpose of transacting the business of the 
Cherokee Nation. Separate groups such as these began to work together for the benefit of all their 
people, realizing any progress could only be accomplished through cooperation. In other words, 
these groups needed each other to achieve any gains of self-determination.
20
 
 Towards the end of his life, Redbird Smith advocated the joining of all Cherokees 
together, even Progressives. Sources do not definitively state the reason for Smith's change from 
strictly Traditional involvement only to including all of Cherokee society. However, Smith lived 
long enough to see the dissolution of the tribal government, the enforcement of allotment, the 
rampant poverty resulting from assimilationist policies, and the splitting of factions even further. 
Smith, and eventually other Traditionals, saw the consequence of a divided people having less of 
a voice in regards to what happens to them. In the early twentieth century, the many groups of 
Cherokees began to come together to work for the good of the tribe starting with local, grassroots 
movements. This began with the Keetoowah groups, who changed from celebrating only 
Traditionals to unifying all of the tribe under the shared identity of Cherokee Indian. The other 
factions that existed previous to 1906 functioned mostly as political parties and faded away as a 
lack of tribal government provided no base for influence politicking. The Keetoowahs continued, 
albeit in small, scattered communities, as religious and cultural groups. The presence of a 
governing institution did not affect the practicing of traditions, and as a result they remained more 
cohesive and organized, and the most able to unify the people to work towards a greater 
autonomy.  
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 In 1919, at the time of Redbird Smith's death, several separate Keetoowah organizations 
existed. Based on the work of US anthropologist Dr. Charles Wilson (whom she later called 
inaccurate), historian Georgia Rae Leeds argued only six existed: Seven Clans Society, Cherokee 
Emigrant Indians, Medicine Society, Cherokee Immigrant Indians, Nighthawks, and the 
Keetoowah Society, Incorporated. Other sources, such as the Cherokee Observer newspaper, 
name twenty-two Keetoowah organizations, each functioning separately. As these bands did not 
have official institutions or documentation, an exact number cannot be obtained. The varying 
numbers could be due to misremembering or the lack of a definition for a group or "faction." 
Some counted all religious groups who met with likeminded people and lived nearby as 
individual groups. This explains the higher numbers. The number of individual factions for the 
time period is also difficult, as newspapers mostly utilized the term "Keetoowah" for all 
Traditional Cherokees, only occasionally distinguishing the Nighthawks. 
21
 
 Even without knowing the exact number, the amount of various factions that split from 
the Keetoowahs in the early nineteenth century was high. These splits occurred as a result of 
differing reactions to the lack of recognition of a tribal government. Some of the more politically 
minded would have seen no point to continue within their form of political party if they had no 
method to be heard and represented. The Nighthawks went even further, completely withdrawing 
from politics and non-native society to return to a solely religious organization, living among 
each other in the rural hills of Oklahoma. On the other side, other groups, such as the Keetoowah 
Society, Incorporated, refused to capitulate and strove to carry on as usual as a quasi-government 
to continue laboring for their people. Within this group, further splits occurred over 
disagreements of methodology.   
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 However, a new generation of leaders, as well as dire circumstances, led to the 
unification of the various groups. This new generation shared the experiences of allotment and 
the dissolution of their government. Due to the consequences of allotment, they had cared for 
their elders and other family members who were landless and hungry. These leaders worked to 
continue as de facto governments for their communities. They lacked their ancestors' experiences 
of violent intratribal conflict and feelings of betrayal, which enabled them to be more willing to 
bridge factional lives, put aside any ideological differences of maintaining self-determination, and 
better the lives of them and their people. Interestingly, the group that initiated this unity had been 
the first to withdraw from the rest, become apolitical, and focus solely on religion and traditional 
living. 
 In 1920, Stoke Smith, son of Redbird Smith and the new Nighthawk chief, unhappy with 
the lack of unity among the Keetoowah, sought to join them all together. To consolidate his 
authority over all other Keetoowah branches, Smith visited each community and ceremonially 
killed their fires and brought them home to the new, central mother ground near his own home. 
The leaders of the other Keetoowah branches were not all willing to follow Smith. Many citizens 
continued to follow the old dethroned chiefs of these fires, some continued to lead their people 
for several more years, acting as mayors of their communities. Once the Keetoowahs united 
themselves, they set out to bring together the rest of the Cherokee.
22
  
 On November 10, 1920, the Nighthawks called a meeting, referred to as the Illinois Fire, 
of all Keetoowah to unify themselves and later the rest of the tribe for "the prosecution of various 
interests and claims against the United States." The Nighthawks that they themselves and 
organized group of "full blood" Cherokees had always adhered to ancient traditions, customs, and 
practices of their preremoval ancestors. They stated that Traditionals remained handicapped by 
                                                          
22
"Keetoowah," Cherokee Observer, www.cherokeeobserver.org/keetoowah/octissue97.html (accessed 
January 1, 2017).  
121 
 
their lack of literacy in English and lack of experience in Anglo American business and politics. 
Their people "were wholly unadapted and unprepared to assume the role of quick and radical 
changes brought by the obtaining of the Curtis Act."
23
 The invasion of white settlers, living in 
close contact with non-Indians, and the participation of young Progressives in American 
government brought all factions together and showed the need for a single Cherokee chief again. 
They claimed their actions were nonpolitical and that they "invited into its membership 
Cherokees of either of the old political parties and whether Democrat or Republican."
24
  
 The Nighthawks argued further for the need of a single chief since the restrictions on the 
land of "full bloods" would terminate soon. In addition, they preferred to have a chief chosen by 
the people rather than one chosen by the US. In regards to the land titles of allotments, the US 
divided the Cherokees into various classifications, mostly based on blood quantum. "Full bloods" 
and others seen as "incompetent" had their titles held in trust by the federal government for a 
specified time period, free from taxes and unable to be sold or leased to enable the natives to 
establish a farm (land held in trust by the government was also called "restricted"). Consisting of 
mostly non-English speaking Traditionals, they conducted business through a chief and would be 
wholly unprepared to navigate through the Anglo business world and resist being swindled and 
losing their allotments. A chief would serve as a buffer between them, the white settlers, the 
federal government, and the tribe. The Nighthawks stated a new "psychological angle" existed in 
relations between the US and American Indians. Natives were part of the "body politic of a great 
commonwealth, and not an isolated and segregated Indian problem."
25
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 The willingness of the Nighthawks to unify marks a shift in their previous proclaimed 
goal of existing separately from other Cherokee as an apolitical religious organization. This 
change in practice occurred for a number of reasons, including implementation of the allotment 
policy as well as a new generation of leadership. Discussed in greater detail by Angie Debo's And 
Still the Waters Run, numerous indigenous found themselves even further impoverished and 
newly landless after they received their allotments. For many Traditionals who had no previous 
experience with white American business or law, and also did not have adequate legal assistance, 
they were swindled into signing confusing documents that sold their land to settlers for a low 
value. With the Nighthawks consisting of mostly Traditionals, they would have witnessed several 
of these occurrences and, as they pointed out, with no experience in white business and law they 
had no way to help their brethren or prevent further events.  
 In addition to preventing further land loss, the Nighthawks' leadership also shifted from 
the elders to a new generation. These new leaders, such as Redbird Smith's son Sam Smith, were 
raised in their traditional heritage but also saw firsthand the importance of US Indian policy and a 
need for the ability to navigate within the Anglo American world. Some would have been forced 
to go to US Indian boarding schools, interacting with and learning non-traditional trades. Others 
also had different experiences from serving in World War I. This next generation often housed 
and fed older relatives who lost their allotments. They saw the value of working together as a 
stronger front, as well as utilizing the various talents of all the factions to work towards a better 
future for all of the Cherokee.
26
   
 At the time of the Illinois Fire, Sam Smith was the chief of the Nighthawks and William 
Rogers served as assistant chief. As its main order of business, the Nighthawks nominated Levi 
Gritts for chief as he understood the life of a Traditional and spoke Cherokee, but also earned an 
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Anglo American education and spoke English. The Nighthawks requested "that the various 
organized groups, bands, or clubs of the Cherokee people take action…and confirm [sic] a chief 
for the said Cherokee people."
27
 In nominating a principal chief, the Cherokee hoped to regain the 
rights of their tribe to "self-determination in their National Government affairs" since the US 
government had deliberately repudiated all treaty obligations. The Nighthawks acknowledged the 
role of factionalism in hindering self government, stating that  
"this unfortunate position was perpetuated and created by the fact that the 
Cherokee people…became factionalized and bitterly antagonistic towards one 




 The other four groups that made up the Cherokee Executive Committee also wanted to 
work together as one body and agreed to elect a central chief. The Cherokee Executive 
Committee also approved of  Levi Gritts for chief. They viewed him as "well qualified and 
competent" and believed he would be successful in listening to the needs of the Traditionals as 
well as navigating in the Anglo American world.
29
  
 On January 17, 1921, Price Cochran, the head of the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated, 
called for a meeting of a "representative delegation of enrolled Cherokees."
30
 All of the 
communities gathered in Tahlequah, led by Isaac Greece, the second vice chief of the Keetoowah 
Society regarding working together. In 1925, the Nighthawks and Keetwoowah Society, 
Incorporated held a convention in Tahlequah to further discuss unification under a single chief. 
Apart from the very Nighthawks who wished to remain a religious organization but still willing to 
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work together, the Keetoowah Society unified all of the other Traditional factions. These unified 
Keetoowahs met with the other Cherokee groups that consisted of the Cherokee Executive 
Committee (including representatives from four Cherokee groups) and Eastern and Western 
Cherokee Council. They agreed to work together and again all the societies voted to confirm 
Gritts as their leader. Although Gritts was not appointed or recognized by the US, the Cherokee 
viewed him as their true leader. Despite the US laws, the tribe saw no need for the presidential 
appointment of a chief. The tribe retained the Cherokee Executive Council to carry out the 
business of their nation throughout the 1920s and 1930s. They continued to conduct meetings and 
pursue claims against the US. This council served as a business entity to assist their people 
financially rather than as a governmental institution.
 31
     
 In addition to electing and confirming Gritts as chief, the 1925 convention also created 
the Cherokee Representative Committee. The attendees elected Gritts as chairman, Fred 
McDaniel as secretary, John Redbird Smith as vice chairman, and William Rogers and Dan R. 
Coody as members. The Cherokee Representative Committee was authorized to hire attorneys to 
validate petitions that served as requests from the tribe and file suit in the US Court of Claims on 
the behalf of Cherokees. Even though each separate faction maintained their own leaders and 
political and religious beliefs, they formed these coalition groups to work for the good of the 
entire tribe. They discovered they could maintain their various groups and differences in opinion 
while working together for all Cherokee people in attempts to alleviate poverty, improve 
healthcare, and educational opportunities.
32
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 Despite this organization and their actions to regain sovereignty, the US refused to 
recognize them and only communicated with the presidentially appointed chief, W. W. Keeler, 
the CEO of Phillips Petroleum Company and a Progressive Cherokee. However, Keeler 
reportedly told Gritts that perhaps the Keetoowah were the proper ones to help the Cherokees. 
Supposedly he also said the Cherokee Executive Council should be dissolved and the Keetoowah 
serve as the sole representation of the tribe. Regardless of the accuracy of these statements, such 
actions never occurred.
 33
   
 After 1906 and with separate statehood no longer an option, the Nighthawks split from 
the Keetoowah Society to serve as a secluded, apolitical, and religious group. The Keetoowah 
Society continued to fight against allotment and asserted they represented the Cherokees' best 
interests. In 1905 they applied for and received a corporate charter under the name Keetoowah 
Society, Incorporated to function as a business and sue the US for funds still owed to the 
Cherokee. With this charter, even if the Keetoowah were unable to maintain or secure further 
tribal self-determination, they could at least handle finances and aid their people.  
 Other former leaders, such as Chief William Charles Rogers accepted the tribe's fate. 
Even though the Keetoowah Society continued to fight against allotment, it and other groups of 
Cherokees split into several community-level groups to aid those who lived nearby. Some of 
these groups solely focused on religion and traditional living. Others worked similarly to the 
Keetoowah Society, such as the Cherokee Executive Council, Eastern and Western Cherokee, 
Tulsa Contingent, and the Cherokee Executive Committee. These groups, which also included 
Rogers, formed and functioned as businesses to handle finances and advocate for aid for their 
destitute people.  
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 After nearly two decades of functioning solely through community-level groups, the 
Nighthawks call all the Keetoowah and later the other Cherokee factions together to unify. 
Despite the Nighthawks serving as one of the first factions to remove themselves to individual 
communities to focus on religion and traditional living, they were the faction to call for 
unification. Sam Smith and the other Traditionals, after enduring the destitution and landlessness 
caused by allotment and without representation through a tribal government, realized they needed 
to work together to not only serve all the Cherokee but to also utilize the talents of those who had 
been educated in Anglo American business and law.  
 This new generation of leaders in the 1920s shared the same hardships, which also led to 
faction unification. This new generation had endured allotment and the dissolution of their tribal 
government. They witnessed and cared for their elders and other friends and family who were 
impoverished and landless. These leaders shared the experience of serving as de facto 
governments at the community level to provide care for their people. They shared the common 
goal of surviving the aftermath of allotment as well as later laboring for tribal self-determination. 
In addition, these leaders lacked their predecessors' experiences of violent intratribal conflict and 
feelings of betrayal, which enabled them to be more willing to bridge factional lines and work 
together to benefit all of the Cherokee people. 
 In the 1920s, the various factions organized into a single unit and elected Levi Gritts as 
the representative of all the Cherokee. Gritts was supported by the gathered factions, including 
the Keetoowah, Nighthawks, and Cherokee Executive Council. At this time, the US refused to 
recognize the coalition de facto government or work with Gritts. Just as the organized Cherokee 
met another defeat, the tide of US Indian policy was about to change. After the Meriam Report of 
1928 illuminated the wrongs of the allotment and assimilation practices, reformers and the new 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier began to lobby for further tribal self-determination. 
127 
 
The spirit of cooperation and work to organize and elect a single leader proved useful for the 












AN OPPORTUNITY: THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, THE OKLAHOMA INDIAN 
WELFARE ACT, AND THE KEETOOWAH 
 With perfect timing, as the Cherokees were coming together, a shift occurred in US 
Indian policy. The effort and experience of unification of the various factions would prove 
advantageous and enable the Cherokee to take advantage of the new favorable legislation. To 
fully comprehend the new opportunities and the importance of the previous unification work by 
the Cherokee, one must understand the changes that occurred in US federal legislation, and a new 
generation of reformers and government officials behind them.  
 Important changes in the federal government slowly ended the assimilation policies in the 
1930s. New Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier persuaded Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
sign an executive order to abolish the Board of Indian Commissioners, which consisted of 
staunch assimilationist supporters. In addition, on August 12, 1933, Secretary of Interior Harold 
Ickes signed a bureau order that ended the allotment policy. The order stated that no more trust or 
restricted Indian lands could be sold.
1
  
 Another occurrence in the 1920s that brought further awareness to the plight of American 
Indians, and served as a precursor to Collier's actions was the Meriam Report. Along with other 
grievous errors in Indian policy, the report illustrated that allotment had turned natives into a 
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 Historian Angie Debo in And Still the Waters Run not only personally 
witnessed and wrote about the conditions described in the Meriam Report, she also publicly 




 In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the wealthy began to see it as their 
duty to help the less fortunate. A group of philanthropists referred to themselves as "Friends of 
the Indian" met annually to discuss American Indian policies. An ethnocentric gathering of 
wealthy white men and women, these reformers believed they knew better than the natives 
themselves what would benefit the tribes. With their monetary influence, they held considerable 
sway with members of Congress, the president, and other government officials. Missionary 
societies, which included more women, often supported and joined these reformers' meetings and 
policies. The reformers initially believed allotment would prove best for the Indians by breaking 
up reservations, making American Indians citizens and subject to state laws, and educating the 
children in trades. However, after the dissemination of the Meriam Report and proof that 




 The poverty caused by allotment was further exacerbated by a depression that affected 
the rest of the nation. With the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929, the financial panic and 
poverty that touched all of Anglo America also affected tribes. Already suffering from being 
forced into an obsolete economy of yeoman farming, American Indians faced even worse 
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conditions of poverty and hopelessness. While many white Americans looked for work, 
subsistence farms for natives were decimated by drought and many starved. Banding together to 
fight for rights of self government became less of a priority when they had to focus on day-to-day 
survival.  
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly instituted reforms to ease the suffering of the 
Great Depression after his election. The creation and evolution of the Indian New Deal by Collier 
functioned similarly to FDR's other programs to provide immediate relief and then reform to 
continue improvements into the future. He also worked to get American Indians included in 
existing New Deal programs, such as the establishment of the Indian Division of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps. Collier sought to reorganize the Indian Bureau to end the allotment policy 
that further impoverished natives. He remained vocal that the allotment policies of the last sixty 
years caused the depressed condition of the natives and continued to negatively affect the survival 
and future of the tribes. Collier became convinced that in order to achieve the immediate and 
longterm goals, reform legislation needed to be passed. While angering those entrenched in the 
idea of assimilation, Collier made these proposals. Then came his grander and more radical ideas 
of supporting tribal communities, enlarging landholding, fostering native self-government, and 
preserving indigenous culture through the Indian New Deal.
5
 
 New Deal programs sought to aid natives in daily survival, but it was not until the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934 that progress was made towards native-led autonomy. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier labored to improve the lives of American Indians as 
well as to keep their culture intact in the process, previously unheard of in US policy. The IRA 
was meant to stop allotment, provide ways for natives to acquire more land, strengthen tribal 
governments, and assist tribes to develop businesses, higher education, and more. Overall, it 
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ended allotment but did little to boost tribal self-determination for all Indians as it excluded tribes 
in Oklahoma from some of its articles, including self-government. The Secretary of the Interior 
still exercised massive control over tribal elections and governmental functions there.
6
   
 Despite little progress, Indian policy in the early twentieth century marked an important 
reversal of the damaging US policy of assimilation. For the first time, US officials such as John 
Collier, Felix Cohen, D'Arcy McNickle, and Nathan Margold labored to boost self-determination. 
Cohen wrote The Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which is still used today.
7
 These men not 
only sought to bring about change for the better of the natives but also had to move public 
sentiment away from assimilation as a solution.  
 
 
 In July 1934, prior to Congressional hearings on new native legislation, John Collier sent 
questionnaires to various Indian superintendants regarding the status of the indigenous living in 
their districts. A. M. Landman, Superintendant of the Five Tribes reported "that the greatest 
impediment among the Cherokee was the Mixed-Bloods [sic] who would control any tribal 
organization."
8
 Landman stated that he believed help for the impoverished could best be handled 
by the Traditionals themselves, but that problems resulted from each individual faction wishing to 
serve as the sole representative for the tribe.  
 In contrast to the methodology of passing legislation in the past with little to no native 
input, John Collier travelled throughout Indian country to hold hearings with various tribes to get 
their opinions on the IRA, initially named the Wheeler-Howard Act after Senator Burton K. 
Howard who introduced it and Representative Edgar Howard who cosponsored. After more than 
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two centuries of broken treaties, American Indians remained wary and distrustful of these 
travelling US officials and their promises of new legislation to benefit them. Tribes varied, 
sometimes even amongst themselves, on their viewpoints on the IRA. According to Jon 
Blackman, some Pawnees opposed it, fearing the Progressives who sold their land would control 
the tribe. Comanches in Oklahoma opposed it because they did not wish their current manner of 
governance to change. The Fort Sill Apaches contended it would hinder economic and social 
advancement. Often, the discord within tribes boiled down to a conflict between Progressives and 
Traditionals on what constituted the best path for their people. However, other issues complicated 
the process, such as the tribes being unable to interpret the technical legal language of the act, the 
question of the fate of the landless, and if the act would only exist until the US government 
changed its policy and forced something else upon them.
9
 
 The Cherokee tribe held similar opinions. The Nighthawks and other Traditionals favored 
the act as the best way to regain self-determination. Others supported it because they believed it 
would help obtain more land and stop the allotment system. Those still laboring for daily survival 
did not support Collier's long range plans and instead focused on what would eliminate 
destitution. They welcomed the proposed financial aid for their daily survival.
10
  
 Many Traditionals supported the IRA as a way to gain more participation in their own 
governance. In addition, many approved the IRA as it ended the allotment policy while providing 
opportunities to gain land. The Keetoowah Society passed resolutions to show their support for 
the new legislation. However, the Progressive Cherokees opposed the IRA. They worried they 
would lose the land they held individually if ownership reverted back to traditional communal 
holdings. Progressive Cherokee and former US Representative William Wirt Hastings opposed 
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the IRA, believing it made the Cherokees feel inferior and would slow the process of 
assimilation. Both Progressives and Anglo Americans still contended assimilation was the best 
method for American Indians to survive and blend into Anglo society.
11
  
 A. M. Landman seemed to have been in a minority of non-natives supporting the IRA 
within Oklahoma. Such change in policy brought heavy opposition from both Anglo Americans 
and some American Indians. Non-native politicians agreed with Progressives that the new 
legislation would strip those living among white society of their progress in assimilation. 
Hastings spoke out early and often. In addition to reversing the assimilation policy, Hastings 
opposed the provisions that would shift the authority on land settlement and probate issues from 
local county courts to the Secretary of the Interior. He argued that the federal government had no 
business taking control of such local issues and leaders who knew the Indians in Oklahoma and 
what benefitted them best. Also, lawyers and others who made their living from work related to 
land settlement would lose their source of income if the federal government assumed control.
12
  
 Led by Senator Elmer Thomas, the Oklahoma congressional delegation opposed the IRA 
and Thomas proposed contrary amendments. One proposition excluded most Oklahoma natives 
from the sections of the bill allowing for establishing new reservations, Indian corporations, and 
tribal governments. Historians Angie Debo and Jon Blackman argued that Thomas and Hastings 
only opposed the extension of restrictions on native land because state tax revenue could not be 
collected on restricted allotments. The benefit of lifted restrictions and lost revenue from taxes 
were mentioned often in meetings and Congressional hearings regarding the new bills. Obviously, 
money played a large role in the decisions of politicians, lawyers, and non-natives. Both Wirt and 
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 Oklahoma newspapers such as the Oklahoma City Times, Okmulgee Daily Times, 
Shawnee Morning News, and The Muskogee Daily Phoenix served as the mouthpiece for white 
opposition to the IRA and carried a tone of wishing to maintain assimilation through a 
paternalistic idea that they knew the best course for the natives. Some missionary organizations 




  Thomas continued to work behind the scenes to gain support for his amendment. He 
obtained support for the provision that would exclude most Oklahoma Indians from establishing 
new reservations, native corporations, and tribal governments. The Oklahoma natives would still 
be eligible for the financial aspects of the IRA. Thomas stated that these amendments kept his 
indigenous constituents from being forced backwards by creating reservations. Jon Blackman 
argued that the motive for objection from white Oklahomans resulted from a lack of state tax 
revenue if the restrictions on native land were extended. This put politicians' greed for further 
income over the best interests of the natives, without ever having consulted them. Several 
American Indians, from various tribes including the Cherokee Traditionals, feared that if the 
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restrictions on native land were lifted, those who remained unfamiliar with white business 
transactions would lose their land and become even more destitute.
15
 
 The IRA (Wheeler-Howard Bill) became law in June 1934. Collier's original proposal 
had been cut from forty-eight to five pages. The act excluded Oklahoma Indians from the ability 
to organize constitutional governments and incorporate under charters. As a result, as far as self-
governance, the IRA did not change anything for the Cherokees. The Keetoowah Society, Inc. 
continued to function in a limited capacity under its corporate charter from 1905. The Society 
mostly functioned as a business entity, filing suits with the US Court of Claims for financial 
reparations to assist their people.
16
 
 However, the Cherokees wanted to participate in the new policy despite their exclusion 
from the act. Levi Gritts became chief of the Keetoowah Society, Inc. in 1928. After the passage 
of the Indian Reorganization Act, he travelled to Washington, DC, many times to attempt to 
organize the Cherokee in accordance to the new act. Even though the added amendments 
excluded Oklahoma indigenous from organizing a new tribal government, the Keetoowah 
continued to lobby for their people's sovereignty. 
17
 
 Despite the ineligibility to reorganize their governments, Oklahoma Indians could still 
take advantage of the new policy's financial aspects. The IRA allowed an annual $2 million 
appropriation to purchase land, as well as an annual fund of $250,000 for vocational training and 
college scholarships. In addition, the act exempted natives from many civil service requirements 
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for employment within the Office of Indian Affairs. However, while Oklahoma natives were not 
barred from benefitting from these financial provisions, they did not receive much actual support. 
They did not qualify for aid from the revolving fund because only a federally recognized, 
chartered tribal government could apply for aid from this source. A recognized government was 
also necessary for access to funds for land and property improvements from the Indian office. 
Opponents achieved their goal of keeping the Oklahoma indigenous from the communal aspects 
of the IRA, preferring them to live in an individualistic manner similar to mainstream white 
society. But in doing so, they also cut them off from most of the financial aid the IRA sought to 
help entire tribes, not just individuals. However, the financial portions of the IRA ultimately 
proved  difficult for Congress to implement as no funds had actually been implemented and 
conflict existed within bureau administrators, members of Congress, legal experts, and even 
anthropologists as how to best apply the IRA.
18
  
 After the passage of the IRA, Collier promised to extend its terms to Oklahoma natives 
and immediately set to work. Senator Thomas agreed to new legislation as long as it suited the 
conditions of Oklahomans specifically. In September 1934, Thomas announced a schedule of 
planned visits to all Indian agencies within the state, inviting Collier to attend. Throughout 
October 1934, Thomas and Collier concluded meetings with various Oklahoma tribes to gauge 
what needs existed for the new legislation. However, throughout most of the meetings, Collier 
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 On October 1, shortly before leaving for Oklahoma, Collier spoke at the Indian 
Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia. He stated that Oklahoma natives suffered from cruel wrongs and 
if they had been included in the IRA, it "would have done away with the avaricious local 
guardians who fatten upon Indians." Currently, he maintained, they still remained at the mercy of 
"blood-sucking local guardians."
20
 Oklahoman politicians felt personally attacked by his 
statements, even though Collier sought to simply garner sympathy and support for the new 
legislation. This slight influenced the dialogue of the early OIWA meetings, with Thomas 
coloring his speeches with defensive remarks and attacks against Collier. Livid, Thomas stated 
that "the legislation [IRA] was designed to primarily perpetuate the Indian Bureau and I am 
against that." However much Thomas also opposed the federal government taking charge of 
natives, he never once mentioned or considered the tribes governing themselves.
21
 
 On October 15, 1934, the first meeting regarding new legislation for Oklahoma Indians 
occurred in Muskogee, with more than two thousand natives from the Five Tribes attending. 
Thomas and Collier verbally sparred most of the meeting. Thomas announced the IRA would not 
prove beneficial for the Oklahoma indigenous but wanted to hear directly from the tribes what 
would suit them better. He reiterated that the IRA would have hurt those who held property and 
put them back on a reservation of the poorest quality land, stating that "Oklahoma is the Siberia 
of the Indian race."
22
  
 Thomas also stated that the IRA further proved that Collier only knew about reservation 
Indians in Arizona and New Mexico. Collier conceded that the new legislation needed to be 
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suitable for Oklahoma Indians due to their differences from natives in other areas and that could 
be achieved by altering the existing IRA. However, he said, the purpose of the IRA was to 




 At the second meeting on October 16, 1934 in Miami, Thomas continued his attacks on 
Collier and the Indian Bureau. Thomas had a history of speaking against the BIA. He had before 
been so critical of the Bureau of Indian Affairs previously that he had not been permitted to 
testify on bills regarding American Indians before the House Committee on Indian Affairs. 
However, by the third meeting on October 18, 1934, Collier and Thomas had forged a fragile 
alliance to achieve a bill benefitting Oklahoma Indians. They agreed on three points: existing 
legislation was not satisfactory for Oklahoma; effective provisions for purchasing land and credit 
was needed; and, that natives needed legal protection from encroaching white settlers.
24
  
 At the time of the next meeting on October 22, Collier had returned to Washington, DC, 
for unrelated work, and was replaced by Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs A. C. 
Monahan. At this meeting, Thomas argued against the organization by charter provision of the 
IRA, stating that natives would support this provision so they could go into business but then 
oddly asserts, "I know you are not interested in the continuation of boarding schools."
25
 It is 
unclear how Thomas equated organizing a tribal government via charter with the cultural 
genocide of boarding schools unless he meant American Indian children would not be allowed in 
public schools. It is possible, as many Oklahoma natives voiced their approval of the new 
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legislation, that Thomas used the emotional trauma of boarding schools to turn the tide against 
support of a new bill.
26
  
 Factionalism within tribes did not go wholly ignored during discussions of the proposed 
new legislation. After the second meeting, Louis McDonald, a person on the Ponca Business 
Committee, referred to arguments amongst the Poncas between Traditionals and Progressives 
regarding the IRA. The Arapahos voiced similar concerns. Blackman argued that this sort of 
division was clearly evident among many tribes as they considered the IRA. For the Cherokees, 
the record of such factionalism is absent from any existing records. For a tribe that divided, 
sometimes violently, over removal, the American Civil War, and allotment, it is surprising that 
publicized arguments and meetings did not occur regarding the IRA or Oklahoma bills. Some 
Progressives stated they opposed the IRA when they believed it would force them to give up their 
land and live on reservations but once this misconception was cleared, no other objections were 
recorded. Even disputes regarding which faction would govern a new, reorganized Cherokee tribe 
is absent from the record. The only mention of a faction at this time is the Seven Clan Society 
Christians, a Cherokee Traditional organization with 297 members, which sent a resolution to 




 In January 1934, Senator Thomas and Representative Will Rogers of Oklahoma became 
chairs of the Indian Affairs committees in the Senate and House, respectively. After the meetings 
with tribes in Oklahoma regarding new legislation, Thomas and Rogers worked together to draft a 
bill similar to the IRA. They introduced the Thomas-Rogers Bill on February 27, 1936.
28
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 Several aspects of the Thomas-Rogers Bill, later known as the Oklahoma Indian Welfare 
Act (OIWA), remained similar to the IRA. Section 12 acknowledged the right of natives to 
organize themselves. The section outlined the procedures for establishing a constitutional tribal 
government, beginning with a charter of incorporation, similar to that of the IRA. Section 17 
removed the exemptions to all benefits of the IRA that had been imposed by Thomas as 
additional amendments in the act. This gave Indians access to the $10 million revolving credit 
fund for indigenous chartered corporations.
29
 
 The OIWA differed from the IRA in its treatment of the role of blood quantum. The IRA 
only used blood quantum to define someone as indigenous if they possessed one half Indian 
blood or more. The OIWA introduced the use of blood quantum to determine if natives would 
have their lands held in trust by the federal government, and exempt from taxes but unable to be 
sold or leased. According to historian Circe Sturm, this provision served as a measuring tool for 
the US government to "control access to economic resources," while non-natives used it as "a 
justification for economic exploitation."
30
 
 The OIWA defined an "Indian of the first degree" as any person whose name appeared on 
membership rolls of the tribe or is classified by the Secretary of the Interior as having "one-half 
or more of Indian blood." The new bill proposed that the lands, property, and funds of the 
"Indians of the first degree" be restricted by the Secretary of the Interior and held in trust. The 
document defined an "Indian of the second degree" as any person whose name was on the official 
rolls of the Indian Office and was classified by the Secretary of the Interior as a person having 
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"less than one-half Indian blood." The OIWA stipulated that all lands, property, and funds of 
"Indians of the second degree" were relieved of all restrictions if approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior. Lastly, at least once every four years, the Secretary of the Interior had to create a 
competency commission to examine each "Indian of the second degree" to judge if their 
restrictions should be removed.
31
 
 The blood quantum provisions of the OIWA proved to be the most controversial among 
those who would otherwise support the bill. Laurence E. Lindley testified on behalf of the Indian 
Rights Association (which had no native members) that they supported the legislation except for 
this portion. Lindley stated that relying on blood quantum served as one of the most effective 
ways to separate the Indian from their land. Many thought back to the Dawes Act and those "full 
bloods" who lost their lands due to being deemed "incompetent" and placed under the care of 
greedy guardians who took their lands and earnings.
32
  
 The Grand Council of the Five Civilized Tribes sent a letter to Senator Elmer Thomas 
regarding the use of blood quantum and the definition of who qualified as an "Indian" within the 
proposed act. They requested greater clarification regarding the contradictions in said act on 
restrictions of lands and qualifications for financial credit. The council argued that the act initially  
states restrictions would be based on health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability 
rather than blood quantum. In another, it authorized the Secretary of the Interior to determine on a 
case-by-case basis, along with the requirements of blood quantum. Lastly, they complained about 
people being "shipped" into Oklahoma to run Indian affairs without any experience or knowledge 
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and advocate for natives to earn these positions. The council stated with the contradictory terms 
of the act, that one would need a considerable amount of political pull to benefit from the 




 On May 9, 1935, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes testified before the House 
Committee, endorsing the Thomas-Rogers Bill. He called the previous policies of Congress 
"heartless," stating this new legislation served as a reversal of past mistakes. He said "the 
Oklahoma Indians themselves are unanimously in favor of this measure…."
34
 The endorsement of 
the Secretary of the Interior proved an invaluable asset in the discussion of the bill. In addition, 
several Oklahoman natives testified their tribe's approval during the hearings. For an unknown 
reason, no Cherokees were included among the indigenous who testified. 
 However, the Thomas-Rogers bill angered politicians in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma State 
Legislature passed a resolution condemning the extension of restrictions, removal of probate 
jurisdiction from the state courts, and the purchase of more land that would also be tax exempt on 
April 5, 1935. Those who protested most proved to be those who benefitted from the legal costs 
surrounding land matters and probate hearings. Lawyers stood to lose personal income gained 
from legal fees from handling allotment land matters. Some even called the bill communist or 
atheist. Many white Oklahomans opposed it because of the possible loss of state tax revenue. 
Within Congress, most remained uninterested in the proceedings as it did not affect them or their 
constituents. So they left it to the Oklahoma members. Historian Frederick Hoxie observed that 
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the indifference occurred because Congress viewed American Indians as a "western problem," 
similar to how African Americans were seen as a "Southern" responsibility.
 35 
 
 Those who did actively opposed the OIWA labored to prevent its passage. Congressmen 
Jack Nichols and Wesley Disney, both from Oklahoma, along with former Congress member 
Hastings, vehemently objected to the bill. Nichols, despite not serving on the House Committee 
of Indian Affairs, was allowed to participate in the hearings. He represented non-native interests 
from eastern Oklahoma—lawyers, judges, and guardians who profited from legal fees made from 
indigenous allotment litigation and probate matters. These constituents proved especially 
concerned with the restrictions on Indian land and Section 8 that transferred jurisdiction regarding 
land from the state courts to the Secretary of the Interior.
36
  
 On May 15, 1935, Nichols delivered a lengthy formal statement refuting most of 
Secretary Icke's remarks. He and Disney both blamed the failures of previous Indian policies on 
the Indian Bureau, with Collier as a specific target. They repeated their insults of Collier often, 
stating he looked like a mummy, only knew about reservation Indians in New Mexico and 
Arizona, and relied on textbooks rather than experience in his understanding of natives. Nichols 
also asserted that he'd heard "dozens and dozens" of Indians who opposed the bill. Nichols argued 
the bill served as an attempt by those like Ickes to bring the full control of Oklahoma Indians 
under the Secretary of the Interior and thus forcing federal control over state matters. Collier 
stressed that nothing in the Thomas-Rogers bill was compulsory so if any natives did not want to 
follow it, they would not be forced to comply.   
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 Despite Nichol's claims, those indigenous on record during the hearings all voiced 
support for the OIWA. Many testified during the Senate hearings, but most could not afford to 
stay in or return to Washington, DC, for the House hearings. While not a perfect, broad 
representation of all native opinions, these hearings marked a shift in Indian policy allowing 
indigenous voices to be heard regarding matters that affected their welfare.
37
  
 Of several natives interviewed during the Congressional hearings, most overwhelmingly 
supported the OIWA. However, a number of Oklahoma Indians did oppose the new bill. Some 
Progressives, especially those who already felt assimilated, still believed the OIWA would 
separate them from the white society where they were educated, lived, and made their living. 
Some natives opposed any new Indian legislation from the federal government. They distrusted 
the US and new ideas of any non-native politicians and reformers. The indigenous had 
experienced the loss of land, sovereignty, and rights with each new bill. The removal policy had 
cost them their ancestral homelands and the lives of relatives, allotment resulted in the massive 
loss of lands, and the Curtis Act eliminated their tribal governments. These people and several 
generations before had seen white settlers covet their land, resulting in policies advocated by 
politicians as advantageous for the Indian. With the legacy of broken treaties and harmful 
Congressional acts, the suspicion and distrust of many natives was unsurprising.  
 On July 29, 1935, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs reported on an amended 
Thomas-Rogers bill. They struck out Section 8, leaving the Oklahoma Indians under the 
jurisdiction of the state in regards to probate and land matters. The Secretary of the Interior could 
not extend restrictions on Indians with less than one-half of "Indian blood." Most of the suggested 
changes returned jurisdiction to state courts and liberalized the provisions in declaring the natives' 
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land unrestricted. This bill kept the portions addressing economic and tribal governance. It passed 
the Senate on August 16, 1935. However, as a result of the undermining work of Disney and 
Nichols, the Thomas-Rogers bill was tabled, effectively killing the first version of the OIWA and 
this opportunity for tribal self-determination.
38
  
 Almost immediately after Congress adjourned, Senator Thomas began working with 
Collier on a new bill. Thomas presented the second version to the Senate. This shorter version, 
designed to pass quickly, removed the blood quantum designation, the transfer of jurisdiction 
from state courts to the Secretary of the Interior, and the competency commission to remove 
restrictions. The second version of the bill retained the welfare, economic, and organizational 
aspects of the original OIWA.
39
  
 In April 1936, the House Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings on the revised 
Thomas-Rogers bill. The hearings dragged into June as Congressman Disney continued his 
adamant opposition, even though he was not a member of the committee. He requested an 
amendment to exempt the Osage from the OIWA, describing the tribe as more independent than 
those in the rest of Oklahoma. Disney never clarified the basis of his claims regarding the Osage 
and their differences from other tribes. The committee approved his request, and then Disney 
gave his support. However, the Osage sent a telegram to the committee, requesting they not be 
excluded from the new legislation. Obviously, Disney supported the wishes of non-native 
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 The second version of the bill did not change the length of restrictions on Indian land. It 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land for natives without homesteads. Tribes 
could organize via charter of incorporation, which would give them access to a revolving credit 
fund and allowed them to engage in business, administer tribal property, and manage local affairs. 
After a charter, the tribe could organize by constitution, subject to approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior. Any ten or more natives could organize and form a cooperative association for credit 
administration, production, marketing, and management. Lastly, the second version maintained 
jurisdiction regarding land allotments and probate issues to state courts.
41
 
 The Thomas-Rogers bill passed out of the House Committee on Indian Affairs on June 
15, 1935. The House passed the bill the next day. The bill passed Senate on June 18 and on June 
26, 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the OIWA into law. The OIWA marked a new 
era of Indian policy, embracing tribal self-determination and ending the assimilationist policy of 
the Dawes and Curtis acts. The legislation gave Oklahoma Indians the right to administer tribal 
property and elect officers. Most importantly, it allowed natives in the state to form a corporation 
and seek a federal charter, which would give them “all the rights and responsibilities of any 
federally recognized Native American tribe.”
 42
  
 At first, many Cherokees did not attempt to organize because they believed themselves 
inherently sovereign and did not need confirmation from the US. However when the act passed, 
the Cherokee Nation had no federally recognized government. Without an authority recognized 
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through a charter of incorporation and constitution, the tribe remained ineligible for the sorely 
needed financial benefits from the OIWA and had no nation-to-nation relationship with the US.   
 The process of organization under the OIWA required two steps, beginning with an 
application for a corporate charter. A charter defined the right of the tribal government to exercise 
the powers of a corporation, such as handling the financial affairs of a tribe and managing the 
funds within a national bank. Second, a tribal constitution needed to be written and ratified by 
native citizens to designate the powers and duties of the tribal government. Charters and 
constitutions relied on the Secretary of the Interior for approval.
43
 Despite gaining federal 
recognition and the right to reorganize a tribal government, the terms of the OIWA did not grant 
full sovereignty to tribes. Things normal for government-officers, roles and duties of officials, 
financial management, and citizenship-most aspects of self-determination were returned. 
However, with all facets of organization dependent on the Secretary of the Interior, the US still 
maintained overarching control of the tribes as they could refuse to approve their governing 
documents without just cause.  
 Despite the Curtis Act ending US recognized tribal governments, most natives retained a 
form of informal, functioning government to take care of their citizens. US presidents continued 
to appoint "chiefs for a day" to sign land deeds for allottees, but most tribes also maintained a 
form of council or business committee. Many tribes maintained a tradition for group and 
community action, and held meetings and created voluntary organizations. In this capacity, the 
Nighthawks and Keetoowahs remained active for the Cherokees, along with the Cherokee 
Executive Committee. Historian Erik Zissu argues that tribal members did not abandon political 
initiative and remain passive, as Angie Debo previously implied. Instead they undertook political 
activity and fashioned a renewal of their collective identity. Zissu's work accurately dispels the 
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 Levi Gritts travelled to Washington, DC, after the passage of the IRA to lobby for the 
organization of the Keetoowah under its terms. The passage of the OIWA gave the legal 
foundation for it to finally achieve federal recognition. The Department of the Interior found the 
Cherokee Nation, organized under the September 6, 1839, constitution, a government dissolved in 
1906 and ineligible to reorganize under either the IRA or OIWA. Field investigators reported that 
Cherokee citizens, except Keetoowah, had abandoned tribal relations and had no interest in 
reorganization. As a result, the Cherokee Nation continued as before in a state of nonexistence 
with a presidentially appointed chief existing solely to sign land deeds. A council of several 
Cherokee organizations met in 1938 and chose J. Bartley Milam as principal chief. In April 1941 
President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Milam as chief, marking the first time the appointed and 
elected chief was the same. Milam never applied for a charter for his tribe under the OIWA. 
Milam served as chief until 1949 when the Cherokee Nation returned to non-elected, US-
appointed chiefs. Milam more than likely did not apply for a charter either because the intention 
of the Keetoowah to apply and represent all Cherokee or he did not see it necessary because he 
represented the tribe and had a relationship with the US.
45
   
 Continuing the leadership established with the 1921 meeting in Tahlequah and taking a 
different course than the Cherokee Nation, the Keetoowah began preparing for organization under 
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the OIWA soon after its passage. Gritts visited A. C. Monahan, the Regional Coordinator for the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs in Oklahoma City to begin the process.
46
  
 After Gritts' visit, Monahan directed Ben Dwight and A. A. Exedine, organization field 
agents for the Five Civilized Tribes Agency, to investigate the possibilities of eligibility. Both 
agents interviewed members of the various factions within the Cherokees and found the sentiment 
within all groups, including the Progressives, that they wished to come together for the benefit of 
Traditional Indians. Dwight advised Gritts that he believed all Keetoowahs could organize under 
the provisions of the OIWA as they already had the charter from 1905 for the Keetoowah Society, 
Inc, which had been approved by the US District Court in Tahlequah. Dwight and Exedine 
planned a joint meeting of the Keetoowah groups to create a strategy for taking advantage of the 
provisions of the OIWA.
47
 
 Chief Sam Smith, the son of Redbird Smith, notified Exedine that the Nighthawks did not 
wish to participate in a meeting regarding reorganization under the Keetoowah Society, Inc. 
Monahan explained to Smith that even if the Keetoowah groups came together under one name, 
each entity would remain autonomous and administer government benefits to its own members. 




 Superintendant of the Five Civilized Tribes A. M. Landman issued a formal call for a 
meeting of the Keetoowahs for March 30-31, 1939, at the Lyons Community House, about six 
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miles south of Stillwell, Oklahoma. True to their word, Smith's Nighthawks did not participate, 
but the other five Keetoowah groups attended. With a common goal of reorganization to benefit 
all citizens, little discord occurred among the various groups. After this meeting, reference to the 
various Keetoowah groups became simply the Keetoowah and rarely the Nighthawks. After 1930, 
most Keetoowah factions had reconciled and were considered as one.
49
  
 At the March meeting, Dwight and Exedine told those gathered that a possibility existed 
that the US government would quickly recognize them under the OIWA because of the 
preexisting Keetoowah Society, Inc. charter. The assembly then hired Dwight as their legal 
counsel. Houston B. Teehee, a Cherokee attorney who had previously worked in Cherokee claims 
suits, gave a speech. He stated that even if the Nighthawks did not attend meetings, those 
gathered were members of the original Keetoowah Society, Inc. and that everyone was 
"undertaking to perfect an organization as the United Keetoowahs."
50
 
 On May 6, 1937, Dwight and Dr. Charles Wilson, anthropologist for the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, met with the Nighthawks as part of their interviews regarding native sentiment towards 
reorganization and the historical basis of the Keetoowah. Dwight and Wilson wished to ensure 
that all the Cherokee groups were willing to organize as one entity. After the interviews, Wilson 
remained in the area to research and contact the Keetoowahs to determine if the group would be 
eligible to organize for "general tribal purposes."
51
 
 Concurrently with Wilson's research, the Cherokee delegates created and renamed 
themselves as the United Keetoowah Cherokee Indians (UKCI) to reflect the various factions 
working together. An elected committee drew up a constitution and bill of rights and submitted it 
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on July 9, 1939, to their members for approval. The gathering discussed various ideas they 
wished to be included in their new recognized government. 
 The preamble of the new constitution stated that the Keetoowah were organizing to 
promote their common welfare and to obtain their rights and privileges from the US and the State 
of Oklahoma. An elected committee drew up the document, including a bill of rights. The 
constitution provided for four officers and twenty-seven councilmen. It required the councilmen, 
secretary, and treasurer to have at least "half blood" and the chief and vice much be "full blood." 
To vote, the citizens could be no less than one half Cherokee. The Keetoowahs wished to exclude 
freedmen and intermarried whites from their membership, as they had pushed for in 1899 when 
the US created tribal membership rolls for allotment. Collier asked an opinion regarding their 
wishes from the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, Frederick L. Kirgis. He responded 
that the Cherokee tribe continued to own any remaining land and other tribal assets, and those 
assets would be omitted from any new organization. As a result, intermarried whites and 
freedmen would lose no existing rights or property, even if otherwise excluded.
52
   
 Discord within the Cherokee occurred concurrently with the creation of the new 
constitution, although not regarding the question of reorganization. After the passage of the IRA 
and OIWA, Dick Pickup brought together the leaders of the various Keetoowah branches for a 
meeting in Tahlequah. After much discussion, a vote was taken to unite the society under one 
chief (continuing the collective movement in the 1920s when Levi Gritts had been selected as 
chief for all Keetoowah) and officially petition Congress. All leaders agreed to participate except 
for Stoke Smith who wished to retain his faction for solely religious purposes. On July 1939, 
despite difficulties obtaining permission to organize from the federal government, the committee 
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submitted the constitution to members for approval, which occurred shortly. This united 
Keetoowah for political purposes. However, Smith did not prevent the members of his band from 
participating in the new group.
53
  
 After agreeing to work together to unite under the OIWA, the united bands of Keetoowah 
held elections. Reverend John Hitcher defeated Levi Gritts for the office of chief in 1946. Hitcher 
served as the first chief of the new UCKI. After a feud with Hitcher, Gritts had withdrawn from 
the cooperative effort and took some of the Keetoowah Society, Inc. with him. The Seven Clan 
Society, led by Eli Pumpkin, also left for an unknown reason. Any further mention of the Seven 
Clan Society is not in any found sources.
54
  
 As Dr. Charles Wilson finished his research in Oklahoma, he wrote that none of the 
Keetoowah factions had ever been a governing unit of the Cherokee Nation. As a result, on July 
1937, Frederick L. Kirgis, acting Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, denied the 
application of the Keetoowahs to organize under the OIWA. He stated that "…neither the 
Keetoowah Society nor any of its factions can be considered a band, much less a 'recognized' 
band under Section 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act."
55
 
 Shortly after denying the Keetoowah the right to organize under the OIWA, the federal 
government discovered that the Five Tribes Act of 1906 never specifically mentioned the 
Keetoowahs. The act had restricted the tribal governments of the five tribes. However, since it did 
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not include the Keetoowah, a legal grey area existed. This confusion led to years of research and 
debate before the Keetoowah again attempted to organize. Soon after Kirgis' denial, the 
Department of the Interior also ruled the Cherokee Nation (defined as the government organized 
under the 1839 constitution) ineligible to organize under the OIWA since it was formally 
dissolved in March 1906. In addition, field investigators found Cherokee citizens, with the 
exception of Keetoowahs, uninterested in reorganization and had abandoned tribal relations. 
56
 
 Those the field investigators found uninterested in reorganization were more than likely 
Progressives. They lived and prospered within white society and would have gained less from 
returning to tribal self-determination. These assimilationists had incorrectly believed the IRA and 
OIWA functioned to strip them of property and send them on communally held reservations. 
Traditionals, however, made up most of the Keetoowah membership. They would have needed a 
tribal government to voice their plight as many lived in poverty, did not speak English or 
understand/have experience with non-native law and business.  
 Despite their denial, the Keetoowah never stopped functioning as the unofficial 
government for the Cherokee and kept lobbying the federal government for recognition. They 
continued to hold elections for council and elected John Hitcher as chief in 1939. Councilmen 
continued to be appointed from the old nine districts of the Cherokee Nation. Hitcher also served 
as chief from 1939 until his death in 1946, after which Jim Pickup became chief.
57
 
  In 1942, the Keetoowah sent a resolution and revised constitution to Landman requesting 
another analysis and decision. The most major revision from that submitted in 1939 changed the 
name of the band to the United Cherokee Band of Indians (UCBI). Although the name would 
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later change, the band sought to avoid the religious connotation of the term "Keetoowah." 
Membership had grown during the 1930s-1940s, representing approximately half of the 
Traditionals who lived within Cherokee territory.
58
  
  In 1944, the Chief of the Branch of Tribal Relations met with Chief Counsel of the US 
Indian Service Thomas Haas to consider the revising the 1937 opinion of Kirgis. In April, 
McNickle wrote a brief arguing the historical legitimacy of the UCBI. He stated that although the 
term "Keetoowah" may have originally applied to just a town, it historically existed as a 
governing unit. Keetoowahs and their constitution in 1858 pledged its members as a group of 
trustees to keep their people intact. By that time, many non-natives had come onto Cherokee land, 
factionalism became strong over how to respond, and it was necessary as a means of adopting 
measures for self protection. The actions of the Keetoowah during the Civil War showed they 
acted as a nation rather than solely a private organization. They exercised independent political 
action and had been a formally organized body since 1858. D'Arcy McNickle stated that "the fact 




 McNickle also acknowledged the preference and practice of the US to continue to 
appoint "chiefs for a day" from the old Cherokee Nation. He stated that 
 "The pressures exerted by the US government resulted in producing numerous 
counter pressures within the Cherokee Society. Those elements within the tribe 
who were more compliant and willing to concede the demands made by the US 
in time were recognized as compromising the corpus of the tribe; those who 
resisted were treated as a malcontented minority."
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In short, factionalism occurred as the result of encroaching settlers and pressures of the federal 
government and should not be used as a justification to deny the right of the UCBI to organize.  
 McNickle and Chief Counsel Theodore Haas, defining the UCBI as a historic tribe, met 
on June 5, 1944, and recommended Congress pass a bill to recognize the Keetoowah under the 
OIWA, Section 3. This legislation would need to clarify the UCBI's status and right to reorganize 
as a tribe under the OIWA. Abe Fortas from the Department of the Interior, Oklahoma Senator 
William Stigler (who replaced Jack Nichols), and Senator Elmer Thomas all supported the bill. 
Also called Stigler's bill, the legislation went to Congress in April 1946 as part of a measure to 
also grant land to the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe in Oklahoma. Levi Gritts stated in a letter to 
Stigler that since Frank J. Boudinot's death, the tribe lacked the funds to keep a delegation in 
Washington, DC, and asked for their help to represent their wishes in Congress. On August 10, 
1946, President Harry Truman signed the bill, recognizing the Keetoowahs and their right to 
organize under the OIWA. This legislation passed nearly ten years after the Keetoowahs first 
attempted to regain self-determination under the OIWA.
61
 
 After Congress recognized the band's right to organize under the OIWA, the UCBI still 
needed to write a constitution that would be approved by its citizens as well as the Secretary of 
the Interior. This process took another four years, for unknown reasons. It is possible that the 
strain of daily survival during the Great Depression and the decade afterwards stalled longterm 
goals, such as a new tribal government. Tribal leaders busied themselves with helping those hit 
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the hardest. For example, after the 1940 election, Chief Hitcher requested building a central 
headquarters building for the use of "restricted Indians" in the Cherokee Nation (meaning the 
Traditionals that faced the most poverty). The BIA denied the request due to a lack of funds.
62
  
 In order to gain the right to organize under the OIWA, the Keetoowah were considered a 
separate organization from the Cherokee Nation. Otherwise, they would have been ruled as the 
same government that had been dissolved in 1906 and ineligible for reorganization. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Zimmerman (1948-1949) faced the task of recognizing 
which Cherokee factions made up the Keetoowahs, and the UCBI. Even though the UCBI had 




 Eventually, in working with Chief Pickup, Zimmerman realized that the UCBI consisted 
of the six Keetoowah bands that existed at the time, as well as citizens of the old Cherokee 
Nation. Overlap occurred as well as many held membership in both Keetoowah and Cherokee 
factions. He also pointed out that a separate chief appointed by the US president, J. B. Milam, 
existed. He asserted that the best solution would be to recognize the UCBI as a separate band 
since the appointed chief represented the old Cherokee Nation. He also initially proposed 
organizing via one charter for the UCBI and then subcharters for each of the six divisions. 
Eventually, Zimmerman decided that the 1946 act authorizing organization designated the 
Keetoowah a band within the meaning of Section 3 of the OIWA but did not make a provision for 
the six other groups. He named the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated, the Nighthawks, the Seven 
Clan Society and acknowledged that others may exist that he was not aware of yet. As a result, he 
determined one charter for all sufficient and abandoned the idea of organization by confederation. 
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Despite his confusion, also shared by Jim Pickup due to a lack of written records for the 
Keetoowah, Zimmerman expressed a general desire to exist among the Cherokee and join 
together to protect their lands, improve education, and take care of the health of its neglected, 
more remote citizens. However, a single, compiled membership list of all who would be within a 
single charter under the Keetoowah name was needed.
64
  
 The Keetoowah continued functioning as normal, holding their annual meeting of the 
"United Keetoowah Society" on August 1, 1949 at the Lyons Community House near Stilwell, 
Oklahoma. They invited Oklahoma Representative William Stigler, with whom Chief Pickup had 
been in constant correspondence regarding US recognition and reorganization. Stigler expressed 
regret for his busy schedule and declined the invitation. The sources did not reveal the exact time 
or meeting, but at one of the gatherings at this time a membership roll was created.
65
  
 While lobbying for their charter and organization, the Keetoowah kept in touch with their 
US representatives and remained involved in advocating for those who favored their same goals. 
For example, Jim Pickup wrote to Stigler regarding the removal of an W. O. Roberts as 
Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes. Owens served as an ally for the Cherokee in his 
position, and the tribe needed to retain all the help they could.
66
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 After receiving recognition, the UCBI began to work on a new constitution. Earl Boyd 
Pierce served as their legal counsel and assisted in writing it. The constitution passed in 1950 was 
almost identical to that submitted in 1939. The tribe created a reorganization committee that met 
every two weeks in Salina, Oklahoma, to work on a new governing document, as well as 
reenrolling the people. On April 15, 1948, at a council meeting, attendees appointed a Committee 
of Five Tribal Delegates to choose an attorney to represent the UCBI in Washington, DC and for 
claims against the US. The committee chose William Maben, who immediate started 
correspondence pushing for approval of a new charter and constitution. Lastly the tribe held a 
three-day barbeque giving the candidates for officers the chance to address their possible 
constituents. Reverend Jim Pickup, elected in chief in 1947, led the efforts to create a new, 




 Enrolled as 1/32 Cherokee, J. B. Milam first attended the Cherokee Male Seminary, then 
graduated from the Metropolitan Business College in Dallas, Texas. After returning to Oklahoma, 
he worked in banking. In the mid 1930s, he served as the President of the Cherokee Seminary 




 In July 1948, Milam convened a National Convention in Tahlequah. This meeting served 
mostly to select legal counsel for all the Cherokee groups. Gritts attended but left shortly after the 
start, stating that the BIA, Milam, and the attorneys present controlled the convention. The 
convention selected Earl Boyd Pierce as counsel, which Gritts especially rejected. The former 
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chief claimed Pierce was unfriendly to him because the Keetoowah Society, Incorporated had 
refused to hire the attorney in the past. In addition, Pierce supported the recognition of Pickup as 
the leader of the Keetoowahs over Gritts. Beyond Gritts, discord seemed absent among the 
various groups of Cherokees gathered. Pierce and the other attorneys selected had worked with 




 The convention suggested Milam appoint a permanent standing committee of nine 
members from the gathered assembly. The committee would then choose attorneys to represent 
all enrolled Cherokees by blood, except intermarried non-natives and freedmen. This counsel 
would serve all groups of Cherokees, dividing them into Eastern Cherokees, Old Settlers, United 
Keetoowah Band, Seven Clans Society, and Texas Cherokees. Even though Gritts had left and 
taken his Keetoowah Society, Inc. followers with him, the convention included them as well.
70
  
 The new procedure for selecting a chief for the recognized Cherokees (UCBI) included 
the Superintendant of the Five Civilized Tribes sending a list of prospective candidates to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who would then forward his recommendation to the Secretary of 
the Interior. Lastly, the Secretary would forward the final selection to the president. This way, the 
chief would still be appointed by president as previously, but the selection would at least originate 
from a pool of candidates chosen by the tribe. In 1949, this Executive Committee elected W. W. 
Keeler as its vice chairman and appointed Chief Pickup as interpreter. The committee then 
followed its newly outlined method of selecting a US-appointed chief. Chief of UCBI, which 
intended to represent all Cherokees, Jim Pickup submitted his name for the appointed chief, but 
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the Executive Committee unanimously selected W. W. Keeler, an executive of Phillips Oil 
Company. President Harry Truman appointed Keeler in 1949, whose selection angered many 
Traditionals as he was only one-sixteenth Cherokee and the appointment was viewed by many as 
nothing more than a political favor for past support.
71
  
 Truman's appointment of Keeler also caused governing issues, and is viewed by many as 
the basis of the creation of the dual government for the Cherokee that exists today.
72
 The 
convention that Milam called served to unify the Cherokee people under one government. 
However, the Keetoowah (including the six groups considered Keetoowah) were those authorized 
to organize under Section 3 of the OIWA. The former Cherokee Nation no longer existed except 
for those chiefs the US president appointed. Had Pickup, already chief of the Keetoowah, been 
selected by the Executive Committee to serve as the appointed chief, the Cherokees from the old 
nation, who followed Milam, would have been united with the Keetoowah, who had elected 
Pickup as their chief. 
 As an appointed rather than elected chief, Keeler and his attorney Earl Boyd Pierce 
attended Keetoowah council meetings. Keeler told members they only served in the capacity of 
caretakers. He considered the Keetoowah the true government and promised that once the 
Keetoowah had enough experience to run affairs, he would relinquish his position. Despite these 
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 Regardless of the appointment of Keeler and Milam's convention, the Keetoowah 
continued their efforts to write a new charter and constitution to reorganize under the OIWA. The 
old Cherokee Nation served as mostly a political faction following the presidentially appointed 
chief. By 1940, the UCBI membership reached more than 3,687, representing nearly half of the 
"full bloods" that lived within Cherokee territory. Despite the continued existence of the smaller 




 While writing the new governing document and nearly ready to request federal 
recognition, a debate ensued regarding the name of the organizing body. Rather than use the 
name UCBI, all those present were Keetoowah and wanted a new name to reflect that. The 
gathering decided they had been brought together despite all the divisions and named themselves 
the United Keetoowah Society. The BIA had issues with extending federal recognition to a 
"society," and proposed the final name, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (UKB). 




 The new constitution was nearly identical to the one written in 1939. The major change 
concerned lowering the blood quantum requirement from one half to one fourth degree. Council 
members were reduced from twenty seven to nine, with one representing each of the old 
Cherokee Nation districts. The new by-laws also did not require a chief or vice chief. The power 
of the new organization fell to the council as the major governing body. They stated "the 
boundaries of the band were and are continuous with those of the old Cherokee Nation."
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 The corporate charter defined the purposes, corporate powers, and restrictions of the 
UKB and could only be revoked by Congress. The charter noted the band held ownership of 
unallotted lands. When the Department of the Interior assigned all of the remaining lands of the 
old Cherokee Nation to the UKB, it contradicted the 1937 opinion of Kirgis that the UKB could 
organize without affecting future land distribution to intermarried non-natives and freedmen, as 




 The tribe submitted its new governing documents and Pickup personally gave a copy of 
the constitution to Associate Solicitor Felix Cohen during his trip to Oklahoma in November 
1946. Chief Pickup remained in constant correspondence with Elmer Thomas and, through him, 
the Interior Department to inquire often about the progress of their approval. Cohen reassured 
them the constitution looked as if it would need only minor revisions. However, the approval 
moved very slowly for the tribe eager to reorganize. Chief Pickup wrote directly to the US House 
of Representatives after several inquiries to the Interior Department, asking officials to approve 
their charter and to "please don't let this be a broken Promises, [sic] Hand us Down a charter."
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Pickup, as well as Stigler and Thomas, frequently wrote Zimmerman and other members of 
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Congress regarding the status and slow pace of approval of the Keetoowah documents. Stigler 
mentioned in a September 1947 letter that the matter had been pending for more than a year. 
Letters inquiring of the charter and constitution's approval continued until 1950.
79
 
 Chief Pickup relied heavily on Representative Stigler and his contacts to inquire and push 
for approval of Keetoowah organization. The Keetoowah invited Stigler to the Keetoowah 
Society Annual Convention in Salina, Oklahoma, on August 11, 1947. Levi Gritts proposed, and 
the tribe passed, a resolution at a convention recognizing and thanking Stigler for his work on 
their behalf for organization. This resolution mentioned the recognition and charter from 
Congress of the Keetoowah with the "abolition of the Cherokee Tribal Government."
80
 
 Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Provinse blamed the delay on the question 
of membership and the existence of various groups within the UKCI. Debate continued regarding 
the decision to have one constitution or a confederate organization, especially after Ben Smith (a 
leader of one of the groups) stated he would not join with the others until the differences had been 
reconciled. US officials also remained unsure of the tribe's membership. Provinse stated that a list 
containing approximately 5,000 names existed, but no one was able to locate it.
81
  
 W. D. Roberts, Superintendant of the Five Civilized Tribes wrote to the Keetoowah with 
his questions and comments on their governing documents on April 25, 1948. Roberts stated that 
while the Keetoowah Society, Inc. is widely known, there was "no record in this office which will 
enable us to identify the Keetoowah Society, Inc. There is no record of membership or the 
organization of the Society."
82
 Gritts replied by recounting the band's history, beginning with the 
1859 constitution written by Bud Gritts. Next, on September 20, 1902, the Keetoowah secured a 
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charter from the Northern District US Court of Indian Territory. Gritts mentioned that the stated 
charter would be on file in the office of the Secretary of the Interior. Gritts pointed out the 1946 
act that stated "the Keetoowah Indians of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma shall be recognized 
as a band of Indians residing in Oklahoma" recognized the tribe and passed without opposition. 
Any information required regarding the UKCI was given by Senator Elmer Thomas and 
Congressman Schwabe of Oklahoma. Roberts also questioned the right of the Keetoowah to file 
claims, to which Gritts answered with the 1946 act that by being recognized as a tribe through a 
charter they legally had a right to file in the Court of Claims. Lastly, Gritts stated that a roll of 




 On May 8, 1950, with the recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon 
S. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of the Interior William E. Warne approved the charter, constitution, 
and by-laws of the UKB. The next day the Secretary of the Interior gave his conditional approval, 
stipulating that all governmental authorities within the tribe must be retained according with the 
tribe's will and within federal Indian law. After US approval, the new governing documents 
required endorsement by the tribe. On October 3, 1950, the Keetoowah ratified their constitution, 
by-laws, and corporate charter by a vote of 1,414 to 1.
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 While the ad-hoc leadership of the Cherokee remained strong after the abolition of tribal 
government, the OIWA provided a stage for communicating native voices with the US 
government. Ending allotment and regenerating a nation-to-nation relationship with some native 
self-determination proved the largest impact of the OIWA on US Indian policy. The 
reorganization of tribal governments in the early twentieth century paved the way for such acts by 
the US towards indigenous self-determination in the 1970s. While the termination policy of the 
1950s cycled the US away from native sovereignty, the reforms and precedent of the IRA-era 
legislation provided a blueprint for quicker implementation of the self-determination policies of 
the 1970s. 
 Despite the successes in reorganizing tribal governments, the OIWA and other policies of 
the Indian New Deal also had many failures. During the early legislative process, US 
policymakers gave little foresight to funding and the mechanisms needed to implement the new 
laws. Continued underfunding of Indian New Deal programs inhibited their effectiveness and 
long term impact. Often, once organized, natives would request funds from a promised revolving 
credit account, which was often empty because Congress had not appropriated any funds. As a 
result, the new laws did not alleviate poverty, homelessness, racial discrimination, and 
unemployment. In addition, the OIWA failed to provide protection for allotted land remaining in 
Indian possession, specifically by its inability to remove the administration of native estates from 
state to federal court. As a result, local lawyers continued to earn income from ongoing legal 
matters regarding allotment and the corruption, manipulation, and sometimes outright stealing, as 
described by Angie Debo.
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 Other obstacles included the overall drain on government resources by the Great 
Depression. Also, several indigenous did not understand how to take advantage of the new 
programs, Congress did not want to extend credit to American Indians because of high default 
levels, and a lack of administrative staff to aid in implementing the new policies existed. Many 
Americans still adhered to assimilation as the correct solution to the "Indian problem" and refused 
to accept any changes to preexisting policies.
86
  
 Regarding the reorganization of tribal governments, historians disagree on its success. 
Loretta Fowler argued that few tribes organized under the OIWA because non-native 
constitutions were written by and forced on them by BIA officials. These prewritten constitutions 
did not adhere to the political traditions of the tribes. Alison Bernstein agrees, stating that Collier 
was "superimposing white political organization on tribe structures."
87
 Jon Blackman falls into 
this school of thought as well, maintaining that few tribes organized under with OIWA because 
they either did not understand a republican government or they refused to stray from their 
traditional decision-making structure.
88
   
 The arguments of Fowler, Bernstein, and Blackman do not apply to the Cherokee. They 
had more than one hundred years of experience with a constitutional republican government. In 
addition, there were no outside suggestions or writings in the UKB constitution. The tribe held 
several meetings to decide the details of their governing document. Debo also maintained the 
opposing view, at least for the Creeks and Keetoowah, as both had experience with the accepted 
form of government under the provisions of the OIWA. She said of the constitution submitted by 
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 In another facet of historiography of these new tribal governments, James Olson and 
Raymond Wilson argued that few Oklahoma tribes organized, not because of forced constitutions, 
but because of factionalism. Olson and Wilson stated that Collier underestimated the diversity 
and strife within Oklahoma tribes, having more experience with the close-knit tribal relations of 
the Navajos and Pueblos. Keneth Philip agreed, stating that the IRA and OIWA intensified 
existing factionalism because of disputes regarding who would control the newly established 
tribal governments. However, in regards to the Cherokees, the lack of violent factionalism after 
their previous history proves the importance of maintaining a voice for their people over 
individual desires. During the early twentieth century factions still existed but they worked 
together for the common goal of obtaining recognition from the US. For example, the six separate 
groups of Keetoowah kept their local leaders while functioning together under the umbrella of the 
UKB. The Nighthawk wished to remain separate from politics as a religious organization. The 
existence of factions did not necessarily mean conflict during this era. The practice of keeping 
local leaders under the umbrella of a larger governing institution was similar to the pre-
constitutional Cherokee practice of having clan leaders and larger village meetings.
90
 
 The largest, and most obvious, problem of the OIWA's provisions for tribal governments 
involved the process of reorganization, it was not a true form of self-determination. Tribes 
remained subject to the approval of the US government. The Secretary of the Interior had to 
approve charters and constitutions. Had any portion of these new governing documents proved 
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undesirable or unfavorable towards the US, the Secretary of the Interior could prevent the tribe 
from reorganizing. Although the US did not prevent reorganization of any tribes other than 
requesting editing of their governing documents, the federal government still maintained that 
authority over the tribes. The OIWA served as a vast improvement from not having a recognized 
tribal government to speak on behalf of its people, but it did not provide complete, independent 
sovereignty. The policy continued the paternalistic attitudes of the US, seen in the belief that 
natives are unable to govern or care for themselves without supervision of US officials.  
 Despite its downfalls, the OIWA did provide lasting improvements to US Indian policy. 
This policy reversed the Curtis Act, allowed natives to govern themselves, and permitted the 
indigenous to have a central authority with which to work towards political and economic 
advancement. Even after the Curtis Act and abolishment of their tribal government, Cherokee 
leaders continued lobbying the US regardless of recognition of a native central authority. Instead, 
during the era with no formally recognized government, the Cherokees united all of their factions, 
realizing they needed each other and cooperation to achieve anything for their people. Despite 
ineligibility to reorganize under the IRA, Levi Gritts and Keetoowah kept lobbying anyway. 
Finally, with the passage of the OIWA, the Keetoowah Cherokee seized the opportunity to 
reorganize a US-recognized government and work for the care of and economic advancement of 













 In the early twentieth century, the Curtis Act and other assimilationist policies ended 
tribal governments in Indian Territory after the completion of allotment. As a result, the 
Cherokees and other tribes lost the right to self govern. Despite the sometimes violent intratribal 
factionalism that ran rampant for nearly one hundred years and the later retreat into several 
community-level organizations, the shared experiences of hardship of a new generation of leaders 
enabled the unification and cooperation of these groups under the Keetoowah to work for the 
benefit of all the Cherokee. Without this intratribal collaboration, the Cherokee would not have 
been able to capitalize on the more favorable US federal Indian policies of the 1930s-1940s and 
reorganize into a tribal government. 
 With this work covering both external and internal pressures on the Cherokee people, a 
context of previous Cherokee history is needed to understand the previous violent factionalism as 
well as the disastrous US federal Indian policies tribal leaders and indigenous citizens endured 
and reacted to. This previous experience of the tribe magnifies the importance of the leaders 
unifying towards a common goal in the twentieth century.  
 After the adoption of a written, republic-style constitution in 1828, the Cherokee leaders 
endured and faced the external pressures of the Trail of Tears, reunifying under a single 
government after removal, splitting during the American Civil War, and encroachment of white 
settlers, and allotment of their lands. As a result of these events, the leaders also faced internal 
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pressure from their citizens as they differed over the best way to maintain self-determination 
during these hardships.  
 The fighting between these factions not only weakened the tribe's negotiating power with 
the US but also resulted in feelings of betrayal, revenge violence, and bitter feuds along factional 
and familial lines. These conflicts prevented intratribal cooperation as leaders and their 
immediate descendants continued these grudges and feuds. As these leaders passed, the later 
generations lacked the experience of the violent factionalism and feuds. As a result, they proved 
more willing to cooperate with other factions for the benefit of all the Cherokee people. By the 
early twentieth century, descendants of previously warring factions served together. 
 After reunification of the Cherokee into a single government in Indian Territory and after 
the destruction of the Civil War, the generation of leaders during the 1870s and 1880s proved 
more willing to cooperate than their predecessors and serve as an early example of the 
cooperation that was to come in the 1920s. The generation of leaders in the 1870s grew up with 
the violence between the factions and resentments still existed. However, even with these bitter 
memories, this willingness to work together created a prosperous golden era of the Cherokee 
republic. This period shows the positive results of working together, often only possible after a 
new generation of leaders emerged without the experience of factional violence. The cooperation 
during this era is rivaled only by that in the 1920s, when leaders were even further removed from 
feuding factionalism. However, the progress of the cooperating factions in the 1870s and 1880s 
was shortened by the detrimental US federal Indian policy of assimilation. In contrast, the 
Cherokee in the 1920s were able to further capitalize on their cooperation with the favorable 
legislation passed during the Indian New Deal.  
 In the early twentieth century, legislation passed forcing private land ownership through 
allotment and dissolving tribal governments in Indian Territory in 1906. Statehood became a 
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discussion regarding Oklahoma and Indian territories. The Cherokee and other tribes viewed 
statehood as a last chance to retain self-determination through a separate native state. However, 
once it became apparent a separate state would not be approved by the US, the Cherokee were 
forced to return to wrapping up allotment and the affairs of the nation before the end date of the 
tribal government.  
 Some Cherokee, such as Chief William Charles Rogers, became resigned to the fate of 
their government and implementation of allotment. However, Traditionals under the Keetoowah 
refused to stop fighting for self-determination and saw this capitulation as an obstacle to their 
goal of continuing their tribal government. As a result they sought to remove Rogers by 
impeaching him due to his refusal to call the last tribal election and selecting Frank J. Boudinot as 
the new chief. However, the US refused to recognize Boudinot as the leader of the Cherokees and 
the dissolution of the tribal government under Rogers continued.  
 A Boudinot working with the Traditionals/Keetoowah illustrates an early shift in 
leadership and a greater willingness to work together regardless of previous feuds between 
factions. Frank J. Boudinot was a descendant of Stand Watie, Elias Boudinot, and the Ridges who 
had signed the Treaty of New Echota that resulted in Cherokee removal during the Trail of Tears. 
These actions resulted in assassinations and several years of violence between the Treaty Party 
and Traditionals. However, in the early twentieth century, as the previous leaders and their 
children had passed, leaders such as Boudinot did not experience the same events that led to the 
violence and worked with Traditionals as they held the common goal of continuing Cherokee 
self-determination. This collaboration serves as another early indicator of the cross-factional 
cooperation that was possible and occurred in the 1920s. 
 Even though Boudinot and the Traditionals viewed Rogers as an obstacle to their 
continued opposition to allotment and dissolution of the tribal government, he was not solely 
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blamed for the assimilation policies as the Treaty Party had been held responsible for the 
Cherokee Trail of Tears. This less direct blame for assimilation also fostered easier cooperation 
between groups. 
 With the US refusing to recognize Boudinot and officially ending the tribal government, 
the Cherokee split into community-level groups that served as de facto governments for closely 
residing citizens. In 1905 the Keetoowah applied for and acquired a corporate charter to function 
as a business to be able to handle the finances of the Cherokee in the absence of a tribal 
government. Funding proved vital as many Cherokee struggled with day to day survival. The 
Keetoowah Society, Incorporated worked within the US Court of Claims to sue for funds owed to 
the tribe. Other organizations, such as the Cherokee Executive Council, the Eastern and Western 
Cherokee, Tulsa Contingent, and the Cherokee Executive Committee also functioned as 
businesses to attempt to aid their destitute people.  
 The level of poverty caused by allotment, as well as the shared experience of leaders in 
caring for their elders, families, and communities led to the unification of the various groups. This 
new generation lacked the memories of violent feuding factions and had all endured allotment 
and the dissolution of the tribal governments and witnessed the desperate conditions of their 
people. As a result, they were more willing to work together for the good of all Cherokee people. 
Sam Smith, leader of the Nighthawk Keetoowah, called for the initial meeting to unify all the 
factions. Interestingly, the Nighthawks had been the first to withdraw from the rest of the factions 
in the early years of the twentieth century to focus solely on religion and living traditionally. The 
Nighthawks now argued that they needed to all work together as they shared a common goal, as 
well as the need to collaborate with those educated in Anglo American business and law. The 
several groups of Keetoowah, as well as the other community organizations, collaborated and all 
selected Levi Gritts as their chief. Even though the US refused to recognize or work with Gritts, 
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this work towards unification proved advantageous as it enabled the Cherokee to easier capitalize 
on the favorable US Indian policy of the Indian New Deal.  
 As the Cherokee factions unified, a new class of reformers and government officials, 
such as John Collier, began studying and publishing reports on the failure of assimilation policies. 
As a result, US Indian policy shifts and becomes more supportive of native self-determination. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 [IRA] served to provide much needed financial aid to 
tribes as well as allowed the reorganization of their governments. Despite the exclusion of the 
Five Tribes from the IRA, Gritts travelled to Washington, DC, immediately to lobby for 
Cherokee inclusion. The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA) passed in 1936, enabling the 
Five Tribes to take advantage of similar policies. The Keetoowah applied for the reorganization 
of a tribal government for the Cherokee. With delays resulting from the confusion of US officials 
regarding Cherokee history and their factions, the Keetoowah finally received approval for their 
new constitution and the US recognized them as the government for the Cherokee in 1950. Until 
the 1970s, this government that resulted from the unified factions in the 1920s served as the tribal 
government for the Cherokees. Without the collaboration of the 1920s, the Cherokee would not 
have been able to reorganize under the OIWA. 
 This work combines the study of the external pressures on the Cherokee such as federal 
Indian policy as well as internal pressures on tribal leaders from resulting various reactions, as 
well as provides a missing chronicle of the Cherokee to existing historiography by not only 
covering the early to mid twentieth century but also by discussing their intratribal factionalism 
and overcoming such conflicts to reorganize under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.  
 Previous research ends after the Curtis Act for multiple reasons. First, sources are scarce 
after the US terminated recognition of tribal governments. Without a centralized institution with 
dedicated recordkeeping and storage, records, legal documents, petitions, and personal papers of 
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tribal leaders ceased to be kept together. The National Council no longer existed to provide 
summaries of its proceedings. After 1906, if leaders needed to disseminate information to the 
Cherokee people they published their announcements in local newspapers. As a result, 
newspapers serve as the bulk of sources for this time period and often it is only fragments of 
events. Tribal and museum archives do not possess personal letters or writings of the Cherokee 
from this time period, most likely from the focus on day to day survival by the people suffering 
from hardship caused by the assimilation policies. A later interview of Keetoowah leader Levi 
Gritts was taken in the mid twentieth century and serves as one of the only written firsthand 
account of the time period by a Cherokee. A lack of sources causes the research of this time 
period to be very difficult, spotty, and tedious.   
 Secondly, many policies affected several tribes at once and it remains difficult to speak 
on one tribe without including concurrent events with others. For example, allotment affected 
many more tribes other than the Cherokee but the experience and reaction of the people varies 
from tribe to tribe. Some policies included two unrelated tribes together, such as settling on the 
same lands, while at the same time another act may include another two tribes. This creates 
confusion in not only research but also in writing a coherent narrative of a manageable length.  
 The events of the early twentieth century are also utilized today in the struggle for 
authority between two factions of the Cherokee. As a result, many histories are told in a biased 
manner, contradictory to each other and favoring each group's right to tribal control. The 
Cherokee Nation cites itself as the same, continuous government created by the constitution in 
1828. The UKB argues that the government created in 1828 ended when the Curtis Act abolished 
it in 1906. The Keetoowah government, recognized by federal charter then with an approved 
constitution in 1950, served as the tribal authority. Historians have not fully examined the logic of 
both sides and individual Cherokees cite one history over the other, usually depending on their 
personal membership. Other historians indirectly comment on the two governments by only 
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mentioning one in their conclusion, usually that of the Cherokee Nation. Rose Stremlau writes as 
concludes her work stating that the Cherokee had no formal government until the new 
constitution in the 1970s. Jon S. Blackman briefly quotes other tribes as having disputes over 
whether Progressives or Traditionals should run their new governments, but does not go into 
detail or mention that of the Cherokees. The lack of historiography likely occurs because of the 
previously mentioned lack of sources as well as strong personal biases within the tribe.   
 Lastly, general American Indian history of reorganization of tribal governments under the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, intratribal factionalism, ethnoregenesis, and general tribal political 
history during the early to mid twentieth century remain scarce. Once tribal governments are 
abolished, not much is written on the community level organizations that continued to care for 
their people. Historiography covers code talkers and native participation in the world wars, 
federal boarding schools, allotment, and corruption in the US government as those topics have an 
abundance of sources available. This dissertation not only fills in the deficit of native history in 
the early twentieth century, it also chronicles the importance of previously contentious relations 
shifting to amicable cooperation under intense external pressure from assimilation policies. 
During a low point of Cherokee history including destitution and a lack of tribal government, 
leaders used their shared experience to cooperation and organize at the grassroots level to care for 
their people and regain self-determination. As a result of the collaboration as well as experience 
with constitutional government, the Cherokee were better prepared to take advantage once more 
favorable US Indian policy emerged. 
 Plenty of opportunities exist for further study during this time period and topic. The 
collaboration of factions occurred both in the 1870s and 1920s and a study comparing and 
contrasting the leaders and effectiveness of both would provide further depth to Cherokee history. 
Incorporating the experience of other tribes affected by these same policies with similar factional 
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conflicts and tribal governments, such as the Creek, would illustrate a uniqueness or similarity of 
the experience of different tribes to similar policies.  
 Overall, rather than passively accepting the dissolution of their government fighting 
among themselves, the Cherokees worked together under the Keetoowahs to maintain and regain 
their self-determination in the early twentieth century. Without this action and unity, the 
Cherokee would have lost any autonomy or organization to provide the services of a tribal 
government, such as distributing funds and providing the Cherokee a voice and representation to 
















 The Keetoowah people ratified their constitution and the federal corporate charter on 
October 3. 1950. By 1963, the Bureau of Indian Affairs began using the Keetoowah as a conduit 
for federal funding to the Cherokees as they existed as the only official Cherokee entity in 
Oklahoma until the 1970s. After forty-four years without a recognized central authority, the 




 Just two decades after moving away from assimilation ideology, the US changed its 
Indian policy once again. FDR's Indian New Deal ended as World War II turned the nation's 
attention from domestic issues to the war abroad. A high turnover in the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
led to an influx of new workers who knew nothing of American Indians, further halting forward 
progress for natives. US interest in Indian reorganization dwindled and in 1945 Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs John Collier resigned.
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 After Collier's resignation and that of his supporter, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes in 
1946, the US moved towards a new policy of "termination." Termination served as another form 
of assimilating the indigenous into mainstream non-native society with the goal of ending the 
responsibility of the federal government for Indian affairs by ending the "ward" status. 
Termination consisted of four actions: repealing laws that set natives apart from other citizens, 
such as land restrictions; ending services of the BIA and transferring those duties to state, local, 
and tribal governments; freeing indigenous people from federal supervision and guardianship; 
and terminating US responsibility for the affairs of individual tribes. As a result, advances toward 




 The new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dillon S. Myer, and his successor, Glenn L. 
Emmons, launched the termination policy. In addition to ending federal responsibility for natives, 
the new policy sought to assimilate indigenous people into mainstream white society by sending 
American Indians to cities to find work. The BIA also discontinued agricultural assistance to 
further motivate people to move to cities. Before, the assimilation policy of the late-nineteenth 
century sought to integrate natives through creating individual, yeoman farmers. Termination, 
with the same general goals, instead modernized and pushed natives to become wage laborers.
4
  
 By the 1960s, the termination policy was judged a failure with American Indians 
remaining in poverty. In addition, the rise of civil rights movements by groups such as the 
American Indian Movement or the Indians of All Tribes and their actions like the occupation of 
Alcatraz and siege of Wounded Knee, brought public and government attention to the plight of 
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the indigenous. President Richard Nixon acknowledged the constant difficulties a 1970 speech 
stating that,  
The first Americans—the Indians—are the most deprived and most isolated 
minority group in our nation. On virtually every scale of measurement—
employment, income, education, health—the condition of the Indian people ranks 
at the bottom. This condition is the heritage of centuries of injustice. From the 
time of their first contact with European settlers, the American Indians have been 
oppressed and brutalized, deprived of their ancestral lands, and denied the 
opportunity to control their own destiny.
5
 
Nixon advocated for the end of forcing assimilation on natives and instead supported tribal self-
determination.  
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 officially made 
tribal self-determination the focus of the federal government. The act shifted control of previously 
federally-run programs to the tribes. In exchange for tribes setting up certain services, such as law 
enforcement and childcare, the tribes, according to guidelines of the act, would receive funding 
for programs. At first, the BIA resisted this loss of influence, but, eventually it relented. The 
Supreme Court further strengthened the act by ruling the federal government liable for the 
promised funding in Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt (2004) after Congress failed to appropriate 
sufficient funds.
6
    
In 1970, Nixon authorized the appointed chiefs of the Five Tribes to call for elections for 
their tribes. The UKB made no action since they already had a constitutional, recognized tribal 
government. However, W. W. Keeler called for an election and was chosen in 1971 to the 
position he had held as an appointee for more than twenty years. Despite his promises in the late 
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The Cherokee Nation had been abolished as a tribal government in 1906 according to the 
Curtis Act. However, the US president continued to appoint "chiefs for a day" to continue 
handling allotment land deeds and providing a signature. Despite the end of allotment with the 
Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, President Truman appointed another chief, Keeler, in 1948. 
With this redundant appointment, Truman (and Keeler through his refusal to step down) 
essentially created the modern two government dilemma. In 1971, Keeler became chief while the 
UKB also had a chief. Later UKB Chief John Hair expressed the confusion many had when he 
proclaimed, "I don't really know why they set up Cherokee Nation."
8
 Keeler continued the "chief 
for a day" role needed by the US since passage of the allotment policy while the UKB labored to 
organize under the OIWA to represent all Cherokee people. 
After the election of Keeler, the Cherokee Nation adopted a new constitution. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Morris Thompson approved it in September 1975. The Nation 
stated the new governing document superseded the old constitution of 1839. A history printed 
during the summer of 1990 in the Cherokee Advocate asserted the new law also ended "the rights 
of all Cherokees to belong to clans or organizations within the Cherokee Nation." However, in the 
actual constitution, Section XIV dictates that "nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to 
prohibit the right of any Cherokee to belong to a recognized clan or organization in the Cherokee 
Nation."
9
 In other words, the Cherokee could belong to one or more of the various factions.   
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The Nation considered the UKB a small, separate group rather than the representative of 
all Cherokees, even when they had been the only recognized government from 1950 to 1970, and 
had a corporate charter since 1905. The Nation argued it was the only authority for all Cherokee 
since 1839, and used Frederick Kirgis' denial of the first Keetoowah attempt to organize under the 
OIWA to delegitimize the UKB in the 1970s. Kirgis had stated the reason for his denial was that 
none of the Keetoowah factions had ever been a governing unit of the Cherokee Nation.
10
 
However, Kirgis' decision had been overturned and the UKB had adopted a constitution approved 
by the US. In addition, the US distributed federal funds for all Cherokee to the UKB since the 
1950s. The Nation eventually denied it was ever terminated by the US, stating the Five Tribes Act 
kept that government active, although in a different format than their previous constitutional 
republic with presidentially appointed chiefs. As a result, the Nation's government never ended 
and the UKB served as just a separate clan.
11
 
By 1979, relations between the UKB and Nation became strained. The Indian Self-
determination Act of 1975 allowed the Nation to contract directly with the BIA for services. 
Before, the UKB had been the only entity of the tribe able to work with the US. Despite the 
federal government working with the Nation, the UKB leadership maintained they should be dealt 
with separately from the Nation. Since 1950, all funds and services had been funneled through the 
UKB and now the two governments lobbied for the same benefits.  
In 1979, Cherokee Nation Chief Ross O. Swimmer authored a lengthy letter arguing, "the 
only way of avoiding serious conflicts and complications for all Cherokees is for Congress to act 
in accordance with Article 8 of their corporate charter which says their charter may be revoked by 
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an Act of Congress.
12
 Congress never revoked the UKB charter. However, the Director the Office 
of Indian Services, Theodore Krenzke, stated that the UKB had organized under the OIWA and 
"clearly has the status of a separate tribal entity."
13
 Julia Coates, Tribal Councilor for the Nation 
from 2007-2015, stated that the fact that the UKB organized under the name the Keetoowah 
Indians of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma shows that they considered themselves part of the 
existing Nation, not over it. They organized solely for economic reasons, and in working often 
with Chief Keeler, acknowledged the existence of the Nation's government.
14
 
The UKB now, however, disputes the Nation's view of its organization under OIWA. The 
UKB views the Nation as terminated in 1906. They argued that the UKB organized and existed as 
the only Cherokee government after this point in history. In addition, they argue that their 1950 
constitution served all those with the old Cherokee Nation. As a result, the UKB considers itself 
the only legitimate government.
15
  
Since 1980, the BIA has held the position that the UKB has the same membership as the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, meaning they are of the same people. Both governments are 
currently federally recognized. Modern disputes between the UKB and Nation center on the 
legality of a UKB casino and its right to issue tribal tags. In addition, controversy erupted with 
the Nation's attempt to renegotiate or alter the Treaty of 1866, as the UKB believed the they had 
no authority to do so without the Keetoowah. The Treaty of 1866 forced the Cherokee Nation to 
grant freedmen full tribal citizenship. In the 1980s, the Cherokee Nation stripped freedmen 
ancestors of citizenship and voting rights. Numerous court cases emerged, both within Cherokee 
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and US courts. The basis of the status of freedmen ancestors came from the Treaty of 1866, 
which the Cherokee Nation wanted to renegotiate. The UKB asserted the Nation had no authority 
for such negotiations without them. In 2017 the US District Court ruled in favor of the freedmen 
descendants, granting them full rights to tribal citizenship, which the Cherokee Nation accepted.
16
  
Other than the autobiographies of tribal leaders, since the 1970s, historians have yet to 
analyze this modern issue of two governments for the Cherokees in Oklahoma. Those who do 
mention it in their epilogues ignore the UKB organization completely, similar to Rose Stremlau, 
who states the Cherokee did not have a federally recognized tribal government until the 1970s. 
Georgia Rae Leeds and Allogan Slagle, two of the few authors on Keetoowah history, provide 
more details from the UKB point of view. Jon S. Blackman acknowledges the UKB organized 
under the OIWA and passed a constitution in 1950, but treats them separately from the Cherokee 
Nation as more of a small clan.
17
  
Blackman argues in Oklahoma's Indian New Deal that the biggest impact the OIWA 
made on tribal government other than federal recognition was that it taught Oklahoma Indians 
how to function and make decisions through a constitutional government. He continues to state 
that most Oklahoma tribes did not organize under OIWA because they were not used to working 
together within the structure of a republic and the law created or worsened factionalism within the 
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tribes as it enabled Progressives, who were more familiar with Anglo style government, to 
completely take over the decision making process.
18
  
This sweeping generalization of all Oklahoma tribes does not take into consideration the 
Cherokee. Blackman does recognize that the Keetoowah Cherokees organized under the new 
legislation, but fails to note that it did not create or increase factionalism among them.  
Organization under the OIWA with a corporate charter ran more smoothly for the Cherokees 
because they already had one hundred years of experience with Anglo-style government. They 
had been making decisions within a constitutional government with three branches since the first 
half of the nineteenth century. The tribe did experience intense factionalism after the creation of 
that government, similar to what Blackman describes happening to other tribes in Oklahoma after 
the OIWA, but did not affect their organization in the 1930s. In fact, the opposite happened. After 
a slight confusion of which group should be recognized, Cherokee organizations came together 
and submitted a charter as the United Keetoowah Band. 
An interesting missing history is a comparative study of tribal factionalism between tribes 
that had an Anglo-style constitutional republic prior to the General Allotment Act and those who 
remained community-oriented and/or matrilineal. Previous to the adoption of the 1828 
constitution, the Cherokees made decisions as a community. Those who disagreed showed their 
disproval by leaving or refusing to vote on an issue. Organized factions functioned as political 
parties, with a hatred so intense it developed into extreme violence at times. A study to see if 
factionalism became more popular after adopting Anglo-style government would prove an 
interesting addition to the needed growth of histories chronicling American Indian reactions to 
US policies.  
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Although plenty of room exists for future studies in indigenous communities and tribal 
governments in the early twentieth century, this study adds to the chronicle of the resilient 
Cherokee leadership of the era following tribal government termination. Rather than passively 
accepting the dissolution of their government fighting among themselves, the Cherokees worked 
together under the Keetoowahs to maintain and regain their sovereignty in the early twentieth 
century. Without this action and unity, the Cherokee Nation would have lost any autonomy or 
organization to provide the services of a tribal government, such as distributing funds and 
providing the Cherokees a voice and representation to the US government, until the tribal self-
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John Ross, 1828-66 
Major Thomas Peggs, 1862-63 (temporary chief during American Civil War), Northern faction 
Stand Watie, 1861-65, Southern faction 
Smith Christie, 1863 (temporary chief during American Civil War), Northern faction 
Lewis Downing, 1864-66 (temporary chief during American Civil War), Northern faction 
W. P. Ross, 1866-67 
Lewis Downing, 1867-72 
W. P. Ross, 1872-75 
Charles Thompson, 1875-79 
Dennis W. Bushyhead, 1879-88 
Joel B. Mayes, 1888-91 
Colonel Johnson Harris, 1891-95 
Samuel H. Mayes, 1895-99 
T.  M. Buffington, 1899-1903 
William C. Rogers, 1903-07 
Frank J. Boudinot (never recognized by the US, deposed), 1905 
W. W. Keeler, 1971-75 
Ross Swimmer, 1975-85 
Wilma Mankiller, 1985-95 
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Joe Byrd, 1995-99 
Chadwick Smith, 1999-2011 
Bill John Baker, 2011-present 
Old Settler, Western Cherokees 
John Jolly, 1819-38 
John Rogers, 1838-39 
John Looney, 1838-April 1839, July 1839-September 1839 when East and West Cherokees 
combined. 
Keetoowah  
Redbird Smith, 1906-1919, Nighthawk Keetoowahs 
Stoke Smith, 1919-unknown, Keetoowah Society, Inc. and later Nighthawks 
Levi Gritts, 1920s, various Keetoowah band coalitions 
John Hitcher, United Keetoowah Band, 1939-46 
Jim Pickup, United Keetoowah Band, 1946-54  
Jeff Tindle, United Keetoowah Band, 1954-60 
Jim Pickup, United Keetoowah Band, 1960-67 
William Glory, United Keetoowah Band, 1967-79 
James L. Gordon, United Keetoowah Band, 1979-83 
John Hair, United Keetoowah Band, 1983-91 
John Ross, United Keetoowah Band, 1991-95 
Jim Henson, United Keetoowah Band, 1996-2000 
Dallas Proctor, United Keetoowah Band, 2000-04 
George Wickliffe, United Keetoowah Band, 2005-present 
Appointed by US Government, "Chief for a Day" 
Andrew Bell Cunningham, November 8-25, 1919 
Edward M. Fry, June 23, 1923 
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Richard B. Choate, 1925 
Charles J. Hunt, December 27, 1928 
Oliver P. Brewer, May 26, 1931 
William W. Hastings, 1936 
Jesse B. Milam, 1941 to 1949 









Faction Names  
Treaty Party 
 Also known as Watie's followers, the Southern Party, Knights of the Golden Circle, 
Southern Rights Party, during the American Civil War. Also known as Progressives, those who 
were more assimilated into non-native American culture. 
 
Ross Party 
 Also known as Traditionalists, lived separately from non-native society and believed in a 
return to traditional customs and religion. 
 
Keetoowah or Pin Indians (During American Civil War) 
 Several followers of Ross, Traditionals, continued to fight for the American Union during 
the Civil War. 
 
Downing Party 
 Formed by John B. Jones to oppose William P. Ross in 1867. Charles Thompson in 
election of 1875. David Rowe for chief in 1879. Thomas Buffington in 1899. W.C. Rogers in 
1903. Rogers and Downing Party called the Democrats of the nation. 
 
Bell-Boudinot Party 
 Watie's followers. After Watie's death in 1871, James M. Bell became leader. Mostly 
related by family ties and Civil War alliances, opposed William P. Ross (Chief at the time) and 
was against the Downing Party. They remained an alienated group throughout the 1870s and 
lobbied for the opening of Indian Territory. They never formed a complete opposition political 
party.  
 
National Independent Party 
 Political party in 1879 led by Dennis Bushyhead and Rabbit Bunch to oppose Ross and 
the Downing Party. Dennis Bushyhead for chief in 1879. Rabbit Bunch for chief in 1887. 
 
National Party 
 William P. Ross as candidate for chief in 1875, Wolf Coon in 1899. E. L. Cookson in 
1903. D. W. Bushyhead, allied with the Keetoowah in 1887. Called themselves the Republican 
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Party of the Cherokees. Changed its name to the Keetoowah Society of National Party of the 
Cherokee Nation in 1899 when the National Party and Keetoowah Society combined.  
 
Keetoowah Society (political party) 
  In 1870s, joined with Downing Party to oppose Progressive corruption. Opposed 
allotment until the early 1900s. 
 
Nighthawk Keetoowah Society 





























Cherokee Blood Law  
Whereas;  a  law has been in existence for many years, but not committed to writing, that if any 
citizen or citizens of this Nation should treat and dispose of any lands belonging to this Nation 
without special permission from the National authorities, he or they shall suffer death;  
Therefore;  resolved, by the Committee and Council, in General Council convened,  that any 
person or persons who shall, contrary to the will and consent of the legislative council of this 
Nation in general council convened, enter into a treaty with any commissioner or commissioners 
of the United States, or any officers instructed for that purpose, and agree to sell or dispose of any 
part or portion of the National lands defined in this Constitution of this Nation, he or they so 
offending, upon conviction before any of the circuit judges aforesaid are authorized to call a court 
for the trial of any such person or persons so transgressing.  
Be it Further Resolved;  that any person or persons, who shall violate the provisions of this act, 
and shall refuse, by resistance, to appear at the place designated for trial, or abscond, are hereby 
declared to be outlaws; and any person or persons, citizens of this Nation, may kill him or them 
so offending, in any manner most convenient, within the limits of this Nation, and shall not be 
held accountable for the same.  
    Passed by the Cherokee General  Council on October 24, 1829 
This was the law that was followed  by Cherokee citizens when they executed John Ridge,  Elias 








Relevant Aspects of the Curtis Act, June 28, 1828 
SEC. 14 
For the purposes of this section all the laws of said State of Arkansas herein referred to, so far as 
applicable, are hereby put in force in said Territory; and the United States court therein shall have 
jurisdiction to enforce the same, and to punish any violation thereof, and the city or town councils 
shall pass such ordinances as may be necessary for the purpose of making the laws extended over 
them applicable to them and for carrying the same into effect 
SEC. 16 
That it shall be unlawful for any person, after the passage of this Act, except as hereinafter 
provided, to claim, demand, or receive, for his own use or for the use of anyone else, any royalty 
on oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral, or on any timber or lumber, or any other kind of property 
whatsoever, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in 
said Territory, or for anyone to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any 
consideration therefor whatsoever; and all royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall 
be paid, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, 
into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe to which they belong: 
SEC. 19 
That no payment of any moneys on any account whatever shall hereafter be made by the United 
States to any of the tribal governments or to any officer thereof for disbursement, but payments of 
all sums to members of said tribes shall be made under directi 
SEC. 21 
That in making rolls of citizenship of the several tribes, as required by law, the Commission to 
the Five Civilized Tribes is authorized and directed to take the roll of Cherokee citizens of 
eighteen hundred and eighty (not including freedmen) as the only roll intended to be confirmed 
by this and preceding Acts of Congress, and to enroll all persons now living whose names are 
found on said roll, and all descendants born since the date of said roll to persons whose names are 
found thereon; and all persons who have been enrolled by the tribal authorities who have 
heretofore made permanent settlement in the Cherokee Nation whose parents, by reason of their 
Cherokee blood, have been lawfully admitted to citizenship by the tribal authorities, and who 
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were minors when their parents were so admitted; and they shall investigate the right of all other 
persons whose names are found on any other rolls and omit all such as may have been placed 
thereon by fraud or without authority of law, enrolling only such as may have lawful right thereto, 
and their descendants born since such rolls were made, with such intermarried white persons as 
may be entitled to citizenship under Cherokee laws. 
It shall make a roll of Cherokee freedmen in strict compliance with the decree of the Court of 
Claims rendered the third day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-six. 
SEC. 26 
That on and after the passage of this Act the laws of the various tribes or nations of Indians shall 
not be enforced at law or in equity by the courts of the United States in the Indian Territory. 
SEC. 27 
That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to locate one Indian inspector in Indian Territory, 
who may, under his authority and direction, perform any duties required of the Secretary of the 
Interior by law, relating to affairs therein. 
SEC. 28 
That on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, all tribal courts in Indian 
Territory shall be abolished, and no officer of said courts shall thereafter have any authority 
whatever to do or perform any act theretofore authorized by any law in connection with said 
courts, or to receive any pay for same; and all civil and criminal causes then pending in any such 
court shall be transferred to the United States court in said Territory by filing with the clerk of the 


















Relevant Portions of the Five Tribes Act, April 26, 1906 
SEC. 6 
That if the principal chief of the Choctaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole Tribe, or the governor 
of the Chickasaw Tribe shall refuse or neglect to perform the duties devolving upon him, he may 
be removed from office by the President of the United States, or if any such executive become 
permanently disabled, the office may be decleared vacant by the President of the United States, 
who may fill any vacancy arising from removal, disability or death of the incumbent, by 
appointment of a citizen by blood of the tribe. 
If any such executive shall fail, refuse or neglect, for thirty days after notice that any instrument is 
ready for his signature, to appear at a place to be designated by the Secretary of the Interior and 
execute the same, such instrument may be approved by the Secretary of the Interior without such 
execution, and when so approved and recorded shall convey legal title, and such approval shall be 
conclusive evidence that such executive or chief refused or neglected after notice to execute such 
instrument. 
SEC. 11 
That all revenues of whatever character accruing to the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, 
and Seminole Tribes, whether before or after dissolution of the tribal governments, shall, after the 
approval hereof, be collected by an officer appointed by the Secretary of the Interior under rules 
and regulations to be prescribed by him; and he shall cause to be paid all lawful claims against 
said tribes which may have been contracted after July first, nineteen hundred and two, or for 
which warrants have been regularly issued, such payments to be made from any funds in the 
United States Treasury belonging to said tribes. All such claims arising before dissolution of the 
tribal governments shall be presented to the Secretary of the Interior within six months after such 
dissolution, and he shall make all rules and regulations necessary to carry this provision into 
effect and shall pay all expenses incident to the investigation of the validity of such claims or 
indebtedness out of the tribal funds: Provided, That all taxes accruing under tribal laws or 
regulations of the Secretary of the Interior shall be abolished from and after December thirty-first, 
nineteen hundred and five, but this provision shall not prevent the collection after that date nor 
after dissolution of the tribal government of all such taxes due up to and including December 
thirty-first, nineteen hundred and five, and all such taxes levied and collected after the thirty-first 
day of December, nineteen hundred and five, shall be refunded. 
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Upon dissolution of the tribal governments, every officer, member, or representative of said 
tribes, respectively, having in his possession, custody, or control any money or other property of 
any tribe shall make full and true account and report thereof to the Secretary of the Interior, and 
shall pay all money of the tribe in his possession, custody, or control, and shall deliver all other 
tribal property so held by him, to the Secretary of the Interior, and if any person shall willfully 
and fraudulently fail to account for all such money and property 
so held by him, or to pay and deliver the same as herein provided for sixty days from dissolution 
of the tribal government, he shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement and upon conviction thereof 
shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars or by imprisonment not 
exceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, according to the laws of the United 
States relating to such offense, and shall be liable in civil proceedings to be prosecuted in behalf 
of and in the name of the tribe for the amount or value of the money or property so withheld. 
SEC. 15 
The Secretary of the Interior shall take possession of all buildings now or heretofore used for 
governmental, school, and other tribal purposes, together with the furniture therein and the land 
appertaining thereto, and appraise and sell the same at such time and under such rules and 
regulations as he may prescribe, and deposit the proceeds, less expenses incident to the 
appraisement and sale, in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the respective 
tribes: Provided, That in the event said lands are embraced within the geographical limits of a 
State or Territory of the United States, such State or Territory or any county or municipality 
therein shall be allowed one year from date of establishment of said State or Territory within 
which to purchase any such lands and improvements within their respective limits at not less than 
the appraised value. Conveyances of lands disposed of under this section shall be executed, 
recorded, and delivered in like manner and with like effect as herein provided for other 
conveyances. 
SEC. 18 
That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to bring suit in the name of the United 
States, for the use of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole tribes, respectively, 
either before or after the dissolution of the tribal governments, for the collection of any moneys or 
recovery of any land claimed by any of said tribes, whether such claim shall arise prior to or after 
the dissolution of the tribal governments, and the United States courts in Indian Territory are 
hereby given jurisdiction to try and determine all such suits, and the Secretary of the Interior is 
authorized to pay from the funds of the tribe interested any costs and necessary expenses incurred 
in maintaining and prosecuting such suits: Provided, That proceedings to which any of said tribes 
is a party pending before any court or tribunal at the date of dissolution of the tribal governments 






That no full-blood. Indian of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole tribes shall 
have power to alienate, sell, dispose of, or encumber in any manner any of the lands allotted to 
him for a period of twenty-five years from and after the passage and approval of this act, unless 
such restriction shall, prior to the expiration of said period, be removed by act of Congress; and 
for all purposes the quantum of Indian blood possessed by any member of said tribes shall be 
determined by the rolls of citizens of said tribes approved by the Secretary of the Interior… 
SEC. 27 
That the lands belonging to the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole Tribes, upon 
the dissolution of said tribes, shall not become public lands nor property of the United States, but 
shall be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians respectively 
comprising each of said tribes, and their heirs as the same shall appear by the rolls as finally 
concluded as heretofore and hereinafter provided for: Provided, That nothing herein contained 
shall interfere with any allotments heretofore or hereafter made or to be made under the 
provisions of this or any other act of Congress. 
SEC. 28 
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, 
Creek, and Seminole Tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect for all 
purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or legislature 
in any of said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than thirty days in any 
one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (except resolutions of adjournment) of 
the tribal council or legislature of any of said tribes or nations shall be of any validity until 
approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That no contract involving the 
payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any property belonging to any of said tribes or 
nations made by them or any of them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until 
approved by the President of the United States. 
SEC. 29 















Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 1936 
Portions relevant to tribal self-government 
SEC. 3. 
Any recognized tribe or band of Indians residing in Oklahoma shall have the right to organize for 
its common welfare and to adopt a constitution and bylaws, under such rules and regulations as 
the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe. The Secretary of the Interior may issue to any such 
organized group a charter of incorporation, which shall become operative when ratified by a 
majority vote of the adult members of the organization voting: Provided, however, That such 
election shall be void unless the total vote cast be at least 30 per centum of those entitled to vote. 
Such charter may convey to the incorporated group, in addition to any powers which may 
properly be vested in a body corporate under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, the right to 
participate in the revolving credit fund, and to enjoy any other rights or privileges secured to an 
organized Indian tribe under the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984): Provided, That the corporate 
funds of any such chartered group may be deposited in any national bank within the State of 
Oklahoma or otherwise invested, utilized, or disbursed in accordance with the terms of the 
corporate charter. 
SEC. 4. 
Any ten or more Indians, as determined by the official tribal rolls, or Indian descendants of such 
enrolled members, or Indians as defined in the Act of June 18,1934 (48 Stat.984), who reside 
214 
 
within the State of Oklahoma in convenient proximity to each other may receive from the 
Secretary of the Interior a charter as a local cooperative association for any one or more of the 
following purposes: Credit administration, production, marketing, consumers’ protection, or land 
management. The provisions of this Act, the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, and the 
charters of the cooperative associations issued pursuant thereto shall govern such cooperative 
associations: Provided, That in those matters not covered by said Act, regulations, or charters, the 
laws of the State of Oklahoma, if applicable, shall govern. In any stock or nonstock cooperative 
association no one member shall have more than one vote, and membership therein shall be open 
to all Indians residing within the prescribed district. 
SEC. 5. 
The charters of any cooperative association organized pursuant to this Act shall not be amended 
or revoked by the Secretary except after a majority vote of the membership. Such cooperative 
associations may sue and be sued in any court of the State of Oklahoma or of the United States 
having jurisdiction of the cause of action, but a certified copy of all papers filed in any action 
against a cooperative association in a court of Oklahoma shall be served upon the Secretary of the 
Interior, or upon an employee duly authorized by him to receive such service. Within thirty days 
after such service or within such extended time as the trial court may permit, the Secretary of the 
Interior may intervene in such action or may remove such action to the United States district court 
to be held in the district where such petition is pending by filing in such action in the State court a 
petition for such removal, together with the certified copy of the papers served upon the 
Secretary. It shall then be the duty of the State court to accept such petition and to proceed no 
further in such action. The said copy shall be entered in the said district court within thiry 
1
 days 
after the filing of the petition for removal, and the said district court is hereby given jurisdiction 
to hear and determine said action. 
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The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent 
herewith are hereby repealed.   
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